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I. INTRODUCTION
The Florida Legislature extensively amended the provisions of the Flor-
ida Business Corporation Act ("FBCA") dealing with rights of appraisal first
in 2003,2 then again in 2004,' and 2005.4 The FBCA adopts, verbatim, the
* Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center of Nova Southeastern University; B.
A., Cornell University; J.D., Boston College. Professor Cane has served as Chair of the Cor-
porations/Securities Committee of The Florida Bar Business Law Section. She is a member of
the American Law Institute and a Fellow of the American Bar Foundation. Professor Cane
wishes to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Ilya Torchinsky in the preparation of this
article.
+ Associate, Dilworth Paxson LLP, Washington D.C.; B. S., Nova Southeastern
University; J.D., Shepard Broad Law Center of Nova Southeastern University. Mr. Ferola is a
member of the firm's Corporate Department and Securities practice area. He is also a candi-
date for an LL.M. in Securities Regulation from Georgetown University.
1. Benjamin Franklin, The Whistle, in Tim OXFORD BOOK OF AMERICAN ESSAYS 4, 6
(Brander Matthews ed., 1914) (emphasis added).
2. Act effective Oct. 1, 2003, ch. 2003-283, §§ 21-44, 2003 Fla. Laws 2902, 2914-31.
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language of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act ("RMBCA")
amendments with certain significant exceptions. The RMBCA amendments
in 1998 made major changes to appraisal procedures and terminology.' For
example, the RMBCA's new formulation does not use the term "dissenter"
and requires shareholders to "perfect" their claim by sending a "certification"
plus their stock certificates.'
The key distinction this article will address is that, whereas the RMBCA
explicitly states that "fair value" shall be computed "without discounting for
lack of marketability or minority status, 7 the FBCA limits this language to
apply only to a corporation with ten or fewer shareholders.
This could create an inference that in appraisal proceedings involving
corporations with more than ten shareholders, such discounts should apply.
As amended in 2003, the Florida statute eliminated the language concerning
discounting, breaking completely with the RMBCA model on this issue.9
Additionally, in 2005, the FBCA included RMBCA's concept of denying
discounts in appraisal proceedings, but only for corporations with ten or
fewer shareholders. 0
3. Act effective June 24, 2004, ch. 2004-378, 2004 Fla. Laws 2881.
4. Act effective June 20, 2005, ch. 2005-267, 2005 Fla. Laws 2425.
5. See Committee on Corporate Laws, Section of Business Law, Proposed Changes in
the Model Business Corporation Act-Appraisal Rights, 54 Bus. LAW. 209, 209 (1998).
6. Id. at 238-39.
7. MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 13.01(4)(iii) (2005).
8. FLA. STAT. § 607.1301(4)(c) (2005).
9. Act Effective Oct. 1, 2003, ch. 2003-283, § 21, 2003 Fla. Laws 2902, 2914-15
(amending FLA. STAT. § 607.1301).
10. MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 13.01(4)(iii) (2005); FLA. STAT. § 607.1301(4)(c) (2005).
There was concern over the issue of appraisal rights by Florida Governor John Ellis "Jeb"
Bush that the change proposed to eliminate minority discounts was designed to affect the
outcome of a certain pending lawsuit. Letter from Jeb Bush, Governor, State of Florida, to
Glenda E. Hood, Secretary of State, Florida Department of State (June 20, 2005), available at
http://www.flabuslaw.orglindex.php?/Ilist.comnittees=4/1 (follow "Gov. Bush 6/20/05 Letter
re SB 1056/HB 595" hyperlink under "Committee Documents") [hereinafter Bush Letter]. He
was assured by State Represenative J. Dudley Goodlette that the legislation was not designed
to do that, but rather, as Representative Goodlette wrote:
I am comforted by the fact that provisions substantially like those amendments, derived from
the Revised Model Business Corporation Act, had been unsuccessfully introduced in earlier
legislative sessions and the Florida Bar's Business Section was only attempting to gain their
passage this time around. In fact, I was one of the sponsors of that earlier legislation. Thus, I
am assured that this was the sole motivation of the Florida Bar members involved in the draft-
ing, analysis and editing of the amendments.
Letter from J. Dudley Goodlette, Representative, District 76, State of Florida, to Jeb
Bush, Governor, State of Florida (June 17, 2005), available at http://floridataxlawyers.
org/pdf/goodletteSB 1056HB595_business-entities.pdf [hereinafter Goodlette letter].
[Vol. 30:3:333
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The official commentary to the RMBCA states that the statutory ap-
praisal remedy for shareholders should be available:
only when two conditions co-exist. First, the proposed corporate
action as approved by the majority will result in a fundamental
change in the shares to be affected by the action. Second, uncer-
tainty concerning the fair value of the affected shares may cause
reasonable persons to differ about the fairness of the terms of the
corporate action."
This means, generally, that the appraisal remedy is available in mergers,
share exchanges, and dispositions of assets other than in the ordinary course
of business. 2 Moreover, the new provisions reinstall a market exception for
publicly traded companies. 3 Specifically, the new provisions deny appraisal
rights in connection with any class of shares that is "[1]isted on the New
York Stock Exchange [NYSE] or the American Stock Exchange [AMEX] or
designated as a national market system security.., by the National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers [Automated Quotations] [NASDAQ]," or that is
held by 2000 or more shareholders and has a public float (number of shares
that are outstanding) "of at least $10 million, exclusive of the value of such
shares held by its subsidiaries, senior executives, directors, and beneficial
11. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr § 13.01 cmt. 1 (2005). Florida first adopted a modified ver-
sion of the Model Business Corporation Act, former Florida Statutes Chapter 607, in 1975.
FLA. STAT. ch. 607 (1975). Chapter 89-154, Laws of Florida, created the Florida Business
Corporation Act, the current Florida Statutes Chapter 607. See FLA. STAT. ch. 607 (2005).
This legislation, effective July 1990, revised, updated, and organized Florida Statutes Chapter
607. Id. It substantially followed the provisions of the Revised Model Business Corporation
Act ("RMBCA") adopted by the American Bar Association in 1984. Chapter 607 was
amended several times during the 1990s and early part of 2000. Specifically, Florida's dis-
senter's rights statute granted by Florida Statutes Chapter 607 was intended to protect share-
holders against coercion, in majority-approved transactions that radically altered the nature of
their investment in a corporation, by enabling them to dissent formally from certain funda-
mental corporate changes and demand payment from the corporation for the fair value of the
shares. The then revised statute, which set forth what corporate actions gave rise to dis-
senter's rights, was based in part on existing Florida Statutes, and incorporated certain provi-
sions of the RMBCA and the Georgia Business Corporation Code. Generally, the revised
dissenter's rights statute filled the procedural gap left in the prior statute by providing proce-
dures and time limits for both the corporation and the dissenting shareholder. If the dissenting
shareholders fail to comply with the statutory requirements, their right to determine fair value
of their shares terminates and they are bound by the corporate action. See generally Michael
V. Mitrione, Dissenters' Rights, in FLORIDA CORPORATE PRACTICE § 11.1 (4th ed. 2002).
12. FLA. STAT. § 607.1302(1) (2005).
13. § 607.1302(2)(a).
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shareholders owning more than 10 percent of such shares."' 4 The reason is
that with such liquidity the minority shareholders have a ready market for
their shares.
II. FLORIDA'S RIGHT OF APPRAISAL
A Florida statute carving out corporations with ten or fewer sharehold-
ers does not make sense. There is likely no market for shares in a corpora-
tion with eleven, twenty, or fifty shareholders. The logical distinction is
whether there is an established market for the shares to ensure liquidity. This
is the distinction drawn by the RMBCA. 5 If there is a ready market, there is
no need for the appraisal remedy; if there is not, there should be no minority
or marketability discounts applied.
A. Dissenter's Right Application
Under Florida Law, the right to appraisal applies to the following types
of corporate actions: first, the consummation of a merger or conversion re-
quiring a shareholder vote;' 6 second, upon disposition of assets requiring a
shareholder vote with certain exceptions; 17 third, "[c]onsummation of a share
exchange;"'" fourth, amendment to the articles which reduces the share-
holder's ownership interest to a fractional share;19 fifth, upon certain amend-
ments to the articles of incorporation merger and the like;2  finally, with re-
spect to a class of shares existing prior to October 1, 2003, which negatively
affects the shareholder in specified ways.2'
Under section 607.1302(1), shareholders who are entitled to vote on a
corporate action-whether because such shareholders have general voting
rights or because group voting provisions are triggered-are not entitled to
appraisal if the change will not alter the terms of the class or series of securi-
14. Id. Note that the RMBCA uses a $20 million float. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §
13.02(b)(l)(ii) (2005). Delaware law contains a market exception that is quite similar to the
1998 amendments to the RMBCA except that Delaware law contains no float requirement.
There are several important exceptions to the market exception under the RMBCA and the
Florida Statutes. See generally FLA. STAT. § 607.1302(2)(c)-(d) (2005); Richard A. Booth,
Minority Discounts and Control Premiums in Appraisal Proceedings, 57 Bus. LAW. 127
(2001).
15. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 13.02 cmt. 2 (2005).
16. FLA. STAT. § 607.1302(l)(a) (2005).
17. § 607.1302(l)(c).
18. § 607.1302(1)(b).
19. § 607.1302(l)(d).
20. § 607.1302(l)(e).
21. § 607.1302(l)(f).
[Vol. 30:3:333
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ties that they hold.22  Thus, statutory appraisal rights are not available for
shares of any class of the surviving corporation in a merger or any class of
shares that is not included in a share exchange.
B. General Considerations
A voluntary dissolution will not trigger an appraisal remedy because
such an action does not affect liquidation rights-the only rights that are
relevant following a shareholder vote to dissolve. Moreover, the new provi-
sions also eliminate appraisal in connection with amendments to the articles
of incorporation, with some grandfathering.23 Instead, the amended statute
permits corporations to delineate a list of transactions for which the corpora-
tion may voluntarily choose to provide appraisal by permitting a provision in
the articles of incorporation that eliminates, in whole or in part, statutory
appraisal rights for preferred shares.24
Generally, the value of a corporation as a whole should be determined
on the basis of what a willing purchaser, in an arms-length transaction,
would pay for the entity as an operating business.2' However, valuation
should take into account all relevant "factors, such as market value, asset
value, [going concern value and] future earning prospects .... After these
factors have been [evaluated] . . . they should then be weighed as to their
relative bearing upon the ultimate question of the fair value of the stock.
'
"
26
A shareholder "usually has a statutory right of ... appraisal" in a statutory
merger.27 "That is, a stockholder [typically holding a minority interest] who
objects to the terms of a merger may demand to be paid in cash the fair value
of his or her shares exclusive of any gain or loss that may arise from the
merger itself.,
21
22. See§ 607.1302(1).
23. § 607.1302(1)(e)-(f) (discussing a class of shares prescribed in the articles of incorpo-
ration prior to October 1, 2003).
24. Id.
25. 12B WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 5906.120 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2000). See generally, Timothy K. Bronza,
Reg'l Dir., Mgmt. Planning, Inc., Business Valuation for Corporate Law Practice (Feb. 16,
2005) (presentation to Corporate Finance class at Nova Southeastern University),
http://www.nsulaw.nova.edulfaculty/courses.cfm?ID=17 (follow "Business Valuation of the
Corporate Law Practice" hyperlink).
26. 12B FLETCHER, supra note 25, § 5906.120.
27. See Booth, supra note 14, at 127.
28. Id.
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C. Appraisal Remedy Purpose
The purpose of an appraisal is to ensure that "the price paid in a merger
is a fair one."'29
Most courts and commentators seem to agree that it is inappropriate to
apply a minority discount in the context of an appraisal proceeding
even though the fair market value of minority shares may be less than
the going concern value of those shares.... Thus the appraisal rem-
edy is founded on the possibility that market prices may be wrong. As
the Delaware Supreme Court has stated, the goal of an appraisal pro-
ceeding should be to determine the value of the corporation as a whole,
not the value of particular shares, and to award the found value per
share to all dissenting stockholders. 30
Thus, Delaware does not apply discounts in corporate appraisal pro-
ceedings.3 ' Moreover, the ALI Principles of Corporate Governance defines
fair value as the value of the shareholder's "proportionate interest in the cor-
poration, without any discount for minority status or, absent extraordinary
circumstances, lack of marketability.
'3 2
Minority shareholders are still shareholders. 33 The fact that a share-
holder is unlikely to exercise control is no reason to ascribe a diminished
value to her shares in a transaction which is involuntary as to such share-
holder.
In contradistinction to commentators, numerous state legislatures, and
state judicial interpretations, Florida's new statutory definition of "fair
value" omits the Model Act's proscription of a minority or marketability
discount except with respect to corporations with ten or fewer shareholders.34
This has opened the door to a multitude of disadvantageous results for the
minority shareholder seeking an appraisal remedy. Florida's revised statute
clearly goes against the overwhelming trend not to apply discounts in ap-
praisal proceedings generally.
Although many courts and commentators use the terms minority dis-
count and marketability discount more or less interchangeably, the two
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1144-45 (Del. 1989).
32. 2 PINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §
7.22 (1992).
33. Booth, supra note 14, at 127.
34. See Act effective June 20, 2005, ch. 2005-267, § 2, 2005 Fla. Laws 2425, 2434.
[Vol. 30:3:333
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are really quite distinct from each other. The idea of a minority dis-
count does not properly refer to the fact that minority shares ordinarily
will trade at a price that is less than the price that a controlling stock-
holder might command in a sale of control. Rather, the term minority
discount as properly understood refers to a discount from the price that
would be set for non-control shares in an active market simply because
they are minority shares and have no power to influence the govern-
ance of the corporation .... 35
Conversely, "a marketability discount refers to a discount from what a fair
trading price would be if there were an active market for the shares."36 Mar-
ketability discounts can also affect owners of large blocks of shares due to a
difficulty in the resale process "without affecting the market price."37
The 1998 Revised Model Business Corporation Act (RMBCA) states,
among other things, that discounts are inappropriate in appraisal transactions
as a whole.38 The RMBCA defines fair value as:
the value of the corporation's shares determined:
(i) immediately before the effectuation of the corporate action to which
the shareholder objects;
(ii) using customary and current valuation concepts and techniques gener-
ally employed for similar business in the context of the transaction requir-
ing appraisal; and
(iii) without discounting for lack of marketability or minority status .... 39
The drafters of the Model Act determined that discounts for marketabil-
ity or minority status are unsuitable because transactions which trigger ap-
praisal rights are those affecting the entire corporation, and such transactions
could not be prevented by minority shareholders.' ° This would result in a
double-whammy for the unfortunate minority shareholder. Not only can she
not prevent the transactions, such as a merger, but she is subject to a dimin-
ishment in the proportional value of her shares in what is effectively a forced
sale. Additionally, "the lead-in language ... is ... designed to adopt the
more modem view that appraisal should generally award a shareholder his or
35. Booth, supra note 14, at 130-31.
36. Id. at 131.
37. Id.
38. MODEL Bus. COrn. ACT § 13.01 cmt. 2 (2005).
39. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 13.01(4) (emphasis added).
40. MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 13.01 cmt. 2.
9
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her proportional interest in the corporation after valuing the corporation as a
whole, rather than the value of the shareholder's shares when valued
alone."'
The discounts can have a profound impact. For example, a combined
thirty percent minority interest discount and forty percent discount for lack of
marketability, which may be applied by appraisals, would render an eight-
share valued at $10 to be valued at $4.20. For example:
$10.00 Control Value per share
-3.00 Less minority interest discount (.30 x $10.00).
$7.00 Marketable minority value
-2.80 Less lack of marketability discount (.40 x $7.00)
$4.20 Per share value of non-marketable minority shares42
D. American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance
The ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance states "that the fair
value of shares in an appraisal proceeding should be determined 'without any
discount for minority status or, absent extraordinary circumstances, lack of
marketability." '4' It also states that the value should be determined "in the
context of the transaction giving rise to appraisal" and further states that
"'[t]his standard does not necessarily imply... that fair value should be de-
termined by the presumed outcome of a hypothetical competitive auction."
45
The ALI's official comment states that the "role of the appraisal remedy is to
assist shareholders to police conflicts of interest that may arise in connection
with the sale or disposition of [a] firm. In the absence of a conflict of inter-
est, less policy justification exists for upsetting the bargain reached between
[the buyer and seller.]"46 Typically a court would not reform a contract to
disturb the price set by the contracting parties, absent unconscionability.47
41. Id. "If, however, the corporation voluntarily grants appraisal rights for transactions
that do not affect the entire corporation-such as certain amendments to the articles of incor-
poration-the court should use its discretion in applying discounts if appropriate." Id.
42. See Linda B. Trugman, Trugman Valuation Assocs. Inc., Business Valuation, http:l/
nsulaw.nova.edu/faculty/syllabi/Novalawcorpfintrugman.ppt (last visited Mar. 11, 2006).
43. Booth, supra note 14, at 136 (quoting 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.22 (1992)).
44. 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.22
(1992).
45. Id. at 136-37 (quoting 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS § 7.22 cmt. d (1992)).
46. 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.22 cmt.
c (1992).
47. See id.
[Vol. 30:3:333
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Accordingly, the ALl principles provide that "the court should give substan-
tial deference to the board's judgment [as to price per share] unless the plain-
tiff can show by clear and convincing evidence that the board undervalued
the firm.
' ' 8
H1. OPPRESSION STATUTES
With the notable exception of Florida, almost all states have passed leg-
islation to provide remedies to shareholders who are opposed, including the
possibility of seeking dissolution." The corporate statute that most states
adopt is the RMBCA "which focuses on the 'illegal, oppressive, or fraudu-
lent' actions by the majority shareholders."50 A remedy for oppression has
been deemed appropriate in most states because oppressed minority share-
holders have no liquidity or other means of redeeming their equity in closely-
held corporations.1 In addition, there are a number of court-created defini-
tions of oppression, some broad and some more narrow. 2 Moreover, the
case law is usually very fact specific which leads to unpredictability for mi-
nority shareholders seeking a remedy. 3
Because of the nature of a closely-held corporation, "some courts have
imposed a [partnership-like] fiduciary duty among [the] shareholders."54 The
same dilemma of ascertaining "fair value" arises in the context of a buyout
"[w]hen a majority shareholder is ordered (or elects) to buy out the shares of
an oppressed minority shareholder."" The dilemma of the "fair value" of the
minority stake is presented in the same manner as with an appraisal action.
5 6
While "there is widespread support for a fair value buyout as a[n] .. .op-
pression remedy, there is significant disagreement [as to] what fair value
means."
57
48. Id.
49. See Joseph W. Bartlett & Kevin R. Garlitz, Fiduciary Duties in Burnout/Cramdown
Financings, 20 J. CORP. L. 593, 614 (1995).
50. Id. (citation omitted).
51. See id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression and "Fair Value": Of Discounts, Dates,
and Dastardly Deeds in the Close Corporation, 54 DuKE L.J. 293, 304 (2004).
55. Id. at 310.
56. Id. at310-11.
57. Id. at310.
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A. Florida Law
The Florida Legislature revised Florida Business Corporations Act's
("FBCA") definition of fair value in 2003.58 Prior to that revision, the FBCA
defined fair value as "the value of the shares as of the close of business on
the day prior to the shareholders' authorization date, excluding any apprecia-
tion or depreciation in anticipation of the corporate action unless exclusion
would be inequitable."59 The 2003 revised definition mirrored that of the
RMBCA version; however, it excluded the express proscription of discounts
for lack of marketability or minority status.6° The act, as revised, defined fair
value as:
[T]he value of the corporation's shares determined:
(a) Immediately before the effectuation of the corporate action to
which the shareholder objects.
(b) Using customary and current valuation concepts and tech-
niques generally employed for similar businesses in the context of
the transaction requiring appraisal, excluding any appreciation or
depreciation in anticipation of the corporate action unless exclu-
sion would be inequitable to the corporation and its remaining
shareholders. 61
In examining both versions, it is quite apparent that the 2003 Florida
legislature did not follow the overwhelming trend with regard to the minor-
ity/marketability discount issue.
In 2004, the Florida Second District Court of Appeal held in a dis-
senter's rights action that "'Florida's dissenters' rights statutes are based, in
part, on the [RMBCA] ... [t]herefore, we may look... to cases from other
jurisdictions that have adopted the provisions of the RMBCA in substantially
the same form., 62 While one can argue that, based on the foregoing, one
could look to other jurisdictions for guidance as to whether marketabil-
ity/minority discounts should apply, a counter-argument could be made un-
58. See FLA. STAT. § 607.1301(4) (2003).
59. FLA. STAT. § 607.1301(2) (2002).
60. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 13.01(4) (2005); Act effective Oct. 1, 2003, ch. 2003-
283, § 21, 2003 Fla. Laws 2902, 2914.
61. FLA. STAT. § 607.1301(4) (2005).
62. Boettcher v. IMC Mortgage Co., 871 So. 2d 1047, 1052 n.5 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2004) (citation omitted). While this case involved the interpretation of the fair value as de-
fined under § 607.1301, it was limited to the "'appreciation or depreciation in anticipation of
the corporate action' element of the definition. Id. at 1052 (quoting FLA. STAT. §
607.1301(2) (1999)).
[Vol. 30:3:333
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der the statutory interpretative cannon of expressio unius est exclusio alteris,
expressing one item of an associated group or series to another left
unmentioned. In its 2003 revision, the Florida legislature generally adopted
the RMBCA definition of "fair value" with the significant exception of its
exclusion of its proscription against minority/marketability discounts.63 Ob-
viously, this was no oversight by the Florida Legislature.
In fact, the Florida House of Representatives Judiciary Committee Sub-
stitute for House Bill 1623 as initially proposed in 2003, included the current
definition of "fair value" with the following addition: "(c) Without discount-
ing for lack of marketability or minority status except, if appropriate, for
amendments to the articles of incorporation pursuant to s. 607.1302(1)(e) or
circumstances in which not discounting for marketability would be inequita-
ble to the corporation and its remaining shareholders."' In other words, as
originally proposed, Florida's language followed the RMBCA by eliminating
discounting by statute; however a subsequent amendment removed the text
from the proposed bill.65 The reason for this remarkable change in 2003 is
not evident from the official legislative history.
IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
A. Pueblo Bancorporation v. Lindoe, Inc.
In 2003, in Pueblo Bancorporation v. Lindoe, Inc.,66 the Supreme Court
of Colorado addressed the meaning of fair value in determining sharehold-
ers' interest under its state corporation statute.67 Like Florida, Colorado
based its statute largely on the Model Business Corporation Act.68 This case
provides an excellent discussion of the applicability of discounts in appraisal
proceedings.69 The Colorado statute at bar was not the recently updated
RMBCA definition of "fair value," but rather the older, more general version
that did not explicitly address marketability/minority discounts.70 In render-
ing its decision, the court held that: 1) "the meaning of 'fair value' is a ques-
tion of law, not an issue of fact to be [determined] ... on a case-by-case ba-
sis; ' 71 2) fair value under the state statute is not fair market value;72 3) "fair
63. FLA. STAT. § 607.1301(4) (2003).
64. Fla. CS for HB 1623, § 21 (2003) (proposed amendment to FLA. STAT. § 607.1301).
65. See id.
66. 63 P.3d 353 (Colo. 2003).
67. Id. at 356.
68. Id. at 368.
69. See id at 360.
70. See id. at 358-60.
71. Pueblo Bancorporation, 63 P.3d at 360.
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value is the shareholder's proportionate interest in the value of the corpora-
tion;, 73 and 4) "a marketability discount should not be applied at the share-
holder level to determine the 'fair value' of the dissenter's shares. 74
In Pueblo, the plaintiff brought an action to determine the fair value
of a minority shareholder's interest under the state statute, challenging the
value assigned after the lower court applied a minority and marketability
discount in a cash-out merger.75 In holding that the meaning of fair value is a
question of law, the court rejected the case-by-case approach stating that it
was "too imprecise to be useful to the business community., 76 This impreci-
sion creates a problem for parties because they may not know what the trial
court is, in fact, valuing. 77 For example, does the trial court, seeking to de-
termine what is "fair," award the shareholder the value of proportionate in-
terest in the corporation or the value of his minority shares? In an arms-
length transaction, willing buyer-willing seller situation, the buyer would
likely seek discounts for both marketability and minority status. However,
should that apply to the transaction, triggering the appraisal remedy transac-
tion, which is involuntary as far as the minority shareholders are concerned?
The differences between the two measures is the most significant vari-
able between the two measures (i.e., proportional or based on specific shares)
in the appraisal process; however, the Colorado court said that "the [trial]
court's choice of which interpretation to adopt is largely determined by" the
most persuasive expert.78 Both corporations and dissenting shareholders are
disadvantaged by the case-by-case approach which is subjective, unpredict-
able, and encourages unnecessary, costly litigation.79 The court also held
that the legislature could not have intended the definition of fair value to
vary from court to court.80 In holding that the Colorado legislature did not
intend "fair value" to be synonymous with "fair market value" it stated that
"[iun the sixty year history of Colorado's dissenters' rights statute, the meas-
ure of compensation has changed from 'value' to 'fair value,' but the legisla-
ture has never required that dissenters to be paid 'fair market value."''
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 356.
76. Pueblo Bancorporation, 63 P.3d at 361.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Pueblo Bancorporation, 63 P.3d at 361.
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Since Colorado's adoption of the MBCA standard of fair value and sub-
sequent revisions, the definition has remained intact.82 In holding "that the
proper interpretation of fair value is the shareholder's proportionate owner-
ship interest in the value of the corporation, without discounting for lack of
marketability," the court held that the object of the dissenters' rights statute
should be to compensate the minority shareholders for what they lost, which
is their proportionate interest in the whole corporation as a going concern.83
The Court thus held that "[a] marketability discount is inconsistent with this
interpretation."' " Moreover, the court also determined that a discount for
minority status was also inappropriate. 5 "'Such a rule would inevitably en-
courage corporate squeeze-outs.' '8 6 The court also looked to other jurisdic-
tions for the interpretation of fair value and found that most determined "fair
value" in the appraisal context as a proportion of ownership without dis-
counts.8 7
The Colorado court found that, because the language at bar from the
MBCA was nearly identical to that in many other statutes and because such
language is based on a Model Act designed to promote uniformity among
state corporation laws, the interpretation by other state courts on this issue
was particularly persuasive.8 Citing "the leading case regarding discounts,"
the court concluded that:
[T]he appraisal process is not intended to reconstruct a pro forma sale
but to assume that the shareholder was willing to maintain his invest-
ment position, however slight, had the merger not occurred. Discount-
ing individual share holdings injects into the appraisal process specula-
tion on the various factors which may dictate the marketability of mi-
nority shareholdings. More important, to fail to accord to a minority
shareholder the full proportionate value of his shares imposes a penalty
for lack of control, and unfairly enriches the majority shareholders who
may reap a windfall from the appraisal process by cashing out a dis-
senting shareholder, a clearly undesirable result.8 9
82. Id. at 368. "Fair market value is typically defined as the price at which property
would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller when neither party is under
an obligation to act." Id. at 362 (citations omitted).
83. Id. at 363.
84. Id. at 364.
85. Pueblo Bancorportation, 63 P.3d at 364.
86. Id. (citation omitted).
87. Id. at 364-65, 367.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 365-66 (quoting Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1145 (Del.
1989)).
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B. Munshower v. Kolbenheyer
In 2004, the Florida Third District Court of Appeal held in a dissolution
action that the fair value of shares of a corporation "rests on determining
what a willing purchaser in an arm's length transaction would offer for an
interest in [a] business."" In rendering its decision, the court held that "Flor-
ida case law neither define[d] 'fair value' nor provide[d] criteria by which
'fair value' may be measured."9'
To date, only one Florida appeals court has addressed the issue of mar-
ketability discounts. In 1999, in Munshower v. Kolbenheyer,92 the Florida
Third District Court of Appeal affirmed a marketability discount, applied by
the trial court, to reflect the lack of liquidity of the shares in a dissolution
context.93 In Munshower, the plaintiff appealed a final judgment as to ascer-
taining the fair value of shares owned in a closely held corporation, deter-
mining the value of shares of Munshower's stock, and imposing a lack of
marketability discount of twenty percent. 4  In rendering its decision, the
court followed a New York decision, Blake v. Blake Agency, Inc.,9 which
held that "[a] discount for lack of marketability is properly factored into the
equation because the shares of a closely held corporation cannot be readily
sold on a public market.
96
V. CONCLUSION
As amended, the Florida Business Corporation Act's definition of "fair
value" in the appraisal context departs from the latest version of the
RMBCA. The legislation is flawed by under-inclusion. Of course, this does
not preclude a court from determining, on a case-by-case basis, whether or
not to apply a minority or marketability discount in a Florida corporation
with more than ten shareholders. However, "[tihe clear majority trend is to
interpret fair value as the shareholder's proportionate ownership of a going
concern and not to apply discounts at the shareholder level. 97 Moreover, the
90. G & G Fashion Design, Inc. v. Garcia, 870 So. 2d 870, 871 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2004). This case centered around a dissolution action not involving the issue of minority or
marketability discounts. See id.
91. Id.
92. 732 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
93. Id. at 385-86 (this case was decided prior to the 2003 revision of the FBCA); see
Mitrione, supra note 11.
94. Munshower, 732 So. 2d at 385-86.
95. 486 N.Y.S.2d 341 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
96. Id. at 349.
97. Pueblo Bancorporation v. Lindoe, Inc., 63 P.3d 353, 367 (Colo. 2003).
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FBCA departs from the RMBCA in at least one other significant way.
Unlike the RMBCA, the FBCA does not include "oppression" as a ground
for judicial dissolution or other remedy.9" Florida is in a shrinking minority
of states that do not include oppression as grounds for statutory relief.99
Taken together, these two departures from the RMBCA signify that the
FBCA is exceptionally inhospitable, indeed antagonistic, to the interests of
minority shareholders. Counsel should consider this statutory anti-minority
shareholder tilt when determining whether to incorporate clients in Florida or
in some other state. At the least, counsel for minority shareholders should
attempt to address the concerns raised herein in a carefully drafted share-
holders' agreement.
98. See Jeffrey M. McFarland, Florida Corporation Law: Proposed Statutory Relief for
Oppressed Minority Shareholders in Florida, 46 FLA. L. REv. 149, 158 (1994); Marilyn B.
Cane, Oppressive Conduct: Should It Be Grounds for Judicial Dissolution?, Fla. B. Bus. L.
Sec., Q. Rep., Dec. 1993, at 20.
99. See generally F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL AND THOMPSON'S
OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS AND LLC MEMBERS: PROTECTING MINORITY
RIGHTS IN SQUEEZE-OUTS AND OTHER INTRACORPORATE CONFLICTS § 3:2 (rev. 2d ed. 2004);
Robert C. Art, Shareholder Rights and Remedies in Close Corporations: Oppression, Fiduci-
ary Duties and Reasonable Expectations, 28 J. CORP. L. 371, 373 (2003).
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I. INTRODUCTION
In several recent cases involving judicial misconduct in Florida, a few
of the justices of the Supreme Court of Florida have openly questioned the
appropriateness of the disciplinary recommendations made by the Judicial
Qualifications Commission (JQC).' In fact, in several recent election mis-
conduct cases, the supreme court has even rejected the stipulation entered
into by the JQC and the accused judge, presumably because the recom-
mended discipline was too lenient.'
1. See, e.g., In re Diaz, 908 So. 2d 334, 338 (Fla. 2005) (Cantero, J., dissenting). In
Diaz, Justice Cantero expressed, in a dissenting opinion joined in by Chief Justice Pariente,
that the penalty recommended by the JQC and stipulated to by the judge was too harsh. Id.
Justice Cantero specifically wrote that "[e]ven assuming that Judge Diaz's conduct violated a
specific canon, the recommended discipline-a $15,000 fine, a two-week suspension, a public
apology, and a public reprimand-is much too harsh .... I would eliminate all but a repri-
mand issued by opinion." Id. at 341. In In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2003), cert. denied,
540 U.S. 825 (2003), the reprimand and large fine recommended by the JQC were approved in
an election misconduct case. Id. at 92. Chief Justice Anstead and Justice Pariente concurred
with approving the recommended discipline, but expressed concern about the appropriateness
of the penalty. See id. at 93-5 (Anstead, C.J., specially concurring and Pariente, J., concur-
ring). Justice Lewis also concurred in the finding of a violation, but stated his belief that
enormous fines, especially in election misconduct cases, are inadequate. Id. at 99 (Lewis, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). He argued that when the conduct is sufficiently
egregious to support such a fine, removal is the appropriate discipline. Id. He expressed this
view again in a later election misconduct case involving the imposition of a large fine. In re
Pando, 903 So. 2d 902, 904-05 (Fla. 2005) (Lewis, J., specially concurring) (citing Kinsey,
842 So. 2d at 99).
2. See, e.g., In re Renke, No. SC03-1846 (Fla. July 8, 2004) (order rejecting stipulation
as to "the merits of the issues of misconduct as well as the appropriate discipline"); In re
[Vol. 30:3:349
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The comments made by the justices in these several cases raise the fol-
lowing questions concerning the issue of discipline in judicial misconduct
cases in this state: 1) what is the purpose of punishment for judicial miscon-
duct; 2) are the penalties imposed for judicial misconduct in this state com-
paratively fair; 3) what factors should be considered in determining the ap-
propriate punishment for judicial misconduct; 4) when is removal from of-
fice appropriate as punishment for judicial misconduct; 5) when should the
punishment imposed for judicial misconduct be suspension and/or fine; and
6) how should judicial misconduct cases involving election violations be
treated in terms of discipline? These questions are not unique to Florida, as
evidenced by the following remarks made in the introduction to a recent
study of state judicial discipline sanctions:
After determining that a judge has committed misconduct, the state judicial
conduct commission and supreme court must "address the more difficult
task of determining an appropriate sanction." Decisions regarding sanctions
have been described as "institutional and collective judgment calls," resting
on an assessment of the individual facts of each case, as measured against
the code of judicial conduct and the prior precedents. Choosing the proper
sanction in judicial discipline proceedings "is an art, not a science, and turns
on the facts of the case at bar.",
3
In an effort to find answers to these questions, this article will generally
examine the conduct which exposes judges to discipline in this state, the
penalties available for such misconduct, and the fairness of both the JQC's
disciplinary recommendations and the penalties that have actually been im-
posed for such misconduct, a process that has never been undertaken in an
organized fashion in Florida.
While a study of the seven canons of the Florida Code of Judicial Con-
duct will certainly reveal what behavior constitutes judicial misconduct war-
ranting the imposition of discipline, such a study cannot provide an adequate
framework for determining the fairness or equality of the penalties actually
received by judges for their misconduct.4 This is true because the canons set
forth only broad categories of appropriate conduct for judges; they do not
speak to the issue of punishment.5 In fact, a particular violation of a canon
Rodriguez, 829 So. 2d 857, 858 (Fla. 2002) (noting the supreme court's rejection of stipulation
recommending public reprimand for judicial misconduct); In re McMillan, 797 So. 2d 560,
564 (Fla. 2001).
3. CYNTHIA GRAY, A STUDY OF STATE JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE SANCTIONS 1 (2002) (cita-
tions omitted).
4. See FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT.
5. See id.
20061
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may be very serious, while another violation of the same canon may not. In
addition, a particular activity by a judge may constitute a violation of several
canons.
6
In order to study the comparative fairness of the penalties imposed for
judicial misconduct in this state, it is necessary to identify particular catego-
ries of behavior warranting discipline as judicial misconduct. In this process,
it is beneficial for analytical purposes to identify narrow categories of con-
duct and to create a large number of categories to ensure that the comparison
of penalties is truly for like conduct. Creating numerous categories of mis-
conduct also allows for the grouping of specific categories that may involve
violations of several different canons, but which are all clearly related.7 The
utility of such a framework has been recognized by others who have engaged
in similar efforts on a much grander scale. 8
According to Gray:
The question of the appropriate sanction in a judicial discipline case pre-
sents special challenges of fairness, consistency, and accountability be-
cause there is a wide range of possible judicial misconduct-from taking a
bribe to accepting an award at a fund-raising dinner for a charity-and a
wide range of possible sanctions-from informal adjustments and private
reprimands to removal. The problem of making the sanction fit the mis-
conduct is exacerbated in judicial discipline cases because most states have
at most one or two formal cases a year, giving the disciplinary authorities
little precedent to use as guidance, a "fortunate circumstance" in serious
cases that nonetheless complicates the determination. 9
In an effort to provide a procedural context for this discussion, this arti-
cle will begin with an overview of the process of judicial discipline in Flor-
ida-including a discussion of the penalties currently available for judicial
misconduct under the Florida Constitution, the factors used to determine the
appropriate penalty in judicial misconduct proceedings, and the goal of pun-
ishment in such cases. A review of the specific canons governing judicial
behavior in Florida follows, with emphasis on what conduct has been deter-
mined in the past to constitute violations of each provision. The article will
then compare the penalties that have been imposed for judicial misconduct in
Florida using the following categories of misconduct: 1) lacking judicial
temperament; 2) failing to be impartial; 3) engaging in ex parte communica-
6. See, e.g., In re LaMotte, 341 So. 2d 513,515 (Fla. 1977).
7. See id. at 515-16.
8. See, e.g., GRAY, supra note 3, at 1.
9. Id. at 1 (quoting In re Drury, 602 N.E.2d 1000, 1010 (Ind. 1992)).
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tions; 4) violating recusal and disclosure requirements; 5) improperly com-
municating with the press; 6) failing to follow the law while conducting judi-
cial duties; 7) inappropriately using contempt power; 8) misusing office for
personal gain; 9) misusing office for the assistance of others; 10) abusing
substances; 11) improperly receiving gifts; 12) engaging in improper sexual
conduct; 13) engaging in improper behavior while practicing law; 14) violat-
ing criminal laws; 15) inordinately delaying ruling; 16) exhibiting a lack of
candor during official proceedings; 17) failing to file required financial dis-
closure documents; 18) criticizing juries and other public officials; 19) using
intimidation with other judges and parties; and 20) engaging in election mis-
conduct.
Election misconduct, in addition to making misrepresentations during
the campaign, includes: a) making inappropriate promises of performance in
office; b) campaign finance and reporting misconduct; c) engaging in parti-
san politics; d) supporting another candidate for office; and e) directly solic-
iting support from attorneys. The penalties imposed for conduct falling into
the last two of these categories have caused the most controversy. It is im-
portant to note that these categories do not purport to address every conceiv-
able action which might violate one or more of the canons; these categories
are structured using only that conduct which has already been determined to
warrant judicial discipline in Florida.
11. PROCESS OF JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE IN FLORIDA
A. Constitutional Framework
Article V, section 12(a)(1) of the Florida Constitution gives the JQC the
power to "recommend to the Supreme Court of Florida the removal from
office of any justice or judge whose conduct.., demonstrates a present un-
fitness to hold office."'" This section of the constitution also gives the JQC
the authority to "recommend the discipline of a justice or judge whose con-
duct... warrants such discipline."" "The supreme court may accept, reject,
or modify in whole or in part the... recommendations of the [JQC] .... ",,12
In cases involving a formal hearing and disputed facts, the supreme
court "determine[s] if [the JQC's findings] are supported by clear and con-
vincing evidence and reviews the recommendation of discipline to determine
10. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 12(a)(1). "'he power of removal conferred by this section [is]
both alternative and cumulative to the [legislature's] power of impeachment." FLA. CONST.
art. V, § 12(d).
11. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 12(a)(1).
12. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 12(c)(1).
2006]
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whether it should be approved." 3 The supreme court has stated that while it
"gives the findings and recommendations of the JQC great weight, 'the ulti-
mate power and responsibility in making a determination rests with [the]
Court.""' 14 In cases where the judge and the JQC "enter into a stipulation,
[the] Court independently reviews the stipulated facts on which the JQC's
findings are based and also determines whether the recommended discipline
is appropriate."' 5
B. Available Penalties
The penalties available for judicial misconduct, as set forth in the Flor-
ida Constitution, are "reprimand, fine, suspension with or without pay, or
lawyer discipline."' 6 A reprimand generally consists of the published opin-
ion outlining the judge's misconduct, and, in most cases, also requires the
judge's appearance before the Supreme Court of Florida for delivery of the
reprimand during a public session. 7 The supreme court has also approved
the limited use of what has been designated as an admonition, generally in-
volving a published opinion describing the misconduct, but no required ap-
pearance by the offending judge before the supreme court, presumably for
cases where less serious violations of the canons have occurred.' Lawyer
discipline is available so the supreme court may determine whether the mis-
conduct rises to the level which would require Bar disciplinary sanctions.'9
The JQC may also recommend, and the supreme court may impose, reason-
13. In re Diaz, 908 So. 2d 334, 336-37 (Fla. 2005) (quoting In re Andrews, 875 So. 2d
441,442 (Fla. 2004)).
14. In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 85 (Fla. 2003) (quoting In re Davey, 645 So. 2d 398,
404 (Fla. 1994)) (footnote omitted).
15. In re Gooding, 905 So. 2d 121, 122 (Fla. 2005) (citing In re Luzzo, 756 So. 2d 76, 79
(Fla. 2000)).
16. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 12(a)(1). Prior to the adoption of Senate Joint Resolution 978
by the voters in 1996, article V, section 12 of the Florida Constitution only allowed the su-
preme court to impose two sanctions against judges: reprimand or removal. FLA. CONST. art.
V, § 12(a) (amended 1996); Fla. SJR 978 (1996) at 3787 (proposed FLA. CONST. art. V, §
12(a)).
17. See, e.g., In re Frank, 753 So. 2d 1228, 1242 (Fla. 2000); In re Schwartz, 755 So. 2d
110, 113, 115 (Fla. 2000). In both Frank and Schwartz, the supreme court determined that all
reprimands would require the judge's personal appearance before the court. Frank, 753 So.
2d at 1242; Schwartz, 755 So. 2d at 115. However, in In re Allawas, the supreme court de-
termined, without any mention of the Frank case, that no personal appearance by the judge
would be necessary for delivery of the public reprimand. Allawas, 906 So. 2d 1052, 1055
(Fla. 2005) (issuing public reprimand by publication).
18. See In re Baker, 813 So. 2d 36, 37-38 (Fla. 2002).
19. See id.
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able conditions related to the misconduct, like alcohol abuse counseling,20
stress management counseling, 2' or anger management programs.
22
With the 1996 amendment allowing, among other penalties, suspension
and fines,23 it is not totally clear whether there is now a punishment element
to judicial discipline or whether the new tools are simply intended to act as a
deterrent to future wrongful conduct. After adoption of the constitutional
amendment providing for the additional punishments, however, the supreme
court reaffirmed its position that the primary purpose of judicial disciplinary
proceedings is "to gauge a judge's fitness" for office. Only once has the
supreme court addressed the appropriate consideration for the imposition of
fines, which will be discussed later in this article.25
The 1996 amendment to article V, section 12 of the Florida Constitution
also complicates the analysis of equality of judicial discipline.26 Do the pre-
1996 cases provide a legitimate basis for comparison? It is impossible to
know whether the JQC would have recommended either reprimand or re-
moval had other options been available. Therefore, the major focus of this
paper is on post-1996 cases.
C. Factors Used to Determine Appropriate Penalty
In determining the appropriate penalty in a particular case, the JQC and
the Supreme Court of Florida evaluate factors other than the conduct itself.
Both bodies weigh past behavior, judicial experience, and other extenuating
circumstances in deciding what punishment is warranted. 27 Patterns of be-
havior are also significant.2 s A number of small incidents may be aggregated
and considered in one proceeding. 29 The JQC initially may also consider
motive, remorsefulness, repentance, and rehabilitation efforts in an individ-
20. In re Wilson, 750 So. 2d 631, 633 (Fla. 1999).
21. In re Trettis, 577 So. 2d 1312, 1313 (Fla. 1991).
22. See In re Schapiro, 845 So. 2d 170, 173,174 (Fla. 2003).
23. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 12(a)(1).
24. In re McMillan, 797 So. 2d 560, 571 (Fla. 2001).
25. See infra Part IV.T.2.; In re Rodriguez, 829 So. 2d 857, 861 (Fla. 2002).
26. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 12 (amended 1996).
27. See In re Allawas, 906 So. 2d 1052, 1054-55 (Fla. 2005).
28. See In re Kelly, 238 So. 2d 565, 566 (Fla. 1970).
29. In re Shea, 759 So. 2d 631, 638 (Fla. 2000) (citing Kelly, 238 So. 2d at 566).
2006]
24
Nova Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol30/iss3/1
NOVA LAW REVIEW
ual case. 30 A judge's candor or lack of candor also may affect disciplinary
recommendations made by the JQC.31
Several state supreme courts have adopted specific checklists of non-
exclusive criteria to be considered in determining the appropriate discipline
for judicial misconduct.32 The Supreme Court of Washington indicated it
would consider the following non-exclusive factors:
(a) whether the misconduct is an isolated instance or evidenced a
pattern of conduct; (b) the nature, extent and frequency of occur-
rence of the acts of misconduct; (c) whether the misconduct oc-
curred in or out of the courtroom; (d) whether the misconduct oc-
curred in the judge's official capacity or in his private life; (e)
whether the judge has acknowledged or recognized that the acts
occurred; (f) whether the judge has evidenced an effort to change
or modify his conduct; (g) the length of service on the bench; (h)
whether there have been prior complaints about this judge; (i) the
effect the misconduct has upon the integrity of and respect for the
judiciary; and (j) the extent to which the judge exploited his posi-
tion to satisfy his personal desires.
33
Louisiana has adopted the same non-exclusive checklist.' Michigan
has adopted a similar checklist.35
Several other states consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances
which have been adopted by applicable case law.36 Other states have
adopted criteria by rule.37 Several compilations regarding appropriate disci-
plinary measures have been attempted.3
30. See In re Lantz, 402 So. 2d 1144, 1146-47 (Fla. 1981).
31. See, e.g., In re Wood, 720 So. 2d 506, 508-09 (Fla. 1998); cf. In re Davey, 645 So.
2d 398, 405-06 (Fla. 1994) (holding that "only where lack of candor [before JQC] is formally
charged and proven may it be used as a basis for removal or reprimand" of a judge).
32. See, e.g., In re Chaisson, 549 So. 2d 259, 266 (La. 1989); In re Brown (Christopher
Brown), 626 N.W.2d 403, 405 (Mich. 2001); In re Deming, 736 P.2d 639, 659 (Wash. 1987),
amended by 744 P.2d 340 (Wash. 1987).
33. Deming, 736 P.2d at 659.
34. Chaisson, 549 So. 2d at 266 (quoting Deming, 736 P.2d at 659).
35. See Christopher Brown, 626 N.W.2d at 405 (quoting In re Brown, 625 N.W.2d 744,
745 (Mich. 1999)).
36. See, e.g., In re Seaman, 627 A.2d 106, 122-23 (N.J. 1993) (citations omitted).
37. E.g., ARIZ. COMM'N ON JUD. CONDUCT R. 19 (2006).
38. See GRAY, supra note 3; Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, Removal or Discipline of
State Judge for Neglect of or Failure to Perform, Judicial Duties, 87 A.L.R. 4TH 727 (1991).
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D. Goal of Judicial Discipline
According to the Supreme Court of Florida, the primary purpose of dis-
ciplinary proceedings is not to inflict "punishment, but rather to gauge a
judge's fitness to serve as an impartial judicial officer."3 9 Courts in other
states have made similar statements regarding the aim of judicial discipline.40
The Supreme Court of Florida determined that the most severe penalty,
removal, is only appropriate when there is no doubt that the judge "intention-
ally committed serious and grievous wrongs."4' The court later modified the
standard for removal, stating that removal is required when "'the judge's
conduct is fundamentally inconsistent with the responsibilities of judicial
office.'"42 Other states have adopted similar standards determining that re-
moval is only appropriate for the most egregious conduct.43 One former
member of the JQC purportedly described the duty of the JQC as being the
protection of the public from bad judges and protection of good judges from
themselves.44 Clearly, this was the duty of the JQC prior to 1996 when the
only punishments available were reprimand and removal.
HI. CANONS OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
A. Canon 1
Florida Canon 1 defines a judge's responsibility to "[u]phold the
[i]ntegrity and [i]ndependence of the [j]udiciary. Conduct covered by
Canon 1 of the Model Code includes "probity, fairness, honesty, uprightness,
and soundness of character." 46 The courts in other jurisdictions have deter-
39. In re McMillan, 797 So. 2d 560, 571 (Fla. 2001) (citing In re Kelly, 238 So. 2d 565,
569 (Fla. 1970)).
40. See, e.g., In re JQC (Vaughn), 462 S.E.2d 728, 733 (Ga. 1995) (citing In re Nowell,
237 S.E.2d 246, 250 (N.C. 1977)).
41. In re Boyd, 308 So. 2d 13, 21 (Fla. 1975); In re LaMotte, 341 So. 2d 513, 517 (Fla.
1977).
42. McMillan, 797 So. 2d at 571 (quoting In re Graziano, 696 So. 2d 744, 753 (Fla.
1997)). The previous rule that required "[m]alafides, scienter or moral turpitude" has been
modified. In re JQC (Taunton), 357 So. 2d 172, 180 (Fla. 1978) (citation omitted).
43. In re Cunningham (Patrick Cunningham), 442 N.E.2d 434, 436 (N.Y. 1982) (citing
In re Steinberg v. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 409 N.E.2d 1378, 1383-84 (N.Y.
1980)); In re Kaiser, 759 P.2d 392, 400-01 (Wash. 1988).
44. This observation was attributed to Judge John S. Rawls, a longtime member and later
General Counsel of the JQC.
45. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 1.
46. See Ann. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 1 annot. (2004). Florida's present
Code of Judicial Conduct is modeled after the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Code
2006]
26
Nova Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol30/iss3/1
NOVA LAW REVIEW
mined that this Canon, adopted verbatim from the American Bar Associa-
tion's Model Code of Judicial Conduct in both Florida and other states, is so
broad that it will not alone support a charge of judicial misconduct.47 In
Florida, Canon 1 has been held to apply to such diverse behavior such as
threatening to misuse the judicial office to get out of a parking ticket,48 driv-
ing under the influence,49 mishandling client funds while practicing law,50
improper campaign financing,51 and failing to exercise judicial temperament
in the courtroom.52
B. Canon 2
Canon 2 addresses the requirement that judges "[a]void [i]mpropriety
and the [a]ppearance of [i]mpropriety." 53 As with Canon 1, the language in
Canon 2 is necessarily broad.54 "The Commentary to Canon 2A acknowl-
edges that Canon 2's proscription against judges behaving with impropriety
or the appearance of impropriety is cast in general terms. The Commentary,
however, defends this language as necessary, noting it is not 'practicable' to
list all prohibited acts. 55 Specific sections of this Canon direct judges to
promote public confidence in the judiciary; 56 not allow business and family
relationships to affect judicial duties;57 not improperly use the prestige of the
judicial office for personal gain;58 and not participate in organizations that
discriminate "on the basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin."59 Canon
2 has been interpreted as recognizing the very high standard of conduct ex-
pected of members of the judiciary.6°
of Judicial Conduct adopted in 1990. See In re Code of Judicial Conduct, 643 So. 2d 1037,
1037, 1040 (Fla. 1994).
47. See In re Larsen, 616 A.2d 529, 558 app. 1 (Pa. 1992) ("Canon 1 is primarily a
statement of purpose and rule of construction, rather than a separate rule of conduct."); see
also In re Jacobi, 715 N.E.2d 873, 875 (Ind. 1999) (finding the judge's conduct not only vio-
lated Canon 1, but also Canons 2 and 3).
48. See In re Steinhardt, 663 So. 2d 616, 617-18 (Fla. 1995).
49. See In re Esquiroz, 654 So. 2d 558, 558-59 (Fla. 1995).
50. See In re Meyerson, 581 So. 2d 581, 582 (Fla. 1991).
51. See In re Rodriguez, 829 So. 2d 857, 859-60 (Fla. 2002).
52. See In re Haymans, 767 So. 2d 1173, 1174 (Fla. 2000).
53. FLA. CODE JuD. CONDUCT Canon 2.
54. See id.; see FLA. CODE JUD. CONDucT Canon 1.
55. ANN. MODEL CODE OFJUD. CONDuCT Canon 2A cmt. (2004).
56. FLA. CODE JuD. CONDUCT Canon 2A.
57. FLA. CODE JurD. CoNDuCr Canon 2B.
58. Id.
59. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDuCr Canon 2C.
60. See, e.g., In re LaMotte, 341 So. 2d 513, 517, 518 (Fla. 1977) (determining that re-
moval was appropriate where judge used a state credit card for personal travel, and stating that
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A violation of Canon 2 can be based on the same behavior that would
constitute a violation of Canon 1. Such conduct includes, but is not limited
to: exhibiting a lack of judicial temperament,6 engaging in illegal gam-
bling,62 being publicly intoxicated,63 driving while intoxicated,' and acting in
a discourteous manner toward attorneys.65 Conduct which has been punished
under Canon 2, but which did not form the basis of a charge under Canon 1,
has included failing to act impartially,' misusing the judicial office for per-
sonal gain,67 and signing official documents in a case involving a family
member.68
C. Canon 3
Canon 3 generally requires that judges perform their duties impartially
and diligently. 69 Specific sections of this Canon address the judge's: 1) ad-
judicative responsibilities in terms of maintaining competence, requiring
order and decorum, remaining dignified and courteous, performing duties
without bias and prejudice, insuring a party's right to be heard, not permit-
ting improper ex parte communication, handling matters expeditiously, re-
fraining from public comment which impairs the fairness of the proceeding,
and not disclosing confidential matters; 70 2) administrative responsibilities,
which include many of the same duties set forth as adjudicative responsibili-
ties, and the additional prohibition against favoritism or nepotism in the ex-
ercise of the judge's power of appointment;7' 3) disciplinary responsibilities
which include reporting to the appropriate authorities substantial violations
of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar;
72
and 4) duty of disqualification in terms of the specific requirements of dis-
closure and recusal.73 Misuse of office for personal gain74 and inappropriate
"[a] judge is required to conduct himself under standards which are much higher than those
required of an attorney").
61. See In re Haymans, 767 So. 2d 1173, 1174 (Fla. 2000).
62. See In re Mclver, 638 So. 2d 45, 46 (Fla. 1994).
63. See In re Norris, 581 So. 2d 578, 578-79 (Fla. 1991).
64. See In re Esquiroz, 654 So. 2d 558, 558-59 (Fla. 1995).
65. See In re Steinhardt, 663 So. 2d 616, 617-18 (Fla. 1995).
66. See In re Gridley, 417 So. 2d 950, 954-55 (Fla. 1982).
67. See In re Richardson, 760 So. 2d 932, 932-33 (Fla. 2000).
68. See In re Brown (Robert Brown), 748 So. 2d 960, 961-62 (Fla. 1999).
69. See FLA. CODE JUD. CoNDucr Canon 3.
70. Fla. Code Jud. Conduct Canon 3B.
71. Fla. Code Jud. Conduct Canon 3C.
72. Fla. Code Jud. Conduct Canon 3D.
73. FLA. CODE JUD. CoNDucT Canon 3E.
74. See In re Steinhardt, 663 So. 2d 616, 617-18 (Fla. 1995).
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courtroom demeanor 75 constitute violations of Canon 3, as well as Canons 1
and 2.76 Conduct which has been determined to violate the specific language
of Canon 3 includes failing to disclose the judge's relationship with one of
the attorneys litigating a case over which the judge was presiding,77 conduct-
ing ex parte communications,78 failing to properly follow the law,79 express-
ing inappropriate bias,80 and inappropriately communicating with the press.8
D. Canon 4
Canon 4 encourages judges to engage in "quasi-judicial" activities in
order to improve the legal system and the administration of justice. 2 Under
this Canon, "[a] judge is encouraged to speak, write, lecture, [and] teach...
the law. 8 3 However, this Canon also states that judges engaging in these
activities must not "cast reasonable doubt on [their] capacity to act impar-
tially," they must not "demean the judicial office," and they may not allow
such activities to "interfere with the proper performance of [their] judicial
duties." 84 This Canon also describes the types of organizations in which a
judge may be an officer or member.85 In addition, it contains a specific pro-
hibition against personally participating in fund-raising or solicitation of
funds on behalf of such an organization.86
The aspirational goals set forth in Canon 4, as restricted by the prohibi-
tions set forth in Canon 5, strike the appropriate balance between two com-
peting interests.87  First, as the commentary to the Model Code states,
75. See In re Marko, 595 So. 2d 46, 46 (Fla. 1992).
76. See FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canons 1-3.
77. See In re Frank, 753 So. 2d 1228, 1230-34, 1238-40 (Fla. 2000).
78. See In re Turner (Fred Turner), 421 So. 2d 1077, 1078-79 (Fla. 1982).
79. See In re JQC (Taunton), 357 So. 2d 172, 174, 177 (Fla. 1978).
80. See In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 88-89 (Fla. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 825
(2003).
81. See In re Miller, 644 So. 2d 75, 78 (Fla. 1994).
82. See FLA. CODE JUn. CONDUCT Canon 4.
83. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 4B. Prior to the amendment to this canon in 2003,
judges were merely allowed, rather than encouraged, to participate in activities designed to
improve the judicial system and the administration of justice. Code of Judicial Conduct, 840
So. 2d 1023, 1026, 1031 (Fla. 2003).
84. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 4A(l)-(3).
85. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 4D.
86. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 4D(2)(a)-(d).
87. See FLA. CODE JuD. CONDUCT Canons 4, 5. It should be noted that Canons 4, 5, and 6
of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct are derived from Canon 4 of the Model Code of Judi-
cial Conduct. See In re Code of Judicial Conduct, 643 So. 2d 1037, 1040 (Fla. 1994). "We
note that the new Florida code places most of the provisions of [C]anon 4 of the Model Code
in three separate [C]anons: 4, 5 and 6." Id.
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"[c]omplete separation . . . from extra-judicial activities is neither possible
nor wise; a judge should not become isolated from the community in which
the judge lives.""8 However, as the annotations to the Model Code make
clear, to maintain public confidence in the judiciary, a judge must avoid all
activity that either affects or appears to affect the ability of the judge to do
the job fairly and impartially.s9 Therefore, Florida's Judicial Ethics Advisory
Committee has recognized that some extra-judicial activities may need to be
completely avoided when one takes the bench. 90
Canon 4 has rarely been the basis for judicial discipline in Florida.
However, in one case a judge was found to have violated Canons 1, 2, 3, and
4 by writing letters to a newspaper which were unduly critical of the criminal
justice system.9 The Supreme Court of Florida determined that the letters
undermined public confidence in the court system, and therefore imposed a
public reprimand for the judge's conduct.92 In another case, the Supreme
Court of Florida found that a judge's statements made to a newspaper, re-
flecting the judge's endorsement of racial stereotypes, warranted the judge's
removal as Chief Judge of a circuit.93 Canon 4 may provide the basis for
warnings by the JQC to judges concerning their membership in inappropriate
organizations and their allowance of the use of their names in connection
with fund-raising on behalf of an organization. 94 These warnings have gen-
erally been sufficient to correct the offending behavior, thus removing the
need for formal action.95
88. ANN. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 4 cmt. (2004).
89. Id. (citing JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT & ETHICS § 10.02 (3d ed.
2000)).
90. See, e.g., Fla. Jud. Ethics Advisory Comm. Op. 97-31 (1997) (holding that Canon
4(D) prohibits a judge from serving as a member of the Comprehensive Offender Rehabilita-
tion and Education Program where that organization administers probation services), available
at http://www.jud6.org/LegalPractice/opinions/j udicialethicsadvisoryopinions/ninet7/97-3 1.
html.
91. See In re Miller, 644 So. 2d 75, 76-78 (Fla. 1994).
92. Id. at 78.
93. In re Removal of a Chief Judge, 592 So. 2d 671, 671-72 (Fla. 1992).
94. See FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 4D(2)(a)-(d).
95. Informal actions taken by the JQC prior to a determination of probable cause are
confidential; therefore, no citation to authority is available in connection with these actions of
the JQC. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 12(a)(4). "Until formal charges against a justice or judge are
filed by the investigative panel with the clerk of the [S]upreme [C]ourt of Florida all proceed-
ings by or before the commission shall be confidential .... Id.
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E. Canon 5
Canon 5 defines the scope of a judge's appropriate participation in non-
judicial activities.96 Like Canon 4, Canon 5 has been amended since its
original promulgation to encourage judges to participate in ethically permis-
sible and beneficial community activities." However, like Canon 4, Canon 5
states that these activities must not: "(1) cast reasonable doubt on the judge's
capacity to act impartially...; (2) demean the judicial office; or (3) interfere
with the proper performance of judicial duties."98 Specific sections of this
Canon address the extent to which a judge may participate in governmental,
civic, or charitable activities; the limitations on a judge's financial activities;
the limitations on the acceptance of gifts by a judge and his family; the limi-
tations on a judge's ability to serve as a fiduciary, arbitrator, or mediator; and
the outright prohibition against a judge's practice of law." The specific pro-
visions of Canon 5 are violated when a judge allows his name to be used in
support of a charity golf tournament; °" becomes intoxicated and engages in
inappropriate behavior at a judicial conference;1 1 or accepts baseball tickets
from a law firm whose lawyers previously appeared before the judge.0 2
A judge's failure to follow the general prohibitions set forth in Canon 5
has also been found to violate Canons 1 and 2.103 A recent example of this
kind of violation of Canon 5 occurred in a case involving a judge's violation
of campaign finance and reporting laws."° A judge's pattern of intimidating
behavior has also been found to violate Canons 1, 2, 3, and 5.15 Similarly, a
judge's intercession into a pending custody dispute violated the same Can-
ons.' 6 Finally, a judge's making of racially insensitive remarks has been
found to violate Canons 2, 4, and 5o7
96. See FLA. CODE JUD. CoNDucT Canon 5.
97. See Code of Judicial Conduct, 840 So. 2d 1023, 1027, 1031, 1034 (Fla. 2003).
98. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 5A.
99. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDucT Canon 5C-G.
100. In re Byrd, 460 So. 2d 377, 377 (Fla. 1984).
101. In re Cope, 848 So. 2d 301, 302-03 (Fla. 2003).
102. In re Luzzo, 756 So. 2d 76, 77-78 (Fla. 2000).
103. See In re Rodriguez, 829 So. 2d 857, 858-59 (Fla. 2002).
104. Id. at 858-60.
105. In re Shea, 759 So. 2d 631, 632-33,638 (Fla. 2000).
106. In re Holloway, 832 So. 2d 716, 717, 729 (Fla. 2002).
107. In re Removal of a Chief Judge, 592 So. 2d 671, 671-72 (Fla. 1992).
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F. Canon 6
Canon 6 regulates the financial interests of a judge.'0 8 The first section
of this Canon sets forth the limited circumstances under which a judge may
receive compensation in addition to his or her judicial salary."° This section
also addresses the amount which may be received by the judge for such ex-
tra-judicial activity." 0 The second and third sections of this Canon define the
terms and conditions of a judge's required public and confidential filings
concerning his or her income assets and gifts."' Few cases have involved
violations of Canon 6. However, the Supreme Court of Florida has deter-
mined that a judge's failure to make full disclosure within a required filing
warranted a public reprimand." 2 The Supreme Court of Florida has also held
that filing an incomplete or misleading campaign finance report violates
Canon 6."' Yet, campaign finance improprieties alone will not constitute a
violation of this Canon in the absence of evidence that any public filing was
required. "'
G. Canon 7
Canon 7 regulates the political activities of judges."5 It applies to
judges and candidates for judicial positions."6  The first section of this
Canon prohibits a judge from engaging in certain political activities, includ-
ing personally raising money for, or making speeches on behalf of a candi-
date, or endorsing any candidate." 7 This section also specifically prohibits
partisan political activities." 8 It also regulates campaigns for judicial office
by expressly prohibiting pledges or promises of specific conduct while in
office, commitments concerning issues that will likely come before the judge
once in office, and knowingly misrepresenting another candidate or the op-
108. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 6.
109. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDuCT Canon 6A.
110. Id.
111. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 6B-C.
112. In re Meyerson, 581 So. 2d 581, 582 (Fla. 1991).
113. In re Rodriguez, 829 So. 2d 857, 858-60 (Fla. 2002); cf. In re Pando, 903 So. 2d 902,
902-04 (Fla. 2005) (finding that a misleading finance report violates Canon 7).
114. In re Gooding, 905 So. 2d 121, 122-23 (Fla. 2005).
115. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 7.
116. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 7A.
117. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 7A(1)(b), (c), (e).
118. See FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 7A(1)(a)-(e).
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posing candidate's qualifications for judicial office." 9 The remaining sec-
tions of this Canon place additional limitations on a judge's fund-raising and
campaigning in competitive and merit retention elections. 20
Canon 7 and similar canons adopted in other states have generated
much debate at both the state and federal levels. The tension between an
individual judge's right to free speech under the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution on the one hand, and the state's compelling inter-
est in regulating judicial elections on the other, has spawned several signifi-
cant court decisions. Foremost among these decisions is the United States
Supreme Court's opinion in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,' 2'
wherein the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a canon in the
Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct forbidding a candidate for judicial of-
fice from "announc[ing] his or her views on disputed legal or political is-
sues." 22 The Supreme Court held that "[t]he Minnesota Supreme Court's
canon of judicial conduct prohibiting candidates for judicial election from
announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues violates the
First Amendment."'123 Soon thereafter the Supreme Court of Florida consid-
ered in In re Kinsey 24 whether the decision in White precluded enforcement
of Canon 7 of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct.25
In Kinsey, the Supreme Court of Florida held that Canon 7's prohibition
against a judicial candidate making statements during an election which ap-
pear to commit the candidate to a particular position in a case or on an issue,
did not violate the candidate's right to free speech under the First Amend-
ment. 26 In reaching this result, the Supreme Court of Florida specifically
determined that the judicial candidate's statement of intent in her campaign
literature that she would "help law enforcement by putting criminals where
they belong ... behind bars" could not be considered protected speech under
the First Amendment. 27 The Supreme Court of Florida in Kinsey distin-
guished the United States Supreme Court's White decision as follows:
119. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 7A(3)(d)(i)-(ii). This Canon was recently amended
by Court Order. In re Amendment to Code of Judicial Conduct, No. SC05-281 (Fla. Jan. 5,
2006).
120. See FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 7B-F.
121. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
122. Id. at 768 (quoting MNN. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d)(i) (2000)).
123. Id. at 788.
124. 842 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 825 (2003).
125. Id. at 85, 88-89.
126. See id. at 87.
127. Id. at 88-89 (emphasis added).
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The [United States Supreme] Court ... emphasized that the "an-
nounce clause" [at issue in White] was separate and apart from the
"pledges or promises clause" [in the Minnesota Code], since Min-
nesota adopted a separate canon which prohibited a candidate from
promising or pledging to act in a certain manner while on the
bench. Based on these observations, the Court found that Minne-
sota did not fulfill its burden in showing that the "announce clause"
was narrowly tailored, and hence found that the rule violated the
First Amendment.
In contrast to White, Florida does not have an "announce clause"
but instead adopted a more narrow canon, which provides as fol-
lows:
A candidate for judicial office.., shall not:
(i) make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the
faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office; [or]
(ii) make statements that commit or appear to commit the candi-
date with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to
come before the court .... 128
Two other recent federal cases have addressed provisions similar to
those found in Canon 7. On remand in the White case, the Eighth Circuit
considered the constitutionality of judicial canon prohibitions against per-
sonal fund-raising and taking part in partisan politics; the court found that
both prohibitions violated the First Amendment. 29 In Weaver v. Bonner,130 a
case decided prior to the White remand opinion, the Eleventh Circuit held
that the provisions of the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct that prohibited
judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign contributions and
regulated campaign speech violated the First Amendment because they were
not narrowly tailored to prevent only false statements knowingly or reck-
lessly made.' 3 '
The Supreme Court of Florida addressed some of these concerns in sev-
eral cases decided after Bonner but before the remand decision in White. In
128. Id. at 86-87 (some alterations in original)(quoting FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canon
7A(3)(d)(i)-(ii)). Florida previously had an announce clause, but it was determined to violate
the First Amendment. ACLU v. The Fla. Bar, 744 F. Supp. 1094, 1099-1100 (N.D. Fla.
1990).
129. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 766 (8th Cir. 2005).
130. 309 F.3d 1312 (1 1th Cir. 2002).
131. Id. at 1315, 1319-20, 1322-23, 1325.
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In re Angel, 32 the Supreme Court of Florida accepted a stipulation finding
that a judge's participation in partisan politics during his judicial campaign
violated Canon 7 and recommended a public reprimand as the appropriate
punishment.1 33 In In re Pando,'" the Supreme Court of Florida also accepted
stipulations finding violations of Canon 7 based on campaign finance and
reporting laws improprieties. 135 The Supreme Court of Florida has also im-
posed discipline for a judge's campaign misrepresentations'36 and inappro-
priate promises of performance, 37 as well as a judge's active support for
another candidate for office.'38 The controversy that has arisen concerning
the appropriate punishment for a violation of Canon 7 will be discussed later
in this article.
V. CATEGORIES OF MISCONDUCT
A. Lacking Judicial Temperament
Canon 3B(3) of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct states, "[a] judge
shall require order and decorum in proceedings before the judge.' 39 Canon
3B(4) states, "[a] judge shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants,
jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom the judge deals in an offi-
cial capacity. .. ."" The portion of the Annotated Model Code of Judicial
Conduct on decorum and intemperate behavior covers twenty-two pages.1 4
Some of the behavior described as violating these sections are: 1) "[jludges'
[1lack of [d]ecorum;"' 42 2) lack of dignity; 143 3) "[i]ntemperate [s]peech to or
132. 867 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 2004). In Angel, the Supreme Court of Florida reaffirmed the
determination, originally made in In re Alley, 699 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 1997), that judges cannot
participate in partisan politics. Angel, 867 So. 2d at 380, 382-83.
133. Angel, 867 So. 2d at 382-83.
134. 903 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 2005).
135. Id. at 903-04.
136. In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 80, 82-84, 92 (Fla. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 825
(2003); In re McMillan, 797 So. 2d 560, 571-73 (Fla. 2001); In re Alley, 699 So. 2d at 1369,
1369 (Fla. 1997).
137. Kinsey, 842 So. 2d at 79-80, 84-92; McMillan, 797 So. 2d at 562, 566, 573.
138. In re Glickstein, 620 So. 2d 1000, 1001, 1003 (Fla. 1993); In re McGregor, 614 So.
2d 1089, 1090 (Fla. 1993).
139. FLA. CODE JUD. CoNDucT Canon 3B(3).
140. FLA. CODE JtD. CoNDucr Canon 3B(4).
141. ANN. MODEL CODE OFJUD. CoNDucr Canon 3B(3)-(4) (2004).
142. ANN. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CoNDucr Canon 3B(3) annot. (2004). The Florida exam-
ple given for this type of behavior is In re Trettis, 577 So. 2d 1312, 1313 (Fla. 1991), in which
the "judge violated [this] canon by directing verbal tirades at jurors, defendants and attor-
neys." ANN. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDuCT Canon 3B(3) (2004) (citing Trettis, 577 So. 2d at
1313).
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[a]bout [l]awyers, [1]itigants, and [clourt [e]mployees;"' 44 4) "[d]isparaging
[1]awyers;"' 145 5) "[d]isparaging [litigants and [w]itnesses;"" 4 6) making
disparaging or critical remarks to judges or other court employees; 147 7) using
racial slurs or profanity; 48 8) "[y]elling during a court proceeding;"'' 49 9)
using inappropriate humor or sarcasm;5 ° and 10) interrupting people who
appear in the courtroom."' While these behaviors are given many names,
they essentially involve a judge being discourteous and not treating people
the way he or she would want to be treated. 
52
Complaints of discourteous conduct constitute a large percentage of the
filings received by the JQC. A number of cases are resolved by the JQC by
counseling the judge prior to formal charges being filed. Nevertheless, many
143. See ANN. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3B(4) annot. (2004). The Florida
example given as violating this principle is In re Shea, 759 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 2000). ANN.
MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3B(4) (2004). In Shea, the judge "engaged in a pattern
of conduct in which he acted with hostility towards attorneys, court personnel and fellow
judges." Shea, 759 So. 2d at 638.
144. ANN. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3B(4) annot. (2004). The Florida exam-
ple given for this type of behavior is In re Schwartz, 755 So. 2d 110, 111-12 (Fla. 2000), in
which the "appellate judge verbally abused law students who were making initial appearances
before the court and made discourteous remarks about [a] professor who was supervising
students." ANN. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3B(4) annot. (2004) (citing Schwartz,
755 So. 2d at 111-12).
145. ANN. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3B(4) annot. (2004). The Florida exam-
ple given for this type of behavior is In re Wood, 720 So. 2d 506, 507 (Fla. 1998), in which
the "judge attacked [the] good faith of [a] lawyer who filed a motion for continuance." ANN.
MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3B(4) (2004) (citing Wood, 720 So. 2d at 507); see
also In re Carnesoltas, 563 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1990).
146. ANN. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3B(4) annot. (2004). The Florida exam-
ple given for this type of behavior is In re Golden, 645 So. 2d 970, 971 (Fla. 1994), in which
the judge told a defendant to "'quit having so many babies so you can afford to pay your
fines."' ANN. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3B(4) annot. (2004) (quoting Golden,
645 So. 2d at 971).
147. ANN. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3B(4) annot. (2004). The Florida exam-
ple given for this type of behavior is In re Graziano, 696 So. 2d 744, 748 (Fla. 1997), in
which a judge was disciplined for "reduc[ing] a court reporter to tears by approaching her in
the midst of a trial in another judge's courtroom, demanding" her to move her car from the
judicial assistant's parking spot. ANN. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3B(4) cmt.
(2004) (citing Graziano, 696 So. 2d at 748).
148. ANN. MODEL CODE OF Jun. CONDUCT Canon 3B(4) annot. (2004). The Florida exam-
ple given for this type of behavior is Golden, 645 So. 2d at 971 in which a judge made dispar-
aging remarks regarding Hispanic Americans. ANN. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon
3B(4) cmt. (2004) (citing Golden, 645 So. 2d at 971).
149. ANN. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3B(4) annot. (2004).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See id.
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cases involve the filing of formal charges after informal procedures have
been utilized. 5 3 One case presently pending for trial by the hearing panel of
the JQC involves allegations of inappropriate comments to court personnel
including chastising a deputy sheriff for being an unwed mother" 4 In the
vast majority of these cases, the offending judge receives a reprimand.'55
Occasionally professional counseling is imposed as part of a reprimand.'56
Even where a pattern of rudeness is established, reprimand appears to be the
preferred method of discipline.157 Only when the discourteous conduct has
been coupled with other misconduct has removal from office been utilized. 
58
In other states, intemperate judges have received similar punishments.
First offenses for less serious cases of discourtesy have received public cen-
sures (which appear to be similar to reprimands in Florida), reprimands 15 9 or
short suspensions. 6° Patterns of discourtesy,16 numerous outbursts of tem-per,162 re ated behavior after admonition,6 3 extremely offensive remarks, 64
153. See, e.g., In re Schapiro, 845 So. 2d 170, 173-74 (Fla. 2003); In re Schwartz, 755 So.
2d 110, 111 (Fla. 2000); In re Wood, 720 So. 2d 506, 507 (Fla. 1998).
154. Answer and Affirmative Defenses at 1-2, In re Todd, No. SC04-1655 (Fla. Sept. 27,
2004).
155. See, e.g., In re Newton, 758 So. 2d 107, 109 (Fla. 2000); Schwartz, 755 So. 2d at 115;
In re Wright, 694 So. 2d 734, 736 (Fla. 1997); In re Fleet, 610 So. 2d 1282, 1282 (Fla. 1992);
In re Marko, 595 So. 2d 46, 46 (Fla. 1992); In re Carr, 593 So. 2d 1044, 1045 (Fla. 1992); In
re Muszynski, 471 So. 2d 1284, 1285 (Fla. 1985); In re Turner (Fred Turner), 421 So. 2d
1077, 1081 (Fla. 1982); In re Lantz, 402 So. 2d 1144, 1147 (Fla. 1981).
156. Schapiro, 845 So. 2d at 174; Wood, 720 So. 2d at 509.
157. E.g., In re Haymans, 767 So. 2d 1173, 1174 (Fla. 2000).
158. See, e.g., In re Shea, 759 So. 2d 631, 638-39 (Fla. 2000) (holding that a pattern of
discourteous behavior and intimidating behavior toward attorneys for personal gain justified
removal); In re Graziano, 696 So. 2d 744, 747, 753 (Fla. 1997) (holding that discourteous
behavior, misuse of office, and threatening behavior, lack of veracity with the JQC, and an
inability to recognize the impropriety of certain ethical violations she committed justified
removal); In re McAllister, 646 So. 2d 173, 178 (Fla. 1994) (holding that discourteous behav-
ior, sexual harassment of an assistant, and improper ex parte communications justified re-
moval); In re Graham, 620 So. 2d 1273, 1274-75, 1277 (Fla. 1993) (holding that discourteous
behavior, improper use of contempt and sentencing power, and unwarranted criticism of fel-
low judges and public officials warranted removal).
159. See, e.g., In re Jenkins, 503 N.W.2d 425, 427 (Iowa 1993); In re Bowers, 721 So. 2d
875, 883-84 (La. 1998); In re Sheppard, 815 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. Spec. Ct. Rev. 1991).
160. See In re Hocking, 546 N.W.2d 234, 246 (Mich. 1996).
161. In re Moore, 626 N.W.2d 374, 393-94 (Mich. 2001) (holding that a pattern of dis-
courteous behavior warranted a six-month suspension); In re Elliston, 789 S.W.2d 469, 480,
484 (Mo. 1990) (holding that a pattern of discourteous, abusive, and abrasive comments war-
ranted fifteen-day suspension).
162. In re Flournoy, 990 P.2d 642, 643, 646-47 (Ariz. 1999) (holding that repeated out-
bursts of temper warranted in six-month suspension).
163. In re Gorenstein, 434 N.W.2d 603, 609 (Wis. 1989) (holding that repeated conduct
after admonition warranted two-year suspension).
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and rudeness, along with other serious misconduct, 65 have resulted in longer
suspensions and removal.
B. Failing to be Impartial
Canon 3 requires that a judge perform the duties of office impartially."6
The Supreme Court of Florida has recognized the importance of this precept
for many years. 167 In a recent disciplinary case, the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida stated, "no other principle is more essential to the fair administration of
justice than the impartiality of the presiding judge."'168 Although the Su-
preme Court of Michigan has noted that discourteous behavior may lead par-
ties to question the impartiality of proceedings, 69 discourtesy generally has
been treated as a separate area of judicial misconduct. 170
In a case involving lack of impartiality, the Supreme Court of Florida
held that it was inappropriate for a judge to interject himself on behalf of a
criminal defendant, and that this conduct justified a reprimand against the
offending judge, even though there was evidence of his good intentions.'
In another proceeding, due to the judge's commendable service, lack of prior
misconduct, demonstrated remorsefulness, and cooperative attitude, a public
reprimand was adequate for signing legal documents in a case involving his
former daughter-in-law. 72 Another judge, however, who was facing unre-
lated JQC charges, intentionally arranged to have himself handle a first ap-
pearance hearing of a defendant that the judge helped apprehend for Driving
While Intoxicated. 73 The judge set an abnormally high bond, and the su-
preme court determined that such behavior, along with the other charges,
justified his removal. 74
164. In re Mulroy, 731 N.E.2d 120, 123 (N.Y. 2000) (holding that a pattern of engaging in
making racial epithets and ethnic slurs warranted removal from office).
165. See, e.g., In re Holien, 612 N.W.2d 789, 792-93, 798 (Iowa 2000) (holding that
persistent violations of court rules and disrespectful and hostile treatment of other people in
the legal system warranted removal).
166. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3B(5).
167. See, e.g., In re JQC (Taunton), 357 So. 2d 172, 177-79 (Fla. 1978).
168. In re McMillan, 797 So. 2d 560, 571 (Fla. 2001).
169. See In re Brown (Christopher Brown), 626 N.W.2d 403, 405-406 (Mich. 2001); see
also Leonard E. Gross, Judicial Speech: Discipline and the First Amendment, 36 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 1181, 1211-20 (1986).
170. See In re O'Dea, 622 A.2d 507, 508-09 (Vt. 1993).
171. See In re Gridley, 417 So. 2d 950, 953-55 (Fla. 1982).
172. In re Brown (Robert Brown), 748 So. 2d 960, 961-62 (Fla. 1999).
173. McMillan, 797 So. 2d at 569-70.
174. See id. at 570, 573.
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C. Engaging in Ex Parte Communication
Misconduct closely related to impartiality includes inappropriate ex
parte communication. 175 The judicial canons state, "[a] judge shall not initi-
ate, permit, or consider ex parte communications ... outside the presence of
the parties concerning a pending or impending proceeding." 176 The Supreme
Court of Florida has commented, "there is nothing 'more dangerous and de-
structive of the impartiality of the judiciary than a one-sided communication
between a judge and a single litigant. ' 177 Thus, the supreme court author-
ized the removal of two judges who committed ex parte communication vio-
lations along with other misconduct. 7 8 While the supreme court deems ex
parte communication to be serious, the court accepted stipulations providing
for a public reprimand. 179 However, these cases occurred prior to 1996.180
Despite reasonable justification for the ex parte communication, the supreme
court publicly reprimanded the judges involved.'18 In one, the court deter-
mined a reprimand was appropriate in spite of the judge's overriding "con-
cern for [the] welfare of the children involved."' 82 In the other, discipline
was approved in spite of the fact that there was no immoral or illegal in-
tent. 183 Yet, in another case, the court considered the prior unblemished re-
cord of the judge involved and reprimanded him."
In 2002, the court admonished rather than reprimanded a judge when,
without the knowledge or consent of the parties, the judge consulted several
computer experts to better understand the case.'85 The Supreme Court of
175. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3B(7).
176. Id.
177. State v. Riechmann, 777 So. 2d 342, 351 (Fla. 2000) (citation omitted).
178. See In re Damron, 487 So. 2d 1, 7 (Fla. 1986) (holding that ex parte communication,
along with solicitation of favors for judicial action, discouraging criminal defendants from
exercising constitutional rights, threatening parties and individuals, and giving inaccurate
testimony to the JQC warranted removal); In re Leon, 440 So. 2d 1267, 1268-70 (Fla. 1983)
(holding that ex parte communication, along with a number of other violations, warranted
removal).
179. In re Sturgis, 529 So. 2d 281, 281, 283 app. (Fla. 1988); In re Clayton, 504 So. 2d
394, 395 (Fla. 1987).
180. Sturgis, 529 So. 2d 281; Clayton, 504 So. 2d 394.
181. Sturgis, 529 So. 2d at 281, 283; Clayton, 504 So. 2d at 395.
182. Sturgis, 529 So. 2d at 281, 283 app.
183. See Clayton, 504 So. 2d at 395.
184. In re Dekle, 308 So. 2d 5, 12 (Fla. 1975). The rule established in Dekle was invali-
dated by the amendment to article V, section 12, subsection f of the Florida Constitution in
1976. In re JQC (Taunton), 357 So. 2d 172, 180 (Fa. 1978).
185. In re Baker, 813 So. 2d 36, 37 (Fla. 2002).
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Florida removed another judge after a JQC trial, finding the judge guilty of
ex parte communication and abusive behavior, among other things."6
Across the country, the discipline for engaging in ex parte communica-
tion has varied widely, ranging from reprimand to removal."7 Other factors,
including motive, past judicial record, and remorse may influence the penalty
which is imposed.
88
D. Violating Recusal and Disclosure Requirements
Canon 3E of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct sets forth the guide-
lines governing disqualification.8 9 It states, "[a] judge shall disqualify him-
self or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might rea-
sonably be questioned."'19 The Canon then lists specific circumstances when
a judge must be recused."19 Further, the Supreme Court of Florida has de-
termined a duty to disclose exists even in certain circumstances when recusal
is not required.192
Specifically, because a judge "should disclose on the record information that
the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might consider relevant to the
question of disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no real basis
for disqualification," it appears that the standard for disclosure is lower. In
other words, a judge should disclose information in circumstances even
where disqualification may not be required. 193
Failure to properly disclose an attorney's representation of his daughter
in a divorce proceeding resulted in a public reprimand for one judge."l
Other judges were publicly reprimanded for acting in cases where recusal
186. In re McAllister, 646 So. 2d 173, 178 (Fla. 1994).
187. See Phoebe Carter, Annotation, Disciplinary Action Against Judge for Engaging in
Ex Parte Communication with Attorney, Party, or Witness, 82 A.L.R. 4TH 567, 572-73
(1990). See also Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Bowen, 662 So. 2d 551, 551
(Miss. 1995) (holding that public reprimand and $1450 fine was warranted for dismissing
traffic tickets after ex parte communications with defendants); In re Schenck, 870 P.2d 185,
210 (Or. 1994) (holding that forty-five-day suspension without pay was warranted for ex parte
communications with district attorney and public comments regarding pending case); In re
Rasmussen, 734 P.2d 988, 989 (Cal. 1987) (holding that public censure was warranted where
judge communicated with a defendant outside the presence of his counsel).
188. See, e.g., Clayton, 504 So. 2d at 395; Dekle, 308 So. 2d at 12.
189. See FLA. CODE JUD. CoNDucT Canon 3E.
190. Id.
191. See id.
192. In re Frank, 753 So. 2d 1228, 1239 (Fla. 2000).
193. Id. (quoting FLA. CODE JUD. CONDucT Canon 3E(1) cmt.).
194. Id. at 1230.
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was required.'95 Continuing to preside over cases when recusal is required
has resulted in discipline in other states, including reprimands.' 96
E. Improperly Communicating with the Press
Publicity violations generally involve contact with a nonparty member
of the media regarding pending litigation. Canon 3B(9) in pertinent part
states:
A judge shall not, while a proceeding is pending or impending in
any court, make any public comment that might reasonably be ex-
pected to affect its outcome or impair its fairness .... This Section
does not prohibit judges from making public statements in the
course of their official duties or from explaining... the procedures
of the court. 1
97
Cases involving inappropriate contact with reporters have generally re-
sulted in public reprimands. In In re Andrews, the Supreme Court of Florida
publicly reprimanded a judge who made statements to a reporter regarding a
party in a pending proceeding which evidenced bias against that party. 198
The same behavior warranted a public reprimand in a pre-1996 case. 99
However, a judge's general comments regarding opposition to capital pun-
ishment did not violate the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct where the
judge indicated he would follow the law.2"
Several states have suspended or removed judges based on the nature of
the remarks made by the judge or when the improper comment is tied to
other misconduct.2°"
195. In re Brown (Robert Brown), 748 So. 2d 960, 961-62 (Fla. 1999); In re Wood, 720
So. 2d 506, 509 (Fla. 1998).
196. See In re Johnson (Shirley L Johnson), 532 S.E.2d 883, 884-85 (S.C. 2000).
197. FLA. CODE JUD. CoNDucT Canon 3B(9). See also Fla. Jud. Ethics Advisory Comm.
Op. 00-30 (2000) (stating that a trial judge may not comment on cases pending appeal).
198. In re Andrews, 875 So. 2d 441, 441-42 (Fla. 2004).
199. In re Hayes, 541 So. 2d 105, 105-06 (Fla. 1989).
200. In re Gridley, 417 So. 2d 950, 954-55 (Fla. 1982).
201. See, e.g., In re Sheffield, 465 So. 2d 350, 353, 359 (Ala. 1984) (finding improper
comment and failure to recuse self warranted two-month suspension); Office of Disciplinary
Counsel v. Ferreri, 710 N.E.2d 1107, 1109, 1111 (Ohio 1999) (finding improper comments
warranted suspension); In re Schenck, 870 P.2d 185, 188-89, 207, 210 (Or. 1994) (finding
improper comments to newspaper about pending cases with three other code violations war-
ranted forty-five-day suspension).
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F. Failing to Follow the Law While Conducting Judicial Duties
Canon 3B(2) provides, "[a] judge shall be faithful to the law and main-
tain professional competence in it.'
20 2
The vast majority of judicial rulings that are not "faithful" to the law
are simply legal errors, which can be corrected on appeal, and are not
grounds for judicial discipline. To discipline a judge for mere legal er-
ror would threaten judicial independence because judges might con-
sciously or unconsciously render decisions based on how they think
the disciplinary body would view the decision instead of what they
think would be the right decision in a particular case.2°a
However, conscious refusal to follow a clear legal duty, or commission
of a gross legal error resulting in a significant loss of a party's rights, may
result in judicial discipline. 2°4 For example, a judge who repeatedly imposed
unauthorized sentences, along with other misconduct, was removed from
office.20 5 A judge's refusal to vacate an order, which both parties agreed was
entered by mistake, warrants reprimand where the judge had otherwise ren-
dered conscientious service to the judiciary.2° Readily apparent violations of
constitutional rights have subjected judges to judicial discipline.2°" In one
circumstance, the court imposed a public reprimand where a judge was con-
victing defendants without trial when they failed to appear.208 Additionally,
the Supreme Court of Florida determined that a judge who held a hearing in
a child custody case without giving pre-hearing notice to the mother de-
served a public reprimand.2° Similar cases in other jurisdictions involving
failure to follow the law have resulted in censures as well as suspensions of
varying length.210
202. FLA. CODE JtJD. CONDUCT Canon 3B(2).
203. ANN. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3 cmt. (2004) (citation omitted).
204. See In re Graham, 620 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 1993).
205. Id. at 1274-75.
206. In re Vitale, 630 So. 2d 1065, 1066 (Fla. 1994).
207. See In re Miller, 644 So. 2d 75, 77, 79 (Fla. 1994); In re Colby, 629 So. 2d 120, 120
(Fla. 1993).
208. Colby, 629 So. 2d at 120, 121.
209. Miller, 644 So. 2d at 77, 79.
210. See, e.g., In re Spencer, 798 N.E.2d 175, 183, 185 (Ind. 2003) (holding that judge's
misconduct warranted a thirty-day suspension); In re Brown (Helen Brown), 662 N.W.2d 733,
735-37 (Mich. 2003) (holding that public censure was an appropriate sanction for a judge); In
re Landry, 789 So. 2d 1271, 1280 (La. 2001) (holding that justice of the peace's misconduct
warranted a six-month suspension plus two years probation).
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G. Inappropriately Using Contempt Power
The JQC has been particularly sensitive to a judge's failure to follow
the law in the area of contempt. The Supreme Court of Florida has said of
the contempt power of the court:
[A]lthough the power of contempt is an extremely important power for the
judiciary, it is also a very awesome power and is one that should never be
abused. Further, because trial judges exercise their power of criminal con-
tempt to punish, it is extremely important that they protect an offender's
due process rights, particularly when the punishment results in the impris-
onment of the offender. As such, it is critical that the exercise of this con-
tempt power never be used by a judge in a fit of anger, in an arbitrary man-
ner, or for the judge's own sense of justice.21'
The court went on to further say that:
Judges must necessarily have a great deal of independence in executing
[their] powers, but such authority should never be autocratic or abusive.
We judges must always be mindful that it is our responsibility to serve the
public interest by promoting justice and to avoid, in official conduct, any
impropriety or appearance of impropriety. We must administer our offices
with due regard to the system of law itself .... 212
Thus, when a judge fails to follow the law concerning the use of the
contempt power, the court has upheld imposition of public reprimands.2 '3 In
addition, when the evidence demonstrated a pattern of abuse in this area, the
court has removed the offending judge.1 4 Other jurisdictions have handled
contempt in a similar manner.1 5
H. Misusing Office for Personal Gain
Canon 2B of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that "[a] judge shall
not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance the private interests of the
211. In re Perry, 641 So. 2d 366, 368 (Fla. 1994).
212. Id. at 368-69 (alteration in original) (quoting In re Turner (Fred Turner), 421 So. 2d
1077, 1081 (Fla. 1982)).
213. Id. at 361 (citing In re Eastmoore, 504 So. 2d 756, 758 (Fla. 1987); Fred Turner, 421
So. 2d at 1081; In re Crowell, 379 So. 2d 107, 110 (Fla. 1979)).
214. Crowell, 379 So. 2d at 110.
215. See generally Ana Kellia Ramares, Annotation, Abuse or Misuse of Contempt Power
as Ground for Removal or Discipline of Judge, 76 A.L.R. 4TH 982, 987 (1990) (noting na-
tional trends in judicial discipline).
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judge or others .... ,2 16 According to the Supreme Court of Florida, "[u]sing
the prestige of judicial office to advance one's own interest undermines the
very prestige and respect that is being traded upon and, inevitably, erodes
public confidence in the judiciary., 21 7 The Court further asserts that "[s]uch
acts cannot be tolerated. ,21" Thus, utilizing the judicial position, by sum-
moning a reporter to chambers to resolve a personal matter, resulted in a
public reprimand.219  Reprimand was also determined to be appropriate
where a judge attempted to get special treatment during his arrest for solicit-
ing a prostitute. 2 ' Another judge was reprimanded for threatening to with-
draw a donation he regularly provided to the Police Officers Benevolent
Fund because of a parking ticket the judge had received.22" '
In two cases, the misuse of office coupled with other misbehavior re-
sulted in removal.222 In In re Damron, the Supreme Court of Florida held
that the use of judicial office for personal political gain, the threatening of
parties and other individuals, and the participation in ex parte communica-
tions warrants removal from office. 223 In another case, a judge's misuse of
office coupled with elections violations resulted in removal.224
In several cases, other states have determined that utilizing the judicial
position for personal financial gain justified a reprimand.225 A judge, who
was involved in an accident and tried to direct how the investigation pro-
ceeded, was suspended for fifteen days without pay in light of his past indis-
226cretions. In another case, a judge was removed for a pattern of misusingthe office for personal gain.227
I. Misusing Office for Benefit of Others
Closely related behavior is misusing the judicial office for the benefit of
others, which is conduct that is also expressly prohibited by Canon 2B.228
216. FLA. CODE JUD. CoNDucT Canon 2B.
217. In re Richardson, 760 So. 2d 932, 933 (Fla. 2000).
218. Id. (citing In re Fogan, 646 So. 2d 191, 194 (Fla. 1994)).
219. In re Eastmoore, 504 So. 2d 756,757-58 (Fla. 1987).
220. Richardson, 760 So. 2d at 932-33.
221. In re Steinhardt, 663 So. 2d 616, 617-18 (Fla. 1995).
222. In re McMillan, 797 So. 2d 560, 573 (Fla. 2001); In re Damron, 487 So. 2d 1, 7 (Fla.
1986).
223. Damron, 487 So. 2d. at 7.
224. McMillan, 797 So. 2d at 562-64, 573.
225. E.g., In re Brown (Harry Brown), 512 S.E.2d 114, 114-15 (S.C. 1999); In re Phalen,
475 S.E.2d 327, 333, 335 (W. Va. 1996).
226. In re Brown (Christopher Brown), 626 N.W.2d 403,406 (Mich. 2001).
227. In re Samay, 764 A.2d 398, 402, 407 (N.J. 2001).
228. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2B.
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Canon 2B also states it is inappropriate for a judge to "testify voluntarily as a
character witness. 229
In In re Holloway, the judge was suspended for thirty days for, among
other things, approaching and chastising the presiding judge in a friend's
child custody case.23° Additionally, the judge exerted pressure on a fellow
judge to take a case out of turn so her brother, who was a lawyer on the case,
might make an appointment.231 Another judge's involvement in hiring, and
subsequent efforts to obtain a raise and promotion for a close personal friend
and business associate, along with other misconduct warranted removal.232 A
judge who inappropriately interceded to release a son's friend after the friend
was arrested for driving while intoxicated, entered into a stipulation with the
JQC for a public reprimand. 233
In other states, isolated cases of inappropriate involvement in another
judge's proceedings appear to have warranted suspension or reprimand.234 In
a case that appears similar to Holloway, a judge tried to help a lawyer-friend
in a dissolution proceeding. 235 The Supreme Court of Iowa determined that a
sixty-day suspension was appropriate. 36 Interceding with law enforcement
on behalf of friends' children regarding pending cases resulted in a public
censure.237 A judge's entry of a protective order in a case involving his fa-
ther, aunt, and first cousin resulted in a fifteen-day suspension. 23' A number
of other cases involving fixing traffic tickets have resulted in reprimands or
censure.
239
In a number of cases, the Supreme Court of Florida has held that pro-
viding a personal character reference letter for a personal friend who is to be
229. Id.
230. 832 So. 2d 716, 717-18, 729 (Fla. 2002).
231. Id. at 721.
232. In re Graziano, 696 So. 2d 744, 747, 753 (Fla. 1997).
233. In re Maloney, 916 So. 2d 786, 786-87, 789 (Fla. 2005).
234. See, e.g., In re Eads, 362 N.W.2d 541, 549-51 (Iowa 1985).
235. Id. at 543, 547, 549-51.
236. Id. at 551.
237. In re Martin, 456 S.E.2d 517, 517-18 (N.C. 1995).
238. In re Funke, 757 N.E.2d 1013, 1014-15, 1017 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
239. See, e.g., Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Warren, 791 So. 2d 194, 196,
199 (Miss. 2001) (holding that a public reprimand, as well as payment of a fine and court
costs, was an appropriate sanction for the judge's misconduct); In re Snow, 674 A.2d 573,
574-75, 579-80 (N.H. 1996) (holding that public censure, six-month suspension, completion
of judicial ethics course, and payment of court costs as sanctions for judicial misconduct were
all supported by the violations).
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sentenced on criminal charges warrants a public reprimand. 24" The law in
other states appears to be consistent with the approach taken by Florida. 1
J. Abusing Substances
Many cases involving substance abuse are dealt with informally prior to
the case becoming public.242 The JQC will intervene and require the judge to
attend treatment programs. 243 In some of these cases, inappropriate behavior
while intoxicated will require that formal charges be filed.24 In some cases,
treatment is required after charges have been filed.245 In one case, an intoxi-
cated judge who witnessed a petty theft by an acquaintance, and later cov-
ered it up, received mandated alcohol counseling as part of her discipline.246
Another judge who went on a three-day drinking binge, during which he
discharged a firearm, received a public reprimand.247 A public reprimand
was determined to be appropriate for being intoxicated and making inappro-
priate sexual advances at an out-of-state judicial conference.248 Absent other
extensive misconduct, treatment and reprimand appear to be the favored dis-
cipline.
K. Improper Receiving of Gifts
Canon 5D(5)(h) of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct prohibits a
judge from accepting a gift of any value from a "person who has come or is
likely to come" before the judge.249 The commentary to Canon 5D(5)(h)
specifically provides that this Canon "prohibits judges from accepting gifts,
favors, bequests or loans from lawyers or their firms if they have come or are
240. E.g., In re Ward, 654 So. 2d 549, 550-52 (Fla. 1995); In re Fogan, 646 So. 2d 191,
191, 194 (Fla. 1994); In re Stafford, 643 So. 2d 1067, 1068-69 (Fla. 1994).
241. See, e.g., In re Carton, 658 A.2d 1211, 1211, 1215-17 (N.J. 1995) (holding that giv-
ing legal advice to a defendant in a criminal matter, and allowing a fax to be sent to another
judge about a matter pending before him, warranted a public reprimand); In re Decuir, 654 So.
2d 687, 691-93 (La. 1995) (holding that writing a letter to a judge regarding sentencing of a
friend, among several other ethical violations, warranted a public censure).
242. See, e.g., In re Norris, 581 So. 2d 578, 578-80 (Fla. 1991).
243. See id. at 579.
244. See, e.g., In re Cope, 848 So. 2d 301, 302-03, 305 (Fla. 2003); Amended Notice of
Formal Changes, In re a Judge (Scott Kenney), No. 98-198, (Fla. July 12, 2001), dismissed by
In re Kenney, 828 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 2002); In re Wilson, 750 So. 2d 631, 632-33 (Fla. 1999).
245. Kenney, 828 So. 2d at 386; Wilson, 750 So. 2d at 632-33.
246. Wilson, 750 So. 2d at 632-33.
247. Norris, 581 So. 2d at 578, 580.
248. Cope, 848 So. 2d at 302, 305.
249. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 5D(5)(h).
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likely to come before the judge."25 One judge, with a spotless record and
high grades in bar polls, stipulated to receiving a reprimand for accepting
tickets to Florida Marlins games from two friends in a law firm whose firm
had two cases in front of him at the time he accepted the tickets.25' There do
not appear to be any other reported disciplinary cases involving acceptance
of gifts. The acceptance of gifts from parties appearing, or likely to appear,
before the court coupled with attempted concealment, however, has resulted
in removal from office in at least two states. 2
L. Improper Sexual Conduct
In In re McAllister,253 sexual harassment of an aide was one of the
charges leading to removal 4.2  Continual sexual advances to court person-
nel,255 or probation officers and other parties appearing in front of the
court, 256 have resulted in judges resigning after charges have been filed.257
Other sexual misconduct has resulted in several judges resigning before for-
mal charges were filed. In one case, a reprimand was warranted when a
judge, who was well regarded as a jurist, was arrested for having sex in a
parking lot with a woman that was not his wife.25 8 Different types of sexual
misconduct have resulted in different penalties in other states. 9
M. Improper Behavior While Practicing Law
Judges who violate the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct, while
practicing as a lawyer, have been found to violate Canons 1 and 2 of the
Florida Code of Judicial Conduct.260 In In re Hapner,261 the Supreme Court
250. FLA. CODE JUD. CoNDucT Canon 5D(5)(h) cmt.
251. In re Luzzo, 756 So. 2d 76, 77-79 (Fla. 2000).
252. See Adams v. Comm'n on Judicial Performance, 897 P.2d 544, 552, 567, 571 (Cal.
1995); In re Cunningham (Mary Rose Fante Cunningham), 538 A.2d 473, 488-90 (Pa. 1988).
253. 646 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 1994).
254. Id. at 174, 178.
255. Notice of Formal Charges, In re a Judge (Howard Berman), No. 00-211, (Fla. Nov.
30, 2000), dismissed by In re Berman, 814 So. 2d 439, 439 (Fla. 2002).
256. Notice of Formal Charges, In re Ward, No. 99-379 (Fla. Mar. 1, 2000), decision
without published opinion, In re Ward, 678 So. 2d 338, 338 (Fla. 1996).
257. Opinion, The Wrong Job Offer, PALM BCH. POST, July 12, 2005, at 12A; see Ward,
678 So. 2d at 338.
258. In re Lee, 336 So. 2d 1175, 1176-77 (Fla. 1976).
259. See Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Sexual Misconduct as Ground for Disciplining
Attorney or Judge, 43 A.L.R. 4TH 1062, 1105-27 (1986).
260. See In re Ford-Kaus, 730 So. 2d 269, 270-72, 276 (Fla. 1999).
261. 718 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 1998).
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of Florida held that a judge's removal from office was warranted for neglect-
ing clients while running for office, giving "misleading testimony in a do-
mestic violence proceeding," and failing to comply with a court order in a
dissolution proceeding. 262 In In re Ford-Kaus, the Supreme Court of Florida
found that clear and convincing evidence supported a judge's removal from
office who, while a lawyer running for office: lied to clients about the status
of their appellate brief, told them she had written the brief when it was writ-
ten by another lawyer, falsified time records, and intentionally inserted a
false certification as to the certificate of service.263 Charging excessive fees
and failing to timely pay charges from a trust account while closing an office
warranted reprimand.264 Removal from office was determined to be appro-
priate in a case of a judge who practiced law while previously serving on the
bench and who also counseled a client with pending criminal charges to flee
the jurisdiction.265
One case involving a dispute over legal fees resulted in a reprimand.
266
Several cases involving inappropriate commingling of funds resulted in rep-
rimands.267 Obviously, the severity of the discipline will depend on the se-
verity of the misconduct.
N. Violating Criminal Laws
Violations of the law clearly demean the judicial office and have been
found to violate a number of canons.268 As in the previous category, the se-
verity of the discipline will depend on the seriousness of the legal violation.
In one post-1996 case, the Supreme Court of Florida removed a judge for
backdating official court records. 269 In a pre-1996 case, the court held that
removal was warranted in a shoplifting case, despite evidence that the inci-
dent was caused by severe depression and the judge previously had an exem-
plary record of public service.27° Misuse of a state credit card for personal
262. Id. at 786, 788.
263. Ford-Kaus, 730 So. 2d at 272-74, 276-77.
264. In re Meyerson, 581 So. 2d 581, 582 (Fla. 1991).
265. In re Henson, 913 So. 2d 579, 582, 594 (Fla. 2005).
266. In re Davey, 645 So. 2d 398, 399-400, 409-10 (Fla. 1994).
267. E.g., In re Capua, 561 So. 2d 574, 575 (Fla. 1990).
268. See In re Wilson, 750 So. 2d 631, 632-33 (Fla. 1999); In re Johnson (June LaRan
Johnson), 692 So. 2d 168, 173 (Fla. 1997); In re Garrett, 613 So. 2d 463, 463, 465 (Fla.
1993); In re Fowler, 602 So. 2d 510, 510-11 (Fla. 1992); In re LaMotte, 341 So. 2d 513, 515,
518 (Fla. 1977).
269. June LaRan Johnson, 692 So. 2d at 170, 173.
270. Garrett, 613 So. 2d at 463-65.
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travel justified removal in another case.27 ' Withholding or giving false in-
formation to the police during an investigation resulted in a ten-day suspen-
27227sion in one case, and a public reprimand in another.273
In In re McIver, 4 the Supreme Court of Florida found the judge's par-
ticipation in an illegal card game and misdemeanor gambling conviction
warranted a reprimand.275 Participation on a golf tournament committee that
promoted gambling on the tournament was cause for public reprimand.276
Improper exhibition of a weapon warranted the same discipline.277 Repri-
mand was also deemed appropriate in several driving while intoxicated
cases. 278 Failure to report a boating accidene79 also resulted in a public rep-
rimand.28° Moreover, in a Michigan case, removal from office was the pen-
alty imposed for a judge who left the scene of an automobile accident, ap-
peared intoxicated, and drank more alcohol before speaking to the police. 28'
0. Delay in Ruling
Canon 3B(8) states: "[a] judge shall dispose of all judicial matters
promptly, efficiently, and fairly. ' 282 Most cases involving delay are resolved
through the informal process. In one case where a large number of cases
were involved, thejudge received a public reprimand.283
P. Exhibiting Lack of Candor During Official Proceedings
The failure to be candid during a police investigation has previously
been discussed under the section on violating the law. 2' Lack of candor or
giving inconsistent statements during a JQC investigation may be taken into
271. LaMotte, 341 So. 2d at 515,518.
272. Wilson, 750 So. 2d at 632-33.
273. Fowler, 602 So. 2d at 510-11.
274. 638 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1994).
275. Id. at 46.
276. In re Byrd, 460 So. 2d 377, 377 (Fla. 1984).
277. In re Tye, 544 So. 2d 1024, 1024-25 (Fla. 1989).
278. In re Esquiroz, 654 So. 2d 558, 558-59 (Fla. 1995); In re Gloeckner, 626 So. 2d 188,
189 (Fla. 1993).
279. In re Fletcher, 666 So. 2d 137, 139 (Fla. 1996) (Anstead, J., specially concurring).
280. Id. at 138 (per curiam).
281. In re Noecker, 691 N.W.2d 440, 441-42, 448 (Mich. 2005).
282. FLA. CODE JUD. CoNDucT Canon 3B(8).
283. In re Allawas, 906 So. 2d 1052, 1053-55 (Fla. 2005).
284. See supra Part IV.N.
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account when assessing penalties.285 In one case, the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida emphasized the importance of candor, stating:
Berkowitz testified before the commission several times, and, each time, his
testimony changed. The JQC found Berkowitz' willful deception, by itself,
sufficient to warrant removal. We agree that lying to the JQC is very serious
because the "integrity of the judicial system, the faith and confidence of the
people in the judicial process, and the faith of the people in the particular judge
are all affected by the false statements of a judge."2 86
Q. Failing to File Required Disclosure
Judges in Florida are required to file various financial disclosure forms,
as well as campaign financing reports, when they run for election. 27 Failure
to file these forms constitutes a violation of Canon 6.288 The vast majority of
the failure to file financial disclosure cases are taken care of informally. The
judge receives a reminder and the appropriate forms are filed. In one case,
the failure to disclose income within a financial disclosure form constituted a
violation of Canon 6 and resulted in a public reprimand. 289 At least one other
state imposed a reprimand for filing an incorrect disclosure form.290 The
campaign finance violations generally are tied to other charges regarding
violations of Canon 7.291 Such violations are discussed later in this article.29 2
R. Criticizing Jurors and Officials
Canon 3B(11) prohibits a judge from criticizing jurors.293 In several
cases, the JQC has taken informal action against judges for violating this
285. See In re Berkowitz, 522 So. 2d 843, 843-44 (Fla. 1988); see also In re Holloway,
832 So. 2d 716, 719, 729 (Fla. 2002) (holding that making materially misleading and incom-
plete statements to judges violates judicial canons).
286. Berkowitz, 522 So. 2d at 843 (quoting In re Leon, 440 So. 2d 1267, 1269 (Fla.
1983)).
287. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 8; FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 6(B).
288. See FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 6.
289. In re Meyerson, 581 So. 2d 581, 582 (Fla. 1991).
290. In re Nelson, 532 S.E.2d 609, 610, 612 (S.C. 2000) (holding that failing to disclose
extra-judicial income on an annual disclosure statement, as well as committing several other
ethical violations before resigning, warranted a public reprimand).
291. See generally FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 7 (regulating inappropriate political
activity).
292. See infra Part IV.T.2.
293. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3B(l 1). This rule was recently renumbered from
3(B)(10) to 3(B)(l1) by court order. In re Amendment to Code of Judicial Conduct, No.
SC05-281 (Fla. Jan. 5, 2006).
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canon. Other canons suggest a judge should not misuse his office in order to
unnecessarily criticize other public officials.294 One judge was removed for
this action along with other erratic behavior.295 The following two categories
have proved to be the most controversial as to the appropriate discipline.
S. Use of Intimidation
Words of intimidation or threat are used in a number of cases involving
judicial discipline. This category involves inappropriate contact with other
people as much as the two categories discussed earlier in this article, but
because of the seriousness of the behavior, it has been treated with height-
ened scrutiny by the highest court and the disciplinary commissions of the
various states. In Florida, a number of these cases exist.
In In re Shea,296 a judge "improperly contacted two attorneys and in-
timidated these attorneys into withdrawing from representation of their cli-
ent." 97 This behavior along with other misconduct warranted removal.298 In
In re Damron,299 a judge's actions of threatening parties and other individu-
als along with other acts of misconduct justified removal from office.300 A
judge's attempted intimidation of a fellow judge who was handling a friend's
case resulted in a thirty-day suspension.3' 1 In another case, a judge who par-
ticipated in the intimidation of a minor and his family received a ninety-day
suspension and a $1500 fine. 32 Lastly, a judge who threatened an attorney
unless subpoenas were withdrawn received a fifteen-day suspension.3 °3
The results in other states are similar. Threats made in the courtroom
mandated a six-month suspension without pay in a Washington State case.
Inappropriate threats of the use of contempt power, as well as the issuance of
294. In re Graham, 620 So. 2d 1273, 1274-75 (Fla. 1993) (approving the JQC's finding of
violations of Canons 1, 2, and 3(A)(1)).
295. Id. at 1274-75, 1277.
296. 759 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 2000).
297. Id. at 632.
298. Id. at 638-39.
299. 487 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1986).
300. Id. at 7.
301. In re Holloway, 832 So. 2d 716, 723, 729 (Fla. 2002).
302. Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Bishop, 761 So. 2d 195, 196, 198 (Miss.
2000).
303. In re Elliston, 789 S.W.2d 469, 476, 484 (Mo. 1990) (holding that a menacing phone
call to an attorney demanding the withdrawal of subpoenas, as well as several other discourte-
ous acts, warranted a fifteen-day suspension).
304. In re Hammermaster, 985 P.2d 924, 926 (Wash. 1999).
[Vol. 30:3:349
51
: Nova Law Review 30, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2006
JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE IN FLORIDA
other threats toward attorneys, resulted in a five-year suspension in Michi-
gan.3" 5 Other threats have resulted in censure or reprimand.3"
In In re Diaz, °7 Justice Cantero, in his dissenting opinion, questioned
the severity of the punishment. 38 Judge Diaz wrote an anonymous e-mail to
another judge threatening political retribution unless the judge receiving the
e-mail discontinued reporting illegal aliens who appeared before him.3° 9 The
judge received a $15,000 fine, a two-week suspension without pay, a public
reprimand, and was required to issue a public apology.
310
The misconduct in Diaz involved threats and intimidation. 311 The facts
of Diaz, however, are unique. It is therefore difficult to determine whether
the penalty was disproportionate. Unlike the other cases involving threats,
the party being threatened was unaware that the person making the threat
was a judge.312 While inappropriate off the bench conduct, which may bring
the judiciary into disrepute, is clearly covered by the code,313 one might ar-
gue that the misconduct in Diaz is less serious because no one knew a judge
was involved. The other viewpoint is that anonymous threats are just as se-
rious and may further tarnish the judiciary when they become public knowl-
edge. The only other case in Florida involving attempted intimidation of
another judge is In re Holloway.1 4 Unlike Holloway, however, the threat in
Diaz was not made in the heat of passion, but appeared to be a calculated
attempt to coerce specific conduct. 35 Thus, it could be argued that Diaz's
level of misconduct was greater because the majority of the court in Diaz
determined the penalty proposed by the JQC was appropriate.3 6
T. Election Violations
The various types of election violations, in addition to making misrep-
resentations during the campaign, include: a) making inappropriate promises
305. In re Del Rio, 256 N.W.2d 727,729, 752-53 (Mich. 1977).
306. See, e.g., In re Diaz, 908 So. 2d 334, 336, 338 (Fla. 2005) (imposing suspension
without pay, a fine, and public reprimand).
307. Id. at 334.
308. Id. at 338 (Cantero, J., dissenting).
309. See id. at 336 (majority opinion).
310. Id. at 336, 338.
311. Diaz, 908 So. 2d at 336.
312. See id. at 337.
313. See, e.g., In re Cope, 848 So. 2d 301, 302-03 (Fla. 2003); In re Wilson, 750 So. 2d
631, 632-33 (Fla. 1999).
314. 832 So. 2d 716, 718 (Fla. 2002).
315. See Diaz, 908 So. 2d at 336.
316. Id. at 336-38.
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of performance in office;31 ' b) campaign financing and reporting miscon-
duct;318 c) engaging in partisan politics; 3 9 d) supporting another candidate for
office; 320 and e) directly soliciting loans in excess of the $500 statutory limit
from family members.32'
These violations have been difficult to deal with not only because of the
First Amendment implications discussed earlier,322 but because of the com-
peting concepts that a party should not profit (by obtaining a position in the
judiciary) from campaign misdeeds and the idea that removal should only
occur in those cases where the judge's conduct is fundamentally inconsistent
with the responsibilities of judicial office.323 The most contentious areas
concerning discipline have involved inappropriate promises of performance
and misrepresentations regarding an opponent. The area of campaign financ-
ing and reporting violations has also created some controversy as to appro-
priate discipline. While the prohibition as to engaging in partisan politics
appears to involve profound First Amendment issues, the question of disci-
pline has not been hotly disputed so far in Florida. Cases involving backing
another candidate for office have been rare.
1. Making Inappropriate Promises of Performance in Office
In In re Alley,324 the parties stipulated that the judge:
(a) misrepresented her qualifications and those of her opponent;
(b) injected party politics into a non-partisan election, by noting
the party affiliation of the governor who had appointed her oppo-
nent to her position of county judge (when in fact both Alley and
her opponent were members of the same political party, which
was different from that of the governor); (c) improperly included
a photograph of her opponent sitting next to a criminal defendant
noting that her opponent "defend[ed] convicted mass murderer,
cop killer, William Cruse," when at the time of the photograph
Cruse had not been convicted and her opponent was an assistant
public defender observing a duty placed on her as a member of
The Florida Bar; and (d) improperly included a portion of a
317. In re McMillan, 797 So. 2d 560, 562-64 (Fla. 2001).
318. In re Rodriguez, 829 So. 2d 857, 858-59 (Fla. 2002).
319. In re Angel, 867 So. 2d 379, 380-82 (Fla. 2004).
320. In re Glickstein, 620 So. 2d 1000, 1001-02 (Fla. 1993).
321. See In re Pando, 903 So. 2d 902, 902-03 (Fla. 2005).
322. See supra Part III.G.
323. See Rodriguez, 829 So. 2d at 858, 860-61; McMillan, 797 So. 2d at 572-73.
324. 699 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 1997).
[Vol. 30:3:349
53
: Nova Law Review 30, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2006
JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE IN FLORIDA
newspaper editorial which falsely implied that Alley, not her op-
ponent, had been endorsed by the newspaper.
325
The JQC, finding her response to be sincere, recommended that the judge be
reprimanded.326 The court reluctantly accepted the recommended penalty
stating: "we find it difficult to allow one guilty of such egregious conduct to
retain the benefits of those violations and remain in office. 327
The difficulty in determining the appropriate penalty in election cases
was more thoroughly discussed in Kinsey.32" The JQC found that judicial
campaigns which depicted a very "pro-law enforcement" stance (representa-
tions made in pamphlets, flyers, and radio statements) violated Canon 7.329
The JQC also found that campaign materials which misrepresented a judge's
role in criminal proceedings (to combat crime and support police officers)
violated the code.330 In addition, there were misrepresentations concerning
the incumbent judge's actions in specific cases.33 '
[T]he JQC recommended that Judge Kinsey be publicly reprimanded and
fined in the amount of $50,000 plus the costs of these proceedings. The
amount of the fine represented approximately 50% of her yearly salary, or
in other words, a six-month suspension without pay (which was the other
option that the JQC considered imposing). The JQC explained this deci-
sion as follows:
The Panel finds that Judge Kinsey is guilty of serious violations grow-
ing out of her campaign in which she was successful in obtaining the posi-
tion of county court judge. The Panel has no hesitancy in recommending
that she be publicly reprimanded by this Court but believes leaving her in
office with no further penalty is entirely inappropriate. Under the current
Constitution, Judge Kinsey is subject to removal or further penalty in the
form of a fine. The Hearing Panel has thoroughly deliberated this issue
and concludes that the penalty imposed here must be sufficient to strongly
discourage others from violating the Canons governing contested elections.
At least one member of this Panel strongly urged Judge Kinsey's re-
moval. This Panel member concurs in and would apply the statement of
this Court in Alley that: "We find it difficult to allow one guilty of such
325. Id. at 1369 (alteration in original).
326. Id. at 1370.
327. Id.
328. In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 80 (Fla. 2003).
329. Id. at 79-92.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 82-84.
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egregious conduct to retain the benefits of these violations and remain in
office."
However, the conduct in Alley was, in the view of the majority of the
Hearing Panel, significantly more egregious than the conduct involved in
the present case. Judge Alley admitted to intentionally misrepresenting the
basic qualifications of her incumbent opponent and in intentionally misrep-
resenting her own qualifications. She altered a published newspaper to
make it appear she had been endorsed by the paper which had actually en-
dorsed her opponent. She intentionally injected party politics into the non-
partisan race. Judge Kinsey's misconduct did not rise to this level.
Despite the less egregious nature of the violations, Judge Kinsey must
be punished for her conduct and such conduct simply cannot be tolerated in
future elections. While a reprimand alone is insufficient, there was no evi-
dence that Judge Kinsey is presently unfit to hold office other than her
misconduct involved in winning the election. Although such misconduct
can rise to the level of present unfitness as is required for removal under
Article V, § 12(a)(1), here, the Panel finds the conduct does not warrant
removal.
33 2
The panel obviously struggled with some very basic issues, including:
1) weighing Judge Kinsey's culpability versus Judge Alley's culpability; 2)
the application of the strict standards for removal previously announced by
the Supreme Court of Florida; 3) trying to arrive at an appropriate penalty
short of removal for what it obviously regarded as serious misconduct; 4)
trying to determine how to apply the relatively new penalties of fine and sus-
pension (applying a fine equivalent to a six-month suspension without strain-
ing resources of the court system); and 5) trying to assess a penalty which
would be strong enough to deter this misconduct in the future.333
The Supreme Court of Florida upheld the decision of the JQC as to dis-
cipline, specifically finding:
We agree with the JQC that Judge Kinsey is guilty of serious campaign
violations that warrant a severe penalty. Accordingly, this Court agrees
with the JQC's recommendation as to discipline and finds that a substantial
fine is warranted in order to assure the public that justice is dispensed in a
fair and unbiased manner and to warn any future judicial candidates that
this Court will not tolerate improper campaign statements which imply
that, if elected, the judicial candidate will favor one group of citizens over
332. Id. at 91-92 (citation omitted).
333. Kinsey, 842 So. 2d at 91-92.
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another or will make rulings based upon the sway of popular sentiment in
the community.
334
Chief Justice Anstead, who concurred in the majority opinion, indicated
he felt the decision as to discipline was close.335 Justice Pariente recognized
the difficulty in applying the punishments of suspensions and fines, but de-
ferred to the decision of the JQC, especially in light of its goal to deter this
behavior in the future.336 Justice Lewis, as previously indicated, 3 7 felt re-
moval was appropriate.3 3 s Justice Wells dissented in an opinion joined by
Justice Quince, finding much of Judge Kinsey's behavior protected by the
First Amendment as construed in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, a
United States Supreme Court case.339 In light of this determination, Justice
Wells would have only found Judge Kinsey guilty of misrepresentations and
imposed a reprimand. 34°
In another case, the Supreme Court of Florida held that a judge is re-
quired to be removed when the judge is charged with:
(1) making explicit campaign promises to favor the State and the police in
court proceedings; (2) making explicit promises that he would side against
the defense; (3) making unfounded attacks on an incumbent county judge;
(4) making unfounded attacks on the local court system and local officials;
and (5) improperly presiding over a court case in which he had a direct
conflict of interest.34
In several recent cases, other state courts have upheld reprimands and
censures for promises of being tough on crime, 34 2 having the heart of a
prosecutor, 13 or promising to be "tough on drunk driving.' '  A pledge to
stop repeated child abuse resulted in a thirty-day suspension from one
334. Id. at 92.
335. Id. at 93 (Anstead, C.J., specially concurring).
336. Id. at 95-97 (Pariente, J., concurring).
337. See supra note 1.
338. Kinsey, 842 So. 2d at 97 (Lewis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
339. Id. at 100 (Wells, J., dissenting) (referencing Republican Party of Minn. v. White,
536 U.S. 765,788 (2002)).
340. Id. (Wells, J., dissenting).
341. In re McMillan, 797 So. 2d 560, 562 (Fla. 2001).
342. In re Haan, 676 N.E.2d 740, 741 (Ind. 1997) (upholding reprimand).
343. In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 2-3, 8 (N.Y. 2003) (upholding censure); see also In re
Kaiser, 759 P.2d 392, 394, 401 (Wash. 1988) (upholding censure).
344. Kaiser, 759 P.2d at 394-98,401.
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court.345 Several cases involving misrepresentations of a judicial candidate's
qualifications or the qualifications of the opponent have resulted in fines or
reprimands.34"
2. Campaign Financing and Reporting Misconduct
In In re Rodriguez,347 the judge was disciplined for filing misleading fi-
nancial reports which, among other things, indicated she had loaned her
campaign $200,000 when in fact she had received a contribution to her cam-
paign of that amount from her boyfriend.48 There were also several other
campaign financing violations. 349 The JQC originally recommended a repri-
mand, which was rejected by the Supreme Court of Florida.35 ° On remand,
the JQC recommended that Judge Rodriguez be disciplined by: 1) a public
reprimand to be delivered personally before the Supreme Court of Florida; 2)
suspension for four months without pay; 3) a $40,000 fine to be paid upon
Judge Rodriguez's return to the bench "in equal monthly payments until the
end of her present term;" and 4) "payment of all court reporter's fees in-
cuffed by the JQC."'35' The court accepted this recommendation; however, it
commented on appropriate considerations for fines in the future.352
The JQC explains that the fine "is designed to reimburse the public for
payments made to the Respondent during her prior paid absence from the
bench." Judge Rodriguez's prior paid absence was an eight-month paid
suspension which she voluntarily took while being investigated by the
State for potential criminal violations of the election laws. All charges re-
lated to the State's investigation were eventually dismissed. The amount of
the fine represents approximately half of the salary she received during that
eight-month suspension. We understand that the JQC intended the fine and
the four-month suspension without pay to account for the monies paid to
her during her previous suspension. However, the fine and the unpaid
four-month suspension will not necessarily make the State whole. Gener-
ally, when a judge is suspended or on leave, a senior judge is appointed in
345. Summe v. Judicial Ret. & Removal Comm'n, 947 S.W.2d 42, 43-44, 46, 48 (Ky.
1997).
346. In re Donohoe, 580 P.2d 1093, 1096, 1098 (Wash. 1978) (reprimanding judicial
candidate's conduct); In re Emrich, 669 N.E.2d 586, 586, 588-89 (Ohio 1996) (assessing
costs).
347. 829 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 2002).
348. Id. at 858-59.
349. See id. at 859.
350. Id. at 858.
351. Id.
352. Rodriguez, 829 So. 2d at 861.
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her place. The senior judge's salary is paid out of a special fund. Thus, the
JQC should in the future also take into consideration, when determining the
amount of any fine, the potential financial burden a given circuit incurs
when it has to appoint a senior judge in the event of a suspension. Any
fine that is intended to make the circuit whole should include that compo-
nent.
353
Thus, one appropriate gauge for a fine is to make the state whole for any
damages resulting from the misconduct. 4
Two other recent cases have dealt with campaign financing violations
during judicial campaigns.35 5 In In re Pando, the Supreme Court of Florida
accepted a JQC recommendation of a $25,000 fine where the judge accepted
loans from her family in excess of the campaign limits, and then filed mis-
leading campaign reports, as well as giving a misleading statement to the
JQC counsel regarding the conduct.356 In In re Gooding, the judge incurred
campaign expenses when his account had insufficient funds, and then he
tried to reimburse the account after the statutory deadline. 357 The Supreme
Court of Florida accepted the JQC recommendation of a reprimand.358
3. Engaging in Partisan Politics
In the most recent case that involves engaging in inappropriate partisan
politics, the JQC and the accused judge stipulated that during his re-election
campaign he spoke at partisan political gatherings to which his opponent was
not invited, attended and campaigned at partisan gatherings, and held himself
out as a member of a political party at political meetings. 3 9 The court ac-
cepted a reprimand as appropriate where the judge wrongfully believed his
conduct was protected by the First Amendment.3 ° In several other cases
involving wrongfully engaging in partisan activities, the court also accepted
recommendations of reprimands. 6
353. Id.
354. See id.
355. See In re Gooding, 905 So. 2d 121, 121 (Fla. 2005); In re Pando, 903 So. 2d 902, 902
(Fla. 2005).
356. Pando, 903 So. 2d at 902, 904.
357. Gooding, 905 So. 2d at 121 (citation omitted).
358. Id. at 123-24.
359. In re Angel, 867 So. 2d 379, 382 n.3 (Fla. 2004).
360. See id. at 383. But see Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 766 (8th
Cir. 2005) (concluding that Minnesota's partisan-activities clause violated the First Amend-
ment).
361. E.g., In re Kay, 508 So. 2d 329, 329-30 (Fla. 1987).
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4. Supporting Another Candidate for Office
In one case, the Supreme Court of Florida held that a reprimand was
appropriate for a judge who wrongfully supported a Supreme Court of Flor-
ida Justice for merit retention.362 The Supreme Court of Florida stated,
"[n]either honest motives nor well-intentioned conduct, however, excuse less
than strict compliance with the Code of Judicial Conduct., 363 Another judge
received a public reprimand for actively supporting his wife for the position
of clerk of the court.3 4
5. Directly Soliciting Support from Attorneys
While federal case law has raised questions concerning the validity of
that portion of Canon 7 which prohibits direct solicitation of funds and sup-
port by judges seeking election,365 the Supreme Court of Florida has not spo-
ken on its continued validity. In the one case where a violation was found,
the court accepted the JQC's recommendation of a public reprimand.36
V. CONCLUSION
While the Supreme Court of Florida retains the right to reject the disci-
pline recommended by the JQC, in the overwhelming majority of cases the
court has approved the recommendation. This has been especially true in
cases involving either removal or reprimand. There also appears to be basic
equality in the discipline that judges receive for violations of the code.
Variations usually result from numerous factors which may be considered by
the JQC and the unique factual circumstances surrounding individual cases.
In fact, the Supreme Court of Florida's rate of rejection of proposed discipli-
nary action in Florida does not vary significantly from what has occurred in
other parts of the country.367
362. In re Glickstein, 620 So. 2d 1000, 1002-03 (Fla. 1993).
363. Id. at 1002 (citation omitted).
364. In re McGregor, 614 So. 2d 1089, 1090 (Fla. 1993); see also In re Turner (Jack
Turner), 573 So. 2d 1, 1-2 (Fla. 1990) (approving recommendation for public reprimand of a
judge for actively supporting his son, a candidate for judicial office).
365. FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 7B(1).
366. In re Lantz, 402 So. 2d 1144, 1146-47 (Fla. 1981) (court found that soliciting support
from a member of the bar violated Canon 7B(2), which at that time was the section that pro-
hibited judicial candidates from soliciting support); FLA. CODE JUD. CONDUcT Canon 7B(2)
(1994) (amended 1995).
367. In a recent survey of judicial discipline sanctions, the low nationwide rate of rejection
of the recommended discipline in judicial misconduct cases was noted:
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The few areas of controversy or potential disagreement seem to concern
election cases and cases where fines or suspensions are imposed. Several
factors appear to be responsible for this confusion. There are very strict
guidelines laid out by the Supreme Court of Florida for removal of judges
and, therefore, this punishment is only imposed for the most egregious con-
duct, repeated behavior, or cases of active concealment. These are cases
where there is little room for disagreement. Reprimand usually involves
minor or isolated infractions. Suspension and fines are imposed in those
tough cases where the misconduct is serious but where the standards for re-
moval have not been met. Suspension and fines are relatively new, as they
were authorized in 1996.68 The philosophy involving when to impose these
measures has not been clarified. The Supreme Court of Florida has stated
that the goal of judicial discipline even after the 1996 constitutional amend-
ment is not punishment. It is therefore unclear when these disciplinary
measures should be utilized.
In the area of elections, the court has stated that a candidate should not
profit by their misdeeds. This area of the law however is extremely compli-
cated. Some violations are technical. Many times the offender has taken the
bench and performed well. It is unclear whether the same standards for re-
moval apply or whether the court is suggesting a different standard applies in
terms of election.
In conclusion, although some areas should be clarified, it appears that in
the area of judicial discipline the JQC is performing its duties in the manner
contemplated by the Supreme Court of Florida.
From 1990 through 2001, reviewing [courts imposed] different sanctions than that recom-
mended or imposed by the commissions in 42 cases. In 22 cases, the state supreme court im-
posed a less severe sanction than that imposed or recommended by the commission; in 20
cases, the court imposed a more severe sanction.
GRAY, supra note 3, at 33.
368. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 12(a)(1).
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THE TRADE WINDS OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE 2004-2005 GOODWIN
SEMINAR ARTICLES BY DENNIS MORRISON, Q.C.,
AND THE HONOURABLE MIA AMOR MOTTLEY,
Q.C., M.P.
JANE E. CROSS*
In Fall 2004, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center
hosted a Goodwin Seminar series entitled Trade Winds in Caribbean Law:
Evolution of Legal Norms and the Quest for Independent Justice.1 Since the
conclusion of the Goodwin Seminar in November 2004, there have been two
significant developments in the Commonwealth Caribbean. First, the Carib-
bean Court of Justice ("CCJ") was inaugurated on April 16, 2005 in Port of
Spain, Trinidad. Second, the CARICOM Single Market and Economy
("CSME") was launched on January 30, 2006.
With these two important first steps, both the CCJ and CSME will un-
doubtedly continue their development. Two countries, Barbados and Guy-
ana, already have access to the CCJ as a final court of appeal while other
countries, such as Jamaica, are still implementing the legal changes neces-
sary to avail themselves of the CCJ's appellate function. The first sitting of
the CCJ took place on August 8-9, 2005. In addition, the CCJ has original
jurisdiction in the interpretation of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, in-
cluding matters related to the CSME. On January 1, 2006, six countries-
Jamaica, Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago-
joined the CSME, which will be fully implemented by December 2008.2
These long-awaited and highly anticipated developments have set a promis-
ing course for the Commonwealth Caribbean.
It is not yet clear, however, whether the CCJ will engage in judicial ac-
tivism in death penalty cases in the Caribbean. Within death penalty dis-
course in the Caribbean, judicial activism posits the concept of national sov-
* Jane E. Cross is an Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Caribbean Law
Programs at Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University. Professor Cross was
the Faculty Chair of the Goodwin Seminar in fall of 2004.
1. For a summary of this Goodwin seminar series, see Jane E. Cross, Introduction for
the Goodwin Seminar Articles: Trade Winds in Caribbean Law-Evolution of Legal Norms
and Quest for Independent Justice, 29 NOVA L. REv. 131 (2005).
2. Six Join Caribbean Single Market, BBC Caribbean.com, Jan. 3, 2006,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/caribbean/news/story/2006/01/printable/060103_newcaricommembers.s
html.
61
: Nova Law Review 30, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2006
NOVA LA WREVIEW
ereignty and cultural imperatives against an expansive view of evolving in-
ternational human rights. Moving into four decades and more of independ-
ence, Commonwealth Caribbean nations seek to strike a sometimes precari-
ous balance between their own national identities and their observance of a
dynamic mass of international obligations.
Both Mr. Dennis Morrison and Minister Mia Mottley, in their respective
articles, explore the role of judicial activism in the Caribbean Common-
wealth. Mr. Morrison examines judicial activism by the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council (Privy Council) in three case studies dealing with the
Privy Council's treatment of the death penalty. Minister Mottley examines
the judicial activism of regional and international human rights tribunals in
determining whether states are breaching their treaty obligations. Mr. Morri-
son expresses admiration for the Privy's Council efforts to infuse emerging
human rights concepts into death penalty cases. Minister Mottley notes with
concern that the imposition of outside cultural values by applying emerging
international norms creates tensions within Caribbean nations as they seek to
protect and safeguard the rights of their citizens. These distinct approaches
to judicial activism show the interplay of international, regional and domestic
concerns as the Commonwealth Caribbean nations strive to consolidate their
independent, national sovereign personae regarding human rights.
Mr. Dennis Morrison is the author of the article entitled The Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council and the Death Penalty in the Commonwealth
Caribbean: Studies in Judicial Activism. 3 He was appointed Queen's Coun-
sel in 1994, is currently a partner and head of the litigation department at the
law firm DunnCox, and serves as a Judge of the Court of Appeal in Belize.
He has also served as chairman of the Council of Legal Education, president
of the Jamaican Bar Association, and a member of the Jamaica Council for
Human Rights.
Mr. Morrison has degrees from the University of the West Indies, Cave
Hill, Barbados and Norman Manley Law School in Jamaica. As a Jamaica
Rhodes Scholar, he attended Balliol College, Oxford University. He has also
lectured at Norman Manley Law School in the areas of the laws of evidence,
hire, purchase and sale of goods, and the rights and obligations of the legal
profession.
Mr. Morrison begins his article by providing background on the role of
the Privy Council and the impetus for the establishment of the CCJ. Near the
end of this section he concludes that:
3. Dennis Morrison, The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and the Death Penalty
in the Commonwealth Caribbean: Studies in Judicial Activism, 30 NOVA L. REv. 403 (2006).
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[t]he recent successful challenge in Jamaica to the constitutionality
of local legislation designed to give effect to the Agreement and
the Protocol demonstrates that, despite the inauguration of the Car-
ibbean Court of Justice on April 16, 2005, the governments and the
people of the region may yet be some distance away from the
complete achievement of abolition of appeals to the Privy Coun-
cil.4
With that assessment, Mr. Morrison turns to the focus of this article-the
role of the Privy Council opinions in the area of capital punishment.
Before starting his case study of Privy Council and three important
death penalty case studies in the Caribbean, Mr. Morrison provides back-
ground on the history and support for the death penalty in the Caribbean. He
observes that despite the international movement to abolish the death penalty
and opposition to the death penalty within the Caribbean, "the death penalty
remains, and is likely to remain for some time, the penalty for murder
throughout the region."5 Next, Mr. Morrison provides a summary of the
International Bill of Rights as it relates to the death penalty issue. He then
explains that the International Bill of Rights was enshrined in the Independ-
ence Constitutions of Commonwealth Caribbean nations. In these sections,
Mr. Morrison masterfully provides the legal, historical, and political context
for the examination of the treatment of the death penalty in three sets of
Privy Council cases he has selected for study.
In structuring his case study, Mr. Morrison selects cases that touch upon
critical topics in Commonwealth Caribbean concerning constitutional limita-
tions on death penalty enforcement. Using these cases, he shows the evolv-
ing trend of the Privy Council to set aside its own earlier decisions as it at-
tempts to reconcile constitutional construction with evolving international
norms on the death penalty. He aptly identifies three areas in which the
Privy Council has reversed prior rulings on the death penalty.
In the first topic, "The Carrying Out of a Sentence of Death-The Im-
pact of Delay," Mr. Morrison explains how the Privy Council departed from
its decision in Riley v. Attorney General6 with its subsequent holding in Pratt
v. Attorney General.7 In Riley, Mr. Morrison focuses on the Privy Council's
holding that delays in death sentence execution are not contrary to constitu-
tional prohibitions against inhuman or degrading treatment.8 Mr. Morrison
4. Id. at 405.
5. Id. at 406.
6. [1983] 1 A.C. 719 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Jam.).
7. [1993] 43 W.I.R. 340, [1994] 2 A.C. 1 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Jam.).
8. Morrison, supra note 3, at 414.
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then remarks that a decade later when the Privy Council addressed the same
issue in Pratt, the Privy Council reversed Riley by holding that a delay of
more than five years in the execution of a death sentence provides a compel-
ling basis for showing a violation of the very same constitutional prohibi-
tions. He ends this study by indicating that one regrettable reaction to Pratt
was the decision by the Governments of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago to
withdraw from the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights.
In his second case study on "Procedural Fairness and the Prerogative of
Mercy," Mr. Morrison reviews the rationale that led the Privy Council to
overrule de Freitas v. Benny9 and of Reckley v. Minister of Public Safety and
Immigration (No. 2)10 with its holding in Lewis v. Attorney General.1 As
Mr. Morrison explains, de Freitas provided that a convicted person did not
have a right to be shown materials submitted or to be heard when a Head of
State is being advised on "the [P]rerogative of [M]ercy.' '  Mr. Morrison
notes that the Privy Council upheld its decision in de Freitas some twenty
years later in Reckley, but four years after Reckley:
the Privy Council concluded in Lewis that [die Freitas and Reck-
ley should be overruled and that a petitioner for mercy should have
access to the material to be placed before the 'Mercy Committee,'
as well as the right to make representations to the Committee,
whether in writing, as would normally be the case, or orally. 13
Mr. Morrison concludes that these cases demonstrate the Privy Council's
tendency to freshly scrutinize existent precedent to incorporate principles of
fairness.
With the final case study, Mr. Morrison explores "The Mandatory
Death Penalty." Starting with Ong Ah Chuan v. Public Prosecutor,4 Mr.
Morrison notes that the Privy Council had not entertained a constitutional
challenge to the mandatory death penalty in Singapore. He then notes that in
two subsequent cases, Reyes v. The Queen 15 and Watson v. The Queen, 6 the
9. [1976] A.C. 239 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Trin. & Tobago).
10. [1996] 1 A.C. 527 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Bah.).
11. [2001] 2 A.C. 50 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Jam.).
12. Morrison, supra note 3, at 416 (alteration in original).
13. Id. at416-19.
14. [1981] A.C. 648 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Sing.).
15. [2002] UKPC 11, [2002] 2 A.C. 235 (appeal taken from Belize). Mr. Morrison also
mentions two other cases decided at the same time as Reyes, Regina v. Hughes [2002] UKPC
12, [2002] 2 A.C. 259 (appeal taken from St. Lucia) and Fox v. The Queen [2002] UKPC 13,
[2002] 2 A.C. 284 (appeal taken from St. Christopher & Nevis).
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Privy Council examined the constitutionality of the mandatory death penalty
in the Caribbean. As Mr. Morrison explains, the Privy Council in Reyes
ruled that the mandatory imposition of the death penalty in Belize after a
murder conviction without considering mitigating factors was unconstitu-
tional because it constituted inhuman and degrading punishment. He ob-
serves that the Privy Council made a similar determination in Watson with
regard to the constitutionality of the mandatory death penalty in Jamaica.
At the same time the Privy Council decided Watson, it upheld the con-
stitutionality of the mandatory death penalty in two cases decided at the same
time as Watson. The mandatory death penalties of Barbados and Trinidad
and Tobago were upheld, respectively, in Boyce v. The Queen'7 and Matthew
v. The State8 due to the saving clause provisions in their constitutions that
preserves the constitutionality of laws in effect prior to the enactment of their
constitutions. The peculiarity of the Watson opinion becomes evident when
Mr. Morrison refers to the dissent of Lord Nicholls in Matthew, which states
in part that:
I do not believe the framers of these constitutions ever intended the
existing laws savings provisions should operate to deprive the
country's citizens of the protection afforded by rising standards set
by human rights values. The savings clauses were intended to
smooth the transition, not to freeze standards for ever. The consti-
tutions of these countries should be interpreted accordingly, by
giving proper effect to their spirit and not being mesmerised by
their letter. A literal interpretation of these constitutions means
that the law of Jamaica, a country which has taken steps to distin-
guish between different types of murders, is held to be unconstitu-
tional, whereas the laws of Barbados and of Trinidad and Tobago,
where no ameliorating steps have been taken, are held to be consti-
tutional. This is bizarre. 
e
Mr. Morrison concludes that sentencing will now play a much greater
role in capital murder cases in the Caribbean. Indeed, after Mr. Morrison
completed his article, the Privy Council once again considered the constitu-
tionality of the mandatory death penalty in the Bahamas. On March 8, 2006,
16. [2004] UKPC 34, [2005] 1 A.C. 472 (appeal taken from Jam.). Like Reyes, Watson
is also one of a trilogy of cases decided by the Privy Council. The other two cases are Boyce
v. The Queen [2004] UKPC 32, [2005] 1 A.C. 400 (appeal taken from Barb.) and Matthew v.
The State [2004] UKPC 33, [2005] 1 A.C. 433 (appeal taken from Trin. & Tobago).
17. [2004] UKPC 32, [2005] 1 A.C. 400, 427 (appeal taken from Barb.).
18. [2004] UKPC 33, [2005] 1 A.C. 433,452 (appeal taken from Trin. & Tobago).
19. Matthew [2004] UKPC 33, [2005] 1 A.C. at 470.
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the Privy Council decided in Bowe v. The Queen2" the mandatory death sen-
tence imposed by the Penal Code of the Bahamas "should be construed as
imposing a discretionary and not a mandatory sentence of death."'"
Mr. Morrison concludes his case study with the following statement:
These three case studies demonstrate the response of the Privy
Council to the challenge of change in the area of human rights
norms in the context of death penalty cases. They underscore the
fact that for the law to preserve its relevance in this area it must be
constantly responsive to the "evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society. 22
In the end, Mr. Morrison expresses his hope that the CCJ will adopt the
Privy Council's judicially active role "as independent guardians of the con-
stitution.""
During the 2004 Goodwin Seminar, Minister Mottley delivered a
speech entitled "Walking the Tightrope." Minister Mottley is currently the
Deputy Prime Minister. At the time she delivered this speech, Minister Mot-
tley was the Attorney General and Minister of Home Affairs. In February
2006, she was appointed the Minister of Economic Affairs and Development.
Throughout her political career, Minister Mottley has reached many mile-
stones. She was elected to the Barbados Parliament in 1994 and was one of
the youngest persons ever to be assigned a ministerial portfolio when she
was appointed to the Ministry of Education, Youth Affairs and Culture. She
is also the first woman to ever hold the position of Attorney General in Bar-
bados. Before that, she was the youngest person ever to become Queen's
Counsel in Barbados. In 1996, she was elected General Secretary of the
Barbados Labour Party.
Minister Mottley has also served as the chairman of the Regional Pre-
paratory Committee for the establishment of the CCJ and the chairman of the
Social Council of Barbados. She is also a member of the National Security
Council of Barbados and the Barbados Defence Board. She is an attorney-at-
law and graduated with a law degree from the London School of Economics
with a specialty in advocacy. She is a barrister of the Bar of England and
Wales.
In her speech, Minister Mottley examined "the impact of judicial activ-
ism on the nature of [Barbados'] obligations either already accepted or in
20. [2006] UKPC 10 (appeal taken from Bah.).
21. Id. 43.
22. Morrison, supra note 3, at 423-24 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
23. Id. at 424.
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fact being considered by sovereign nations in the area of international law; in
particular, international human rights law.",24  Examining the role of the
United Nations in human rights law, she notes that not only the structure, but
also the cultural values of the developed world have influenced the judg-
ments of international human bodies which in turn "have sought to redefine
the obligations of states through re-interpreting those obligations under inter-
national treaty law in a manner that was never understood by the states at the
time of the acceptance of the obligations, or indeed at the time of the reserva-
tions being submitted right before that time. 2 5 She explains that the expan-
sion of the definition of human rights has occurred due to the actions of judi-
cial bodies and not by the state's undertaking new obligations. This trend
impinges on the rights of nations "to appropriately and properly plan for
themselves and their citizens according to their norms, their customs and
their respect for fundamental rights. 26
Since Commonwealth Caribbean nations have a "healthy respect for
human rights,"27 these nations adopted constitutions and entered in to human
rights conventions. Barbados, for example, signed the International Cove-
nant of Civil and Political Rights and the American Convention of Human
Rights. At the time of signing these treaties, however, Barbados indicated its
"continued intention to apply the death penalty as is provided for in both the
,,21
constitution of Barbados and the Offences Against Persons. Until very
recently, Barbados has since its "existence as an independent state, since
1966, been regarded as a model adherent to human rights obligations."29
Minister Mottley notes that judicial encroachment on the construction
of human rights obligations in the Caribbean are reflected in the decision by
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Pratt, a Jamaican case. As
noted in the summary of Mr. Morrison's article, the Pratt decision imposed a
five-year time limit for executing death sentences in Commonwealth Carib-
bean states. Several years after this decision, the United Nations Human
Right Committee reduced that limit by appropriately four months for Trini-
dadian cases. As an exercise of its own sovereignty, Barbados amended its
constitution in 2002 to avoid the application of Pratt to Barbadian death pen-
alty sentences. In the last few years, however, Barbados has had to contend
with litigation on the issue of the "mandatory death penalty."
24. Mia A. Mottley, Walking the Tightrope, 30 NOVA L. REV. 425 (2006).
25. Id. at 427-8.
26. Id. at 428.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 429.
29. Mottley, supra note 24, at 430.
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The issue of the constitutionality of Barbados's mandatory death pen-
alty went before the Privy Council in Boyce.3" In that landmark case, a panel
of nine judges sat to hear this case and two similar cases from Jamaica, 31 and
Trinidad and Tobago.32 The Privy Council found in a five-to-four ruling that
the mandatory death penalty was preserved by the savings clause (section 26)
of the Constitution of Barbados. Similarly, in Matthew, the Privy Council
upheld the constitutionality of Trinidad and Tobago's mandatory death pen-
alty, but in Watson, the Privy Council struck down Jamaica's mandatory
death penalty because it was not preserved by the saving clause in the Jamai-
can Constitution given that the relevant statute had been amended since in-
dependence. Minister Mottley considers the Boyce opinion a reversal of "ten
(10) years of political onslaught in the form of judicial activism."33
Next, Minister Mottley addresses the term "mandatory death penalty."
Although that term has been used in reference to the death penalty in Barba-
dos, Minister Mottley notes that the use of pre-conviction defenses and resort
to post-conviction mechanisms limit the application or execution of the death
penalty. In addition, the Constitutional Amendment Act passed in 2002 will
further strengthen the procedural safeguards for the accused. Despite the fact
that Barbados is deemed to have a mandatory death penalty, Minister Mot-
tley notes that "the statistics show that more often than not, since Independ-
ence, the sentence has been commuted rather than affirmed."34
Even though the death penalty in Barbados has been found consistent
with its domestic law, the death penalty is still being challenged under inter-
national law. In particular, within the Organization of American States, the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has held that the mandatory
death penalty is in contravention of the American Convention on Human
Rights. After the 2002 Constitutional Amendment, Barbados was called
before the Inter-American Commission by a British law firm with ties to the
commission.
Despite this development, Barbados remains committed to remaining a
party to the American Convention on Human Rights. Minister Mottley notes
that both Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago chose to move away from the
convention after their mandatory death penalties came under scrutiny. Min-
ister Mottley states that:
30. [2004] UKPC 32, [2005] 1 A.C. 400, 410 (appeal taken from Barb.).
31. Watson v. The Queen [2004] UKPC 34, [2005] 1 A.C. 472, 480-81 (appeal taken
from Jam.).
32. Matthew v. The State [2004] UKPC 33, [2005] 1 A.C. 433, 446 (appeal taken from
Trin. & Tobago).
33. Mottley, supra note 24 at 433.
34. Id. at 434.
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[t]he Government of Barbados feels fundamentally that we have
worked too long and too hard to promote and to respect human
rights norms and laws for us to be the victim of a form of judicial
activism that constitutes a virtual amendment to the treaty as op-
posed to an interpretation of it.
35
Accordingly, Barbados has consistently maintained that its death penalty has
not breached its treaty obligations or any customary international law.
Minister Mottley explains that judicial activism is more appropriate in a
national arena where there are appropriate checks and balances. In democ-
ratic countries, legislatures can remedy "judicial usurpation of the legisla-
ture's role. 36 Without discussion of this issue in international fora, judicial
activism in an international setting may also have domestic implications. If
international treaty obligations continue to make incursions into domestic
issues, states may seek to limit the executive power to enter into such agree-
ments. Minister Mottley points to debates concerning the use of corporal
punishment and same-sex marriages as topics that might create tensions be-
tween human rights and cultural concerns.
Minister Mottley also broaches the possible problems for developing
nations that might be required to make additional expenditures in order to
guarantee new human rights asserted by international organizations. She
noted that while Barbados provides free education to the tertiary level, free
access to prescription drugs and subsidized public transportation, enshrining
such rights in the Constitution of Barbados "would present tremendous diffi-
culties for us as a small state which has an inherent vulnerability not only to
international economic shocks but also to natural disasters. 37 These con
cerns were noted at a meeting of the Law Ministers of the Small States of the
Commonwealth that Minister Mottley attended in November 2005. In par-
ticular, Minister Mottley quotes the meeting's communiqu6 which stated that
"[t]here was anxiety in particular over the assertion of new human rights,
which emerge not from considerate action by all states but from organiza-
tions with no democratic mandate."38  In addition, the communiqu6 also
stated that the:
Ministers discussed the role of human rights courts in the interpre-
tation and scope of human rights. They recognized that State
35. Id. at 436.
36. Id. at 437.
37. Id. at 16.
38. Mottley, supra note 24 at 440.
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power had to be subjected to scrutiny as part of the system of
checks and balances between the branches of government, but
were concerned at the undue global influence of some regional
courts, as they reflected an activist approach to the interpretation
of treaty obligations and were not subject to appeal to any global
body.39
Minister Mottley suggests the need for regional discourse to address
human rights issues. She also proposes a regional dialogue on the develop-
ment of a Caribbean Human Rights Convention. She also notes that estab-
lishment of the CCJ creates a mechanism for the enforcement of such a con-
vention and asserts that the CCJ might be more sensitive to the "mores and
customs of the region." 4 Minister Mottley predicts that the human rights
dialogue will continue to play a dominant role in the Caribbean region and
the Commonwealth for at least the next ten years. She ends her article by
clarifying that:
We are not blasting or bashing human rights or human rights or-
ganizations. However, by the same token, we are not going to lie
prostrate while people reinterpret the obligations of our States in a
way that causes us to be deemed non-compliant without our active
participation or agreement. This is the tightrope that we must
walk.
41
The articles by Minister Mottley and Mr. Morrison, taken together,
show two distinct views, but complementary views, on judicial activism in
the Commonwealth Caribbean. While both recognize the importance and the
implications of the death penalty decisions, each article presents a different
reaction to the introduction of emerging human rights norms in the Carib-
bean. In doing so, they highlight the texture of the dialogue in the Com-
monwealth Caribbean on death penalty issues. Both are concerned with up-
holding human rights in the Caribbean context, but place emphasis on either
the adoption of prevailing cultural constructs or the adaptation to evolving.
In the end, human rights in the Commonwealth will undoubtedly strike a
balance between the two concerns and perhaps provide a model for other
smaller and developing nations.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 441.
41. Id. at 442.
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I. THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN
The term "the Commonwealth Caribbean" describes that group of coun-
tries bounded by the Caribbean Sea, from the Bahamas in the north to Guy-
ana in the south, including a sole Central American outpost in Belize in the
west, which are bounded by the Caribbean Sea, and all of which were, at
some point in their rich and colourful history, colonies of Great Britain.1 In
this regard, they all share with the United States some aspects of a common
history, such as a common language.2 With the exceptions of Belize and
Guyana, which are geographically parts of the continents of Central and
South America, they are all island countries whose names are well known
1. Dennis M. Hanratty, Introduction to ISLANDS OF THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN:
A REGIONAL STUDY, at xix (Sandra W. Meditz & Dennis M. Hanratty eds., 1989). The full list
of the independent countries is as follows: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, the British Virgin
Islands, Barbados, Belize, the Cayman Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Mont-
serrat, St. Christopher and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, the Bahamas,
Trinidad and Tobago, and Turks and Caicos. Id.
2. Franklin W. Knight, Regional Overview, in ISLANDS OF THE COMMONWEALTH
CARIBBEAN: A REGIONAL STUDY, supra note 1, at 41.
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throughout the world for the exploits of their nationals in the arts, culture,
sports, and for their reputation for physical beauty and an incredibly hospita-
ble climate.3
Prior to these territories gaining independence from the United King-
dom, the apex of their judicial and legal system was the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council, which was an English institution that had been estab-
lished by the Judicial Committee Act 1833.4 The Privy Council accordingly
functioned as the final court of appeal for all of the colonies of Britain (in-
cluding, at various stages of their history: Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
Hong Kong, and much of Africa) and, by that role, provided a unifying force
in the common law of England as it applied in the colonies.5
The independence movement in the Commonwealth Caribbean began in
the early 1960s (with Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago being the fore-
runners in 1962) and continued well into the 1980s.6 By the end of the inde-
pendent movement, there remained in the region only five dependencies of
the United Kingdom.7  Upon achieving independence, each of the former
colonies had a choice "of either allowing appeals to an external court to con-
tinue or of abolishing them." 8 All of them, in fact, opted to preserve appeals
to the Privy Council (an external court) and, with the single exception of
Guyana,9 this has remained the situation up until quite recently.10 In an as-
3. Id. at 5, 41.
4. ROSE-MARIE BELLE ANTOINE, COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN LAW AND LEGAL
SYSTEMS 230 (1999); SIR FRED PHILLIPS, COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
3 (2002).
5. See ANTOINE, supra note 4, at 230.
6. See Rex A. Hudson & Daniel J. Seyler, Jamaica, in ISLANDS OF THE COMMONWEALTH
CARIBBEAN: A REGIONAL STUDY, supra note 1, at 55; Beatrice Berle Meyerson et al, Trinidad
and Tobago, in ISLANDS OF THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN: A REGIONAL STUDY, supra
note 1, at 165.
7. See Foreign & Commonwealth Office, UK Overseas Territories,
http://www.fco.gov.uk (follow "UK Priorities" hyperlink; then follow "UK Overseas Territo-
ries" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 20, 2006). Those remaining dependencies include: An-
guilla, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Montserrat, and Turk and Caicos Islands. See
id.
8. Sir Roy Marshall, The Response of the Law to the Challenge of Independence: A
Review of the Past and an Agenda for the Future, with Particular Reference to Barbados, in
COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN LEGAL STUDIES 4 (Gilbert Kodilinye & P. K. Menon eds.,
1992); See ISLANDS OF THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN: A REGIONAL STUDY, supra note 1,
passim.
9. See Parliament of Guyana, Acts Passed by the National Assembly for the Year 1970,
http://www.sdnp.org.gy/parliament/actslist.pdf. Appeals to the Privy Council were abolished
in Guyana. Id.
10. See ISLANDS OF THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN: A REGIONAL STUDY, supra note 1,
passim.
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sertion of their independence in, as some have argued, "an exercise of sover-
eignty, not a derogation from it,"" the territories of the Commonwealth Car-
ibbean chose to retain the Privy Council as their final court of appeal.
12
However, this state of affairs has not enjoyed complete approbation
from significant parts of the body of informed opinion throughout the region,
and as one distinguished Caribbean jurist observed, "'it is offensive to the
sovereignty of independent nations and therefore, politically unacceptable, to
have a foreign tribunal permanently entrenched in their [Clonstitutions as
their final court.', 13 The arguments for and against are lucidly expounded by
Professor Simeon McIntosh, the distinguished current Dean of the Faculty of
Law of the University of the West Indies, in the concluding chapter, "Read-
ing Text and Polity: The Case for a Caribbean Supreme Court," of his semi-
nal work on constitutional reform in the Commonwealth Caribbean. 4 Many
in the region would find it difficult to question his conclusion that "the con-
tinuing presence of the . . . Judicial Committee in the post-independence
Commonwealth Caribbean political order represents a vestigial incongruity,
a contradiction in the constitutional symbolism of a politically independent
sovereign order."'15 This therefore provides the historical and theoretical
background against which some of the governments in the region have en-
tered into the international "Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of
Justice, signed at Bridgetown, Barbados, on the 14th day of February,
2001 .16 The recent successful challenge in Jamaica to the constitutionality
of local legislation designed to give effect to the Agreement and the Protocol
demonstrates that, despite the inauguration of the Caribbean Court of Justice
on April 16, 2005, the governments and the people of the region may yet be
some distance away from the complete achievement of abolition of appeals
to the Privy Council and the removal of what the Chief Justice of Barbados
11. See Marshall, supra note 8, at 4.
12. See ISLANDS OF THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN: A REGIONAL STUDY, supra note 1,
passim.
13. Hugh A. Rawlins, The Privy Council or a Caribbean Final Court of Appeal?, 6
CARIB. L. REv. 235, 251 (1996) (alteration in original) (quoting Sir Isaac Hyatali, Towards a
West Indian Jurisprudence 9 (1987) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of
the West Indies, Law Library Reserve Collection)).
14. SIMEON C.R. MCINTOSH, CARIBBEAN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM: RETHINKING THE
WEST INDIAN POLrrY 264-342 (2002).
15. Id. at 265.
16. See Caribbean Court of Justice Bill, part I, Feb. 14, 2001, 43 Trin. & Tobago Gazette
155, available at http://www.ttparliament.orgbillslhouse/2004/b2O04h22.pdf. In July 2003,
this agreement was amended by a protocol signed in Montego Bay, Jamaica. See Protocol to
the Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice Relating to the Juridical Personal-
ity and Legal Capacity of the Court, July 4, 2003,
http://www.caricomlaw.org/doc-dl.php?id=556.
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has described as "an affront to sovereignty ... inconsistent with independ-
ence."'
17
But this article's main area of focus is not so much on the merits, or oth-
erwise, of abolishing appeals to the Privy Council and the establishment of a
Caribbean Court of Justice in its place; for despite the constitutional chal-
lenges, the actual setting up of the Court and the appointment of judges, both
of which have now taken place, must surely set the stage for the kind of crea-
tive, but purposive, dialogue between the governments and the people of the
region that will be required to secure a basis for consensus on its viability in
the long run. Rather, my concern is to highlight the role of the Privy Coun-
cil, as a final court of appeal for the region, in an area of critical importance
to the every day life of all citizens of the region, that is, capital punishment.
An analysis of that role will establish, I contend, that the Privy Council has
demonstrated tremendous flexibility in response to changing norms in the
area of international human rights, and it has done so in a manner that under-
scores the absolute desirability of an independent, responsible, and respon-
sive final court of appeal. Far from being an argument in favor of preserving
indefinitely, or for a time, appeals to the Privy Council, this is intended,
rather, to provide a signpost to the quality of thought and adjudication that
the citizenry must be entitled to expect, and to demand, from its higher judi-
ciary, whether its seat is to be found in London, or in Port of Spain.
II. THE DEATH PENALTY
In the case of Boyce v. The Queen,18 an appeal from Barbados, Lord
Hoffman (delivering the majority judgment), described the mandatory death
penalty in this way:
Since the island of Barbados was colonised by the English in the
seventeenth century, death has been the mandatory sentence for the crime
of murder. That was the common law of England and it became the law of
Barbados. In the nineteenth century it was codified in English statutes
dealing with offences against the person: see section 3 of the Offences
Against the Person Act 1828 and section 1 of the Offences Against the Per-
son Act 1861. Each of these statutes was followed a few years later by a
17. Honorable Sir David Simmons, The Caribbean Court of Justice: A Unique Institu-
tion of Caribbean Creativity, 29 NOVA L. REv. 171, 173, 182 (2005). See also Press Release,
CARICOM, Caribbean Court of Justice Is Inaugurated (Apr. 16, 2005),
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/pressreleases/pres82-05.htm (indicating exact date of the inaugu-
ration). For the Jamaican constitutional challenge, see Independent Jamaica Council for
Human Rights (1998) Ltd. v. Marshal-Burnett, [2005] UKPC 3 (appeal taken from Jam.),
available at http://www.privy-council.org.uk/files/other/independent%20jamaica.jud.rtf.
18. [2004] UKPC 32, [2005] 1 A.C. 400 (appeal taken from Barb.).
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similar statute in Barbados. Section 2 of the Barbados Offences Against
the Person Act 1868 provided, as section 1 of the English Act of 1861 had
done, "whosoever shall be convicted of murder shall suffer death as a
felon."
In the United Kingdom the death penalty was confined by Part II of
the Homicide Act 1957 to certain kinds of murder which the Act desig-
nated "capital". The Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965 abol-
ished altogether its imposition for murder and section 1 of the Offences
Against the Person Act 1861 was repealed. But no similar legislation was
enacted in Barbados and the old law remained in force when Barbados be-
came independent on 30 November 1966. Since then, section 2 of the
1868 Act has been replaced by section 2 of the Offences Against the Per-
son Act 1994: "Any person convicted of murder shall be sentenced to, and
suffer, death."
19
Apart from minor differences in wording (in Belize, for instance, the
law states that "[e]very person who commits murder shall suffer death"), 20
the Barbados provision is typical of that to be found in the Commonwealth
Caribbean.2' However, the movement internationally towards the abolition
of the death penalty by statutory intervention has not borne fruit in the region
(save, of course, in the remaining British dependent territories, where the
United Kingdom reforms described by Lord Hoffman have applied as a mat-
ter of course). 22 Despite a strong and sustained human rights campaign, par-
ticularly in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, in favour of abolition of the
death penalty, I think it is fair to say that this result remains a remote possi-
bility. The fact is that the rate of violent crime, particularly murder, in these
small countries continues to be such (and it is on the increase) that abolition
of the death penalty at this time is unlikely to attract the level of public sup-
port that governments will probably want to look to in order to promote such
a radical change in the status quo.23 So the death penalty remains, and is
likely to remain for some time, the penalty for murder throughout the region.
However, there have been legislative attempts, notably in Jamaica and Be-
19. Boyce [2004] UKPC 32 I 8-9 (citation omitted).
20. Criminal Code, 2003, c. 101, § 106(1) (Belize), available at
http://www.belizelaw.org/lawadmin/index2.htmil.
21. See Boyce [2004] UKPC 32 in 52, 62, 69.
22. See id.
23. Take the case of Jamaica: In 2004 there were 1471 murders, and as of September 29,
2005, the total was already in excess of 1260 (out of a total population of approximately 2.5
million). Earl Moxam, Crime Stifling Ja's Progress: UN Envoy, JAM. GLEANER, Oct. 2, 2005,
http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20051OO2/lead/lead6.html (last visited Mar. 20,
2006).
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lize, to mitigate its application by providing for degrees of murder, with only
the most serious ("capital") cases attracting the sentence of death.24
III. THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE
COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN
What has come to be known as the International Bill of Rights com-
prises the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,25 the International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 6 the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, 27 and the Optional Protocols to the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 28 To these may be added the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,2 9 which is similar in
its terms to the Universal Declaration,30 and the American Convention on
Human Rights (1979),3 1 both of which are products of the Organization of
American States system,32 of which many countries of the region are mem-
bers.3 3
The right to life is a centrally enshrined feature of many international
instruments. "Every person has the right to life, liberty and the security of
24. See Offences Against the Person Act, 1992, § 3 (Jam.), available at
http://www.moj.gov.jm/?q=law/view/327; Criminal Code, 2003, c. 101, §§ 106-108 (Belize).
25. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/3/ares3.htm (fol-
low "217 (II)" hyperlink).
26. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200(a)
(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), available at
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/2 l/ares21.htm (follow "2200 (XXI)" hyperlink).
27. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200(b) (XXI), U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), available at
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/2 l/ares21 .htm (follow "2200 (XXI)" hyperlink).
28. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200(c) (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), avail-
able at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/21/ares2l.htm (follow "2200 (XXI)" hyperlink).
29. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Res. XXX, approved by
Ninth International Conference of American States, 1948, reprinted in Basic Documents
Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OAS/Ser.LJV/I.4, rev. 9 (2003),
available at, http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/basic2.htm.
30. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 25.
31. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, art. 4,
Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
32. See Boyce v. The Queen [2004] UKPC 32 16, [2005] 1 A.C. 400 (appeal taken
from Barb.).
33. All thirty-five independent countries of the Americas are members of the Organiza-
tion. Member States and Permanent Missions,
http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/memberstates.asp (last visited Mar. 20, 2006).
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person," proclaims the Universal Declaration, 34 while the equivalent provi-
sion of the American Declaration is very similar.35 More detailed provisions
are to be found in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.36
Article six, paragraph one states, "[e]very human being has the inherent right
to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily de-
prived of his life." 37 Article seven states, "[n]o one shall be subject to torture
or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.'
38
And the American Convention on Human Rights deals with the death
penalty in even greater detail than the earlier instruments:
39
1. Every person has the right to have his life respected. This
right shall be protected by law... No one shall be arbitrarily de-
prived of his life.
2. In countries that have not abolished the death penalty, it may
be imposed only for the most serious crimes ....
6. Every person condemned to death shall have the right to apply
for amnesty, pardon, or commutation of sentence, which may be
granted in all cases.
40
IV. THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTIONS
By the time the Independence Constitutions came to be drafted in the
beginning of the 1960s, the basic outline of what was to become the Interna-
tional Bill of Rights had already began to take shape and all of the new Con-
stitutions incorporated Bills of Rights patterned on the Universal Declaration
and the European Convention on Human Rights.4' As I have previously ar-
gued elsewhere, with reference to the case of Jamaica, "the international
provenance of the Bill of Rights has had the salutary effect of locating those
34. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 25, art. 3.
35. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, supra note 29, art. 1. "Every
human being has the right to life, liberty and the security of his person." Id.
36. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 27, art. 6.
37. Id.
38. Id. art. 7.
39. See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, supra
note 31.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., THE JAMAICA (CONSTrrUTION) ORDER IN COUNCIL 1962 § 13.
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clauses within an international context. ' 4 2 The rights protected by section 13
of the Jamaican Constitution are a fair sample of what appears in the other
Constitutions and are as follows: "(a) life, liberty, security of the person, the
enjoyment of property and the protection of the law; (b) freedom of con-
science, of expression and of peaceful assembly and association; and (c) re-
spect for his private and family life.
'43
The enshrinement of these rights in the Constitutions has "had the effect
of providing an authoritative, normative statement of the standards of con-
duct expected by the society of the state in its relationship with its citizens,"
44
and has also served to promote what Dr. Rose-Marie Belle Antoine has de-
scribed as the "norm-building and evolutionary character of a constitution. 45
Their importance for the discussion which follows has to do mainly with the
extent to which it will be seen that they have prescribed norms of state be-
havior which have come over time, through the way in which they have been
interpreted, to mirror contemporary international standards.
V. THE PRIVY COUNCIL AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE
COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN-THREE CASE STUDIES
It has tended to be a feature of supreme courts or courts of last resort in
common law systems that only a small selection of cases of significant and
general public importance are chosen for hearing and final adjudication.46 In
this way, the dockets of these courts are not overburdened, therefore allow-
ing the judges the kind of space and time that is necessary to make meaning-
ful contributions to the interpretation of existing rules of law and to the de-
velopment of case law.47 One practical consequence of this is that decisions
of courts of last resort tend to endure and to be difficult to change even
where clearly justified by changed or changing circumstances.48 No less so
with the Privy Council, though the Privy Council has never been, in the strict
sense, bound by its own decisions. 49 Against this background, one highly
unusual feature of the decisions of the Privy Council on death penalty cases
from the Commonwealth Caribbean over the past twenty-five to thirty years
42. C. DENNIS MORRISON, THE CITIZEN AND THE LAW: PERSPECTIVES OLD AND NEW 3
(2004).
43. THE JAMAICA (CONSTITUTION) ORDER IN COUNCIL 1962 § 13(a)-(c).
44. MORRISON, supra note 42, at 3.
45. ANTOINE, supra note 4, at 81.
46. See Elisabetta Silvestri, Access to the Courts of Last Resort: A Comparative Over-
view, 5 C.J.Q. 304, 305-06 (1986).
47. Id. at 305.
48. See id. at 304-20.
49. A.D. Burgess, Judicial Precedent in the West Indies, W. INDIAN L.J. 27, 30 (1978).
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is that it has felt able to explicitly reverse its own previous decisions on at
least three occasions, a phenomenon which represents a recognition of the
ferment of changing norms in the arena of international human rights, and no
less of changing times.5°
A. Case Study One: The Carrying Out of a Sentence of Death-The Im-
pact of Delay
In Riley v. Attorney-General,
51
[tihe appellants were sentenced to death in Jamaica on vari-
ous dates in 1975 and 1976 for murder. Their appeals to the Court
of Appeal were dismissed and petitions for leave to appeal to the
Privy Council were either dismissed or abandoned in 1976 and
1978. Between 1976 and 1979, however, there had been acute
controversy in Jamaica regarding capital punishment. During that
period, the execution of sentences of death was held in abeyance.
In 1979, the House of Representatives resolved that capital pun-
ishment should be retained. Warrants for the execution of the ap-
pellants were issued in the same year. They then sought declara-
tions from the Supreme Court that their executions would be con-
trary to section 17(1) of the Constitution, as being "inhuman or
degrading punishment or other treatment" by reason of the length
and circumstances of the delay in each case between the passing of
the sentence and its execution. The Full Court refused the declara-
tions and appeals to the Court of Appeal were dismissed.52
On further appeal to the Privy Council, it was held by a bare majority
that the appeals should be dismissed as "whatever the reasons for or the
length of delay in executing a sentence of death lawfully imposed, the delay
can afford no ground for holding the execution to be a contravention of sec-
tion 17(1).",5
The Privy Council thus rejected the argument on behalf of the appel-
lants that "long delay in the execution of a death sentence, especially delay
for which the condemned man is himself in no way responsible," 54 could
50. Maurice 0. Glinton, The Right to Life and Physical Integrity of the Person (Torture
and Other Cruel or Degrading Punishment, Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights
of Those Facing the Death Penalty), 15 W. INDIAN L.J. 45,50-51,53-54(1991).
51. [1983] 1 A.C. 719 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Jam.)
52. Riley v. A-G [1982] 35 W.I.R. 279, 279, [1983] 1 A.C. 719 (P.C.) (appeal taken from
Jam.) (quoting THE JAMAICA (CONsTrruTION) ORDER IN COUNCIL 1962 § 17(1)).
53. Riley [1983] 1 A.C. at 726.
54. Id. at 725.
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constitute "'inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment"' contrary
to section 17(1) of the Constitution. 5 In so doing, the majority of their Lord-
ships were content to apply the reasoning of their own previous decision on
appeal from Trinidad and Tobago.
56
Ten years later, exactly the same question came before the Privy Coun-
cil again in Pratt v. Attorney-General.57 "The appellants were convicted in
1979 of a murder committed in 1977 (since which [time] they had been de-
tained in custody)," and were sentenced to death.58 After various unsuccess-
ful appellate proceedings, in 1991 they instituted proceedings for redress
under the Constitution of Jamaica "claiming that their continued detention
under sentence of death" for nearly fourteen years constituted "inhuman or
degrading punishment or other treatment" in contravention of section 17(1)
of the Constitution. 59 Not surprisingly, these proceedings were dismissed
and the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal of Jamaica correctly held
themselves to be bound by the Privy Council's earlier decision in Riley.60
But in a reversal of its own decision in Riley, the Privy Council in Pratt
ruled:
That the execution of the death sentence after unconscionable de-
lay would constitute a contravention of section 17(1), except
where the delay had been the result of some fault of the accused,
e.g. an escape from custody or the frivolous or time-wasting resort
to legal procedures such as would amount to an abuse of process;
but delay attributable to the accused exploring legitimate avenues
of appeal did not fall within such exception.
61
The Privy Council ruled further that "to execute the appellants after holding
them in custody and under sentence of death for nearly fourteen years would
be inhuman and in breach of section 17(1) and [that] their sentence[s] should
[accordingly] be commuted to life imprisonment. 62 The factual background
55. Id. at 726 (quoting THE JAMAICA (CONsTrruTION) ORDER IN COUNCIL 1962 § 17(1)).
56. Id. at 725-26 (citing de Freitas v. Benny [1976] A.C. 239 (P.C.) (appeal taken from
Trin. & Tobago)). In a powerful dissent which foreshadowed events to come, Lord Scarman
and Lord Brightman disagreed with the result. See id. at 727-36 (Scarman, L., & Brightman,
L., dissenting).
57. [1993] 43 W.I.R. 340, [1994] 2 A.C. 1 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Jam.).
58. Pratt [1993] 43 W.I.R. at 340.
59. Id. (quoting THE JAMAICA (CONSTrruTION) ORDER IN COUNCIL 1962 § 17(1)).
60. Id. at 355-56.
61. Id. at 341.
62. Id.
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and the context were stated briefly, but graphically, by Lord Griffiths as fol-
lows:
The appellants, Earl Pratt and Ivan Morgan, were arrested sixteen
years ago for a murder committed on 6th October 1977 and have
been held in custody ever since. On 15th January 1979 they were
convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Since that date they
have been in prison in that part of St. Catherine's prison set aside
to hold prisoners under sentence of death and commonly known as
"death row". On three occasions the death warrant has been read
to them and they have been removed to the condemned cells im-
mediately adjacent to the gallows. The last occasion was in Feb-
ruary 1991 for execution on 7th March; a stay was granted on 6th
March consequent upon the commencement of these proceedings.
The statement of these bare facts is sufficient to bring home to the
mind of any person of normal sensitivity and compassion the ag-
ony of mind that these men must have suffered as they have alter-
nated between hope and despair in the fourteen years that they
have been in prison facing the gallows. It is unnecessary to refer
to the evidence describing the restrictive conditions of imprison-
ment and the emotional and psychological impact of this experi-
ence, for it only reveals that which it is to be expected. These men
are not alone in their suffering for there are now twenty-three pris-
oners in death row who have been awaiting execution for more
than ten years and eighty-two prisoners who have been awaiting
execution for more than five years. It is against this disturbing
background that their lordships must now determine this constitu-
tional appeal and must in particular reexamine the correctness of
the majority decision in Riley v. Attorney-General.63
After a full review of the authorities, Lord Griffiths expressed the
unanimous conclusion of the seven member court in these terms:
In their lordships' view a State that wishes to retain capital
punishment must accept the responsibility of ensuring that execu-
tion follows as swiftly as practicable after sentence, allowing a
reasonable time for appeal and consideration of reprieve. It is part
of the human condition that a condemned man will take every op-
portunity to save his life through use of the appellate procedure. If
the appellate procedure enables the prisoner to prolong the appel-
late hearings over a period of years, the fault is to be attributed to
the appellate system that permits such delay and not to the prisoner
63. Pratt [1993] 43 W.I.R. at 342-43 (citation omitted).
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who takes advantage of it. Appellate procedures that echo down
the years are not compatible with capital punishment. The death
row phenomenon must not become established as a part of our ju-
risprudence.
The application of the appellants to appeal to the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council and their petitions to the two hu-
man rights bodies do not fall within the category of frivolous pro-
cedures disentitling them to ask the Board to look as the whole pe-
riod of delay in this case. The total period of delay is shocking and
now amounts to almost fourteen years. It is double the time that
the European Court of Human Rights considered would be an in-
fringement of article 3 of the European Convention on Human
Rights and their lordships can have no doubt that an execution
would now be an infringement of section 17(1) of the Jamaican
Constitution.
To execute these men now after holding them in custody in
an agony of suspense for so many years would be inhuman pun-
ishment within the meaning of section 17(1). In the last resort the
courts have to accept the responsibility of saying whether the
threshold has been passed in any given case and there may be dif-
ficult borderline decisions to be made. This, however, is not a
borderline case. The delay in this case is wholly unacceptable and
this appeal must be allowed.
64
In the result, Riley was overruled,65 and the court concluded that, "in
any case in which execution is to take place more than five years after sen-
tence there will be strong grounds for believing that the delay is such as to
constitute 'inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment." ' 66 It was
accordingly recommended that consideration be given to immediate commu-
tation to life imprisonment of the sentences of death of all affected persons
who had then been on death row for more than five years, and a process to
achieve this was in fact put in place and carried out in due course. In com-
ing to its conclusion, the court was not unmindful of "a powerful argument
that it cannot be inhuman or degrading to allow an accused every opportunity
to prolong his life by resort to appellate procedures," and recognized this as
the view then prevailing in some states in the United States, resulting in what
had become known as the "death row phenomenon. ' '68 At the end of the day,
the court was in no doubt that developed, contemporary human rights stan-
64. Id. at 359-60.
65. Id. at 355.
66. Id. at 362 (quoting THE JAMAICA (CONsTrruTION) ORDER IN COUNCIL 1962 § 17(1)).
67. Id.
68. Pratt [1993] 43 W.I.R. at 356 (internal quotations omitted).
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dards required a departure from its own earlier decision in Riley and Pratt.69
This was therefore a landmark decision, signaling the readiness and willing-
ness of the Privy Council, as the Supreme Court of Jamaica, to mold the law
of that country and the region in response to changing imperatives.
The wholly regrettable sequel to Pratt has, however, been the actions of
the Governments of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, both of which subse-
quently withdrew from the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights.7° It is the Optional Protocol which provides an
"international machinery for dealing with communications from individuals
claiming to be victims of violations" of the rights enshrined in the Cove-
nant.71 The reason given for the withdrawal was that, in light of the decision
in Pratt, those states would be unable to carry out the death penalty, given
the probability that the domestic appellate and the international process
would not be completed within the five-year period.72 The comment of one
learned observer on these developments has, in my view, irresistible force:
Trinidad and Jamaica have now taken a lone stance in the interna-
tional arena as the only group of countries to withdraw deliberately
from the rule of international human rights law. To impose and
carry-out the death penalty in conditions that would escape inter-
national accountability is a clear indication that certain Caribbean
countries are isolating themselves from international principles
concerned with the application of the death penalty. It is hoped
that the states concerned will re-accede to the regional and interna-
tional human rights bodies, and so enable domestic executive prac-
tice to be informed by new international attitudes to human rights
and fundamental freedoms.
73
B. Case Study Two: Procedural Fairness and the Prerogative of Mercy
"The phrase 'procedural fairness' has come to describe those rules...
which are concerned with the procedures for administrative decision mak-
69. See id at 355-62.
70. Total Abolition in Bulgaria, Canada, Lithuania, DEATH PENALTY NEWS (Amnesty
Int'l, London), Dec. 1998, at 5 [hereinafter DEATH PENALTY NEWS].
71. MORRISON, supra note 42, at 6.
72. See HRW and CEJIL Call on Trinidad and Tobago to Reconsider Withdrawal from
the American Convention on Human Rights, HUM. RTS. WATCH, June 2, 1998,
http://hrw.org/english/docs/1998/06/02/trinid1227.htm.
73. Saul Lehrfreund, The Commonwealth Caribbean and Evolving International Atti-
tudes Towards the Death Penalty, in COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN HUM. RTS. SEMINAR 75,
87-88 (2000).
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ing.'' 74 The rules "therefore have more to do with ensuring the integrity of
the decision making process, rather than with the decisions themselves. 75
"The core requirements of the concept of procedural fairness in the modern
law are that administrative decision makers must adhere to the rules of natu-
ral justice" or, put another way, that "they must act fairly. 76 The right to a
hearing has, of course, traditionally been regarded as a key component of the
duty to act fairly.77
Virtually all of the Independence Constitutions in the Commonwealth
Caribbean provide a procedure whereby convicted persons under sentence of
death and who have exhausted all appellate procedures, may nevertheless
seek commutation of their sentences to life imprisonment, by virtue of the
exercise of "the [P]rerogative of [M]ercy. ' '78 The question that arose for
decision for the first time by the Privy Council in de Freitas (a 1975 deci-
sion) was whether, "before advice is tendered" by the designated body or
person to the Head of State "as to the exercise of the prerogative of mercy,"
the convicted person is "entitled (1) to be shown the material which the
[body or person] who tender[ed] th[e] advice has placed before the [Head of
State] ... and (2) to be heard by that [Head of State] in reply at a hearing at
which he is legally represented., 79 The Privy Council answered both ques-
tions in the negative, Lord Diplock observing memorably that "Mercy is not
the subject of legal rights. It begins where legal rights end., 80
The decision in de Freitas, which was concerned with the Constitution
of Trinidad and Tobago,8' was twenty years later followed by the Privy
Council in the case of Reckley v. Minister of Public Safety and Immigration
(No. 2),82 an appeal from the Bahamas.83 Lord Goff, speaking for the Privy
Council, dealt with the matter in this way:
74. MORRISON, supra note 42, at 15 (emphasis added).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 16.
78. See de Freitas v. Benny [1976] A.C. 239, 247 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Trin. & To-
bago). It is so called because its exercise "has always been a matter which lies solely in the
discretion of the sovereign." Id. The person or body on whose advice the Head State acts in
this regard varies from country to country. In Trinidad and Tobago it is a Minister designated
for this purpose. Id. at 248. In Jamaica it is the local Privy Council (not to be confused with
the Judicial Committee). Riley v. A-G [1983] 1 A.C. 719, 725 (P.C.) (appeal taken from
Jam.). In [t]he Bahamas it is the Advisory Committee on the Prerogative of Mercy. See
Reckley v. Minister of Pub. Safety & Immigration (No. 2) [19961 1 A.C. 527, 530 (P.C.)
(appeal taken from Bah.).
79. [1976] A.C. at 247.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 241.
82. [1996] 1 A.C. 527 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Bah.).
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The point can be placed in a broader context. A man ac-
cused of a capital offence in [t]he Bahamas has of course his legal
rights. In particular he is entitled to the benefit of a trial before a
judge and jury, with all the rights which that entails. After convic-
tion and sentence, he has a right to appeal to the Court of Appeal
and, if his appeal is unsuccessful, to petition for leave to appeal to
the Privy Council. After his rights of appeal are exhausted, he
may still be able to invoke his fundamental rights under the Con-
stitution. For a man is still entitled to his fundamental rights, and
in particular to his right to the protection of the law, even after he
has been sentenced to death. If therefore it is proposed to execute
him contrary to the law, for example because there has been such
delay that to execute him would constitute inhuman or degrading
punishment, or because there has been a failure to consult the Ad-
visory Committee on the Prerogative of Mercy as required by the
Constitution, then he can apply to the Supreme Court for redress
under article 28 of the Constitution. But the actual exercise by the
designated minister of his discretion in death sentence cases is dif-
ferent. It is concerned with a regime, automatically applicable,
under which the designated minister, having consulted with the
advisory committee, decides, in the exercise of his own personal
discretion, whether to advise the Governor-General that the law
should or should not take its course. Of its very nature the minis-
ter's discretion, if exercised in favour of the condemned man, will
involve a departure from the law. Such a decision is taken as an
act of mercy or, as it used to be said, as an act of grace. As Lord
Diplock said in de Freitas v. Benny: "Mercy is not the subject of
legal rights. It begins where legal rights end." And the act of the
advisory committee in advising the minister is of the same charac-
ter as the act of the minister in advising the Governor-General.8
4
It might have been thought that the confirmation in Reckley that de
Freitas "remains good law," would have put an end to the question whether,
on a petition for mercy (after all other domestic attempts to set aside the con-
victions or to prevent execution have been exhausted), a convicted person is
entitled to know what material the "Mercy Committee" had before it, and to
make representations as to why mercy should be granted.8 5 But this is pre-
cisely the question that the Privy Council was again asked to determine a
mere four years later in an appeal from Jamaica in Lewis v. Attorney-
83. Id. at 527.
84. Id. at 540 (citation omitted).
85. Id. at 542.
85
: Nova Law Review 30, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2006
NOVA LAW REVIEW
General.86 In that case, there was some discussion of differences in proce-
dure between Trinidad and Tobago, the Bahamas, and Jamaica with regard to
the exercise of the prerogative of mercy, but the majority concluded that
these differences did not justify a distinction in this regard being drawn be-
tween the three countries. Lord Slynn observed that "[tihe position in each
with respect to the right to make representations on a mercy petition should
be the same. 87 The task at hand and the proper approach were therefore
summarized by Lord Slynn as follows:
Their lordships are accordingly compelled to consider whether
they should follow these two cases. They should do so unless they
are satisfied that the principle laid down was wrong-not least
since the opinion in the Reckley (No 2) case was given as recently
as 1996. The need for legal certainty demands that they should be
very reluctant to depart from recent fully reasoned decisions unless
there are strong grounds to do so. But no less should they be pre-
pared to do so when a man's life is at stake, where the death pen-
alty is involved, if they are satisfied that the earlier cases adopted a
wrong approach. In such a case rigid adherence to a rule of stare
decisis is not justified.88
While the Privy Council in Lewis reiterated that "[t]he merits [of a petition
for mercy] are not for the courts to review," it nevertheless observed that
"the insistence of the courts on the observance of the rules of natural justice,
of 'fair play in action', has in recent years been marked" and that, on the face
of the matter:
there are compelling reasons why a body which is required to con-
sider a petition for mercy should be required to receive the repre-
sentations of a man condemned to die and why he should have an
opportunity in doing so to see and comment on the other material
which is before that body.
89
After a full and careful review of authorities throughout the common law
world, as well as of Jamaica's obligations under the American Convention
on Human Rights, the Privy Council concluded in Lewis that de Freitas and
Reckley should be overruled, and that a petitioner for mercy should have
access to the material to be placed before the "Mercy Committee", as well as
86. [2001] 2 A.C. 50 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Jam.).
87. Id. at 74-75.
88. Id. at 75.
89. Id. at 75-76.
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the right to make representations to the Committee, whether in writing, (as
would normally be the case) or orally. 90 The Privy Council was obviously
influenced by the dictum of Justice Holmes in Biddle v. Perovich,91 that "[a]
pardon in our days is not a private act of grace from an individual happening
to possess power. It is a part of the Constitutional scheme., 92 In that case,
the consideration of whether it should be granted or not must necessarily be
open to judicial review in order to determine that the ordinary accepted prin-
ciples of fairness have been applied.93 "This decision, as I have observed
elsewhere, 'is accordingly not so much a 'death penalty' case as it is a case
about the duty to demonstrate fairness in process, enhanced, albeit, by the
finality of the consequences of failing to do so."'94 It is at the same time
another demonstration of the willingness of the Privy Council, as a court of
last resort, to insist that old paradigms (mercy begins where legal rights end)
be subject to fresh scrutiny in the light of developed concepts of what the
requirements of fairness might demand in particular cases.95
C. Case Study Three: The Mandatory Death Penalty
As recently as 1981, Lord Diplock in delivering the judgment of the
Privy Council in Ong Ah Chuan v. Public Prosecutor96 had observed that
there was nothing unconstitutional in a death sentence being mandatory and
that its efficacy as a deterrent might to some extent be diminished if it were
not.97 Furthermore, it had not been sought in either Pratt or Lewis, or in any
of the earlier challenges to the manner of the administration of the death pen-
alty, to argue that the mandatory nature of the penalty was in any way uncon-
stitutional.98 Yet, by 2004, Lord Hope tersely described Lord Diplock's re-
mark referred to above as "no longer acceptable." 99 What is it that had hap-
pened in the interim?
90. See id. at 279-80.
91. 274 U.S. 480 (1927).
92. Id. at 486.
93. See id.
94. MORRISON, supra note 42, at 19 (citation omitted).
95. See generally Biddle, 274 U.S. 480.
96. [1981] A.C. 648 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Sing.).
97. Id. at 674.
98. See Pratt v. A-G [1993] 43 W.I.R. 340, [1994] 2 A.C. 1 (P.C.) (appeal taken from
Jam.); Lewis v. A-G [2001] 2 A.C. 50 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Jam.).
99. Watson v. The Queen [2004] UKPC 34 29, [2005] 1 A.C. 472 (appeal taken from
Jam.).
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In Reyes v. The Queen,1°° the defendant was convicted of a "class A"
murder which by the Criminal Code of Belize was punishable by a manda-
tory sentence of death. 10' The defendant challenged his sentence as unconsti-
tutional in that it infringed upon his right not to be subjected to inhuman or
degrading punishment or other treatment, under Section 7 of the Belize Con-
stitution.10 2 In another landmark ruling, the Privy Council upheld this con-
tention and set aside his sentence, holding that since the character of the of-
fence of murder by shooting could vary widely, the imposition of the death
penalty for some such offences "would be plainly excessive and dispropor-
tionate."' 103 Denying a person convicted of murder by shooting "the opportu-
nity, before sentence is passed, to seek to persuade the court that in all the
circumstances to condemn him to death would be disproportionate and inap-
propriate is to treat him as no human being should be treated and thus to
deny his basic humanity." 1 4 The sentence of death was therefore quashed
and the case remitted to the Supreme Court of Belize to pass an appropriate
sentence after receiving or hearing any evidence and submissions on his be-
half.10
5
In arriving at this conclusion, the Privy Council referred with approval
to the report of an independent enquiry into the mandatory life sentence for
murder, which it obtained in the United Kingdom, in which it was stated that
"'[t]here is probably no offence in the criminal calendar that varies so widely
both in character and in degree of moral guilt as that which falls within the
legal definition of murder." ' 1 6 Reference was also made to "[i]nternational
developments,"1 07 some of which have already been described at paragraphs
eight through ten above, as well as to the modem approach to the interpreta-
tion of constitutional provisions protecting human rights, which is to adopt a
"generous and purposive interpretation" and to consider the substance of the
fundamental right at issue and "ensure contemporary protection of that right
in the light of 'evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.,, 10 8 Against this broad backdrop of principle, the court
had no difficulty in holding that the mandatory sentence of death for murder,
without reference to any potentially mitigating factor in the person or in cir-
100. [2002] UKPC 11, [20021 2 A.C. 235 (appeal taken from Belize).
101. Reyes [2002] 2 A.C. at 235, 238-39.
102. Id. at 237.
103. Id. at 242, 256.
104. Id. at 256.
105. Id. at 258.
106. Reyes [2002] 2 A.C. at 242 (quoting REPORT OF THE COMMrrTEE ON THE PENALTY FOR
HOMICIDE 21 (Prison Reform Trust 1993)).
107. Id. at 244.
108. Id. at 246 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
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cumstances of the condemned man, constituted inhuman and degrading pun-
ishment." 9
To similar effect as Reyes were the decisions of the Privy Council in
Regina v. Hughes"10 and Fox v. The Queen."'1 And more recently, in Watson
v. The Queen, 1 2 the Privy Council came to the same conclusion, Lord Hope
referring specifically to "[tlhe march of international jurisprudence" on the
death penalty issue which had driven the court to the conclusion that the
mandatory sentence of death was unconstitutional." 3 In this regard, two
American cases, Woodson v. North Carolina"l4 and Roberts v. Louisiana,"15
influenced the thinking of the Privy Council, in particular around the notions
that "[c]onsideration of both the offender and the offense in order to arrive at
a just and appropriate sentence has been viewed as a progressive and human-
izing development', 1 6 and that "it is essential that the capital-sentencing de-
cision allow for consideration of whatever mitigating circumstances may be
relevant to either the particular offender or the particular offense."
' 17
In the companion cases to Watson from Barbados and Trinidad and To-
bago, it is clear that the decisions would have been the same were it not for
the existence, in the constitutions of those countries, of effective provisions
saving laws that pre-dated the constitution ("pre-existing laws") from chal-
lenge. 118 Ultimately, in Matthew v. The State, 19 the breathtaking progression
that Reyes, Watson and the other cases have described receives its most ef-
fective summary from the brief, but powerful, dissent of Lord Nicholls:
Years ago no one thought mandatory death sentences were
an unusual or inhumane form of punishment. They existed in the
United Kingdom until 1965. As recently as 1981 Lord Diplock
was able to say there was nothing unusual in a capital sentence be-
ing mandatory.
Times have changed. Human rights values set higher stan-
dards today. The common endeavour, to rid the world of man's
109. Id. at 248-50.
110. [2002] UKPC 12, [2002] 2 A.C. 259 (appeal taken from St. Lucia).
111. [2002] UKPC 13, [2002] 2 A.C. 284 (appeal taken from St. Christopher & Nevis).
112. [2004] UKPC 34, [2005] 1 A.C. 472 (appeal taken from Jam.).
113. Watson [2004] UKPC 34 30.
114. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
115. 431 U.S. 633 (1977).
116. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
117. Roberts, 431 U.S. at 637.
118. See Boyce v. The Queen [2004] UKPC 32, [2005] 1 A.C. 400 (appeal taken from
Barb.); Matthew v. The State [2004] UKPC 33, [20051 1 A.C. 433 (appeal taken from Trin. &
Tobago).
119. [2004] UKPC 33, [2005] 1 A.C. 433 (appeal taken from Trin. & Tobago).
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inhumanity to man, has not ceased. Conduct, once tolerated, is no
longer acceptable. Murder can be committed in all manner of cir-
cumstances. In some the death penalty will plainly be excessive
and disproportionate. As Lord Lane noted, there is "probably no
offence in the criminal calendar that varies so widely both in char-
acter and in degree of moral guilt as that which falls within the le-
gal definition of murder." To condemn every person convicted of
murder to death regardless of the circumstances is a form of inhu-
mane punishment. A sentence of death which lacks proportional-
ity lacks humanity.
The three countries with which these appeals are concerned
have human rights values at the very forefront of their constitu-
tions. Among the fundamental human rights expressly enshrined
is prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment in section 5 of the
Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago, inhuman punishment in sec-
tion 17 of the Constitution of Jamaica, and inhuman punishment in
section 15 of the Constitution of Barbados. Each country has also
entered into international commitments of a like nature.
Despite these constitutional and international guarantees the
governments of these countries insist on continuing to inflict on
their citizens a form of punishment which, by today's standards, is
inhuman. Each government justifies its mandatory sentences of
death for murder by pointing to a transitional savings clause in the
country's constitution in respect of laws in force when the consti-
tution was adopted. Each government seeks thereby to clothe a
form of inhuman punishment with continuing constitutional le-
gitimacy and an appearance of human rights respectability.
I do not believe the framers of these constitutions ever in-
tended the existing laws savings provisions should operate to de-
prive the country's citizens of the protection afforded by rising
standards set by human rights values. The savings clauses were
intended to smooth the transition, not to freeze standards for ever.
The constitutions of these countries should be interpreted accord-
ingly, by giving proper effect to their spirit and not being mesmer-
ised by their letter. A literal interpretation of these constitutions
means that the law of Jamaica, a country which has taken steps to
distinguish between different types of murders, is held to be un-
constitutional, whereas the laws of Barbados and of Trinidad and
Tobago, where no ameliorating steps have been taken, are held to
be constitutional. This is bizarre.
Self-evidently, an interpretation of the constitutions which
produces this outcome is unacceptable. A supreme court of a
country which adopts such a literal approach is failing in its re-
sponsibilities to the citizens of the country. A constitution should
be interpreted as an evolving statement of a country's supreme
law.
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This is not to substitute the personal [predilections] of indi-
vidual judges for the chosen language of the constitution. Rather,
it is a recognition that the values underlying a constitution should
be given due weight when the constitution [fails] to be interpreted
in changed conditions. A supreme court which fails to do this is
not fulfilling its proper role as guardian of the constitution. It is
abdicating its responsibility to ensure that the people of a country,
including those least able to protect themselves, have the full
measure of protection against the executive which a constitution
exists to provide. 120
The result of the decisions in Reyes and Watson is that the sentencing
process, once perfunctory in capital murder cases, must now take on an im-
portance second only to that of the trial itself, in the quest for proportionality
and individualized sentences. This will pose a particular challenge for prac-
titioners at the criminal bar in the affected parts of the region, as they seek to
assist the judges "to develop judicially reasoned alternatives to death in con-
victions for capital murder."'
' 21
VI. CONCLUSION
These three case studies demonstrate the response of the Privy Coun-
cil to the challenge of change in the area of human rights norms in the con-
text of death penalty cases. They underscore the fact that for the law to pre-
serve its relevance in this area it must be constantly responsive to the "evolv-
ing standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."'
' 22
While this conclusion applies equally in relation to private law, its impor-
tance has an enhanced significance in relation to constitutions, which articu-
late and record the covenant between the state and its citizens and which
must of necessity be capable of adaptation to changing circumstances. In
this regard, the role of the judiciary, and in particular courts of last resort,
attains the critical significance so well captured by Justice Dickson in the
Supreme Court of Canada in Hunter v. Southam, Inc.:1
120. Matthew [20041 UKPC 33 in 65-71 (citations omitted) (quoting REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE PENALTY FOR HOMICIDE 21 (Prison Reform Trust 1993)).
121. See Nicholas Blake, The Decision of Lambert Watson in Context: What it Means for
Jamaica and the Caribbean (Sept. 13, 2004, Seminar on Sentencing for Murder in Jamaica).
122. Reyes v. The Queen [2002] UKPC 11, [2002] 2 A.C. 235, 246 (appeal taken from
Belize) (quoting Trop v Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
123. [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (Can.).
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The task of expounding a constitution is crucially different from
that of construing a statute. A statute defines present rights and
obligations. It is easily enacted and as easily repealed. A constitu-
tion, by contrast, is drafted with an eye to the future. Its function
is to provide a continuing framework for the legitimate exercise of
governmental power and, when joined by a Bill or a Charter of
Rights, for the unremitting protection of individual rights and lib-
erties. Once enacted, its provisions cannot easily be repealed or
amended. It must, therefore, be capable of growth and develop-
ment over time to meet new social, political and historical realities
often unimagined by its framers. The judiciary is the guardian of
the constitution and must, in interpreting its provisions, bear these
considerations in mind.
124
The Caribbean Court of Justice was conceived and has been established
with the highest of expectations, reflecting the confidence of the govern-
ments of the region in the ability of local institutions to secure for the future,
the quality of adjudication that every citizen is entitled to expect. In dis-
charging their duties, the new judges of that new court will do well to re-
member always, as the Privy Council has manifestly demonstrated that it has
in recent years, their role as independent guardians of the constitution, par-
ticularly so in changing times.
124. Id. at 155 (emphasis in original).
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THE HONOURABLE MIA AMOR MOTTLEY, Q.C., M.P.*+
Thank you very much. Let me first say that, maybe I am still too young
and recently out of University, but I feel almost on every occasion that I
stand before an academic audience, the same level of nervousness that I felt
when I went to University in 1983 at the London School of Economics. I
told Professor.Cross as well, that it is a very unnerving feeling for me today,
because it is only twice in the last ten years that I have ever read a speech;
and I speak on average four or five times a month to all kinds of bodies-
outside of Parliament, that is. And it is because upon becoming a politician, I
felt it was fashionable to treat all politicians as pariahs incapable of sincerity
or belief. I therefore took a vow upon entering public life that when I spoke, I
would speak only to what I truly believe; and hence I would speak from the
head and the heart, rather than from the aid of paper.
Unfortunately, when you enter an academic environment, if it is not re-
flected on paper, it is treated as an immediate failure by those who are to
judge you. The only other time that I have spoken with the aid of a written
speech, has been when I addressed a recent graduation at the Mona Campus
at the University of the West Indies, in Jamaica; because they too, and per-
haps even more so than you, unwittingly created that aura, buttressed, of
course, by the garb that they wore that it was a no-no for someone as lowly
as a politician to come before them and dare to speak without the benefit of
early and deliberate preparation as evidenced by paper.
Nonetheless, I shall try to walk that tightrope again today, literally and
figuratively, since I have entitled this discussion paper, "Walking the Tight-
rope..." (pun intended).
I am also told that you have been recently addressed by three distin-
guished individuals: first, my distinguished predecessor, who is now Chief
Justice of Barbados; secondly, my colleague with whom I did the Bar Finals
in London, the Prime Minister of St. Lucia; and finally, Dr. Antoine, his
wife, Lecturer at the University of the West Indies, Cave Hill Campus, in
Barbados. Consequently, I feel a sense of comfort now, by virtue of the fact
that those who have spoken to you before are persons with whom I am well
familiar and in whom I have great confidence; and I have heard from some
* Deputy Prime Minister of Barbados; Attorney General and Minister of Home Affairs.
+ The following is a transcription of a speech given by the author at Nova Southeastern
University's 2004 Goodwin Seminar.
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of them that the interaction has been stimulating and worthwhile and that
they have enjoyed the opportunity of being able to address you.
I want to thank you also, because it is not often that one gets the oppor-
tunity to address audiences that are not necessarily rooted within the jurisdic-
tion that you have to represent, and especially as a small state when you be-
lieve that every opportunity should be taken to be able to sensitise persons as
to the differences and vagaries that may perhaps be peculiar in some in-
stances to small states.
I want in particular to thank Professor Cross, whom I met some time
ago in Barbados when I addressed a conference, which she attended at which
I delivered a speech entitled "The Law as an Instrument of Oppression, and a
Tool of Empowerment". Since that time, we have had a number of opportu-
nities to meet again, and therefore, while I really ought to be at home in Bar-
bados today, I felt duty bound to accept this invitation and to reciprocate in
being able to continue to articulate what our participation in the International
Community represents.
I have been informed that my predecessors focused primarily on the
soon to be established Caribbean Court of Justice. Hence, I will not treat to
this issue although I do chair the preparatory committee for the establishment
of the Court.
My appreciation to be able to speak to you is further heightened because
very often there is an absence of sensitivity as to what we confront as a small
state. Indeed, the norm across the developed world and more particularly
within international institutions is to assume that the settlement of one set of
rules in one country is capable of being both appropriate and applicable to all
states and bodies globally on the basis of a "one size fits all" prescription.
This, I must confess, has not been our experience - there can be no such pre-
scription!
One such example, is our negotiations in the area of regional and inter-
national trade agreements as we seek to establish the need for special and
deferential treatment. The constraints of our size coupled with our inability
to distort the patterns of regional or international trade, strengthen our argu-
ments for special and differential treatment. We hold 0.000 percent of global
trade in goods, and 0.001 percent in global trade in services, neither being
capable of distorting global trade in goods and services.
Equally, our settlement of standards within the regulation of the interna-
tional financial services network has become problematic. Consequently, we
have argued once again that the rules must relate to the risk that is con-
fronted, rather than a "one size fits all" prescription, which in effect is tanta-
mount to a non-tariff barrier in relation to the expansion of our international
financial services. This imposes extremely heavy burdens on our administra-
tive, financial and other resources in order for us to be compliant and avoid
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being an international pariah; even though the risk of significant money
laundering and terrorism financing is not found in our states but still is still
prevalent in the metropoles of London and New York.
While it is entirely possible therefore to speak to a range of experiences
in our interaction with the global community, it is intended in this discussion
today to restrict my comments to the impact of judicial activism on the na-
ture of our obligations either already accepted or in fact being considered by
sovereign nations in the area of international law; in particular, international
human rights law.
The second half of the twentieth century as you all know witnessed an
explosion in the birth of new states across the globe. Indeed, this is best ex-
emplified by the fact that at the time of the establishment of the United Na-
tions the number of member countries was approximately 51. Today, there
are over 191 countries involved in that organization. It is clear that this phe-
nomenon would have undoubtedly had an impact on the development of in-
ternational law.
It also meant that there could no longer be a discourse and focus in in-
ternational texts on what Lord McNair refers to in his "Law of Treaties" as
the "Great Powers". In fact, the variables pertaining to circumstances, capac-
ity and culture would initially seem to be irrelevant since the focus of inter-
national human rights law relates to principles that ought to be universal. The
growth in the use of multi-lateral treaties after the establishment of the
United Nations would also have reduced the extent to which customary in-
ternational law and its emphasis on state practice would by implication
prejudice the potential influence of the development of these new nations.
With the apparent equality of States offered by the establishment of the
United Nations and their admission to membership, all would appear, on first
blush, to be propitious for a new, more democratic framework for the con-
duct of both international relations and the development of what has become
the new form of international human rights law. Regrettably this has not been
the case. Those who might have assumed so may on reflection be forgiven
for this form of naive idealism.
Even in the corridors of the United Nations today as we speak, it is ar-
guable that inequity still governs both the structure of the membership and
the veto power, which continues to be vested in the five permanent members
of the Security Council. Were this to be the extent of the challenge, there
might be hope for optimism on the part of developing countries, especially
small states like Barbados. However, it is the invisible hand of the cultural
values of the developed world that has come to define the doubts being ex-
perienced by many of us in small states. In recent times, this perspective has
often been reflected in the judgments of many international human rights
bodies which have sought to redefine the obligations of states through re-
2006]
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interpreting those obligations under international treaty law in a manner that
was never understood by the states at the time of the acceptance of the obli-
gations, or indeed at the time of the reservations being submitted right before
that time.
This process of re-definition and re-interpretation has often been re-
flected in the values of the Western world deemed to be "enlightened" but
insensitive to those from other regions. They have resulted from the lobbying
and petitioning by a number of human rights bodies and Non-Governmental
Organizations which reflect a strong political agenda and which would wish
to reshape the world in their absolute image. It is significant that in 1993 the
Bangkok Declaration reflected that the concentration on western values was
the centerpiece of the more recent development of human rights norms: The
Bangkok Declaration as settled by the majority of the Asian countries.
It is this phenomenon of the continuous expansion of the definition of
what constitutes human rights, (not by the state accepting new obligations,
but by the judicial bodies), that significantly affects the rights of nations to
appropriately and properly plan for themselves and their citizens according
to their norms, their customs and their respect for fundamental rights.
It is critical to emphasise that in the English Speaking Caribbean, there
is a very healthy respect for human rights, as this has been universally under-
stood for years. In addition to this respect for human rights, it is fair to say
that our record on human rights as originally understood in the early decades
of the development of the laws following the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights has been among the best in the world, both the developed and
developing. This has largely sprung from the strong abhorrence for injustice,
oppression and inequity that we feel in light of our own experiences and his-
tory over the course of the last few centuries.
So what is this definition of human rights to which I keep referring? It is
simply this, and this is what it has always been in its purest form, namely,
universal legal guarantees protecting all individuals and groups, simply by
virtue of being human, against action and omissions that interfere with fun-
damental freedoms and human dignity.
What is the key for that definition? Two phrases - firstly, "universal le-
gal guarantees" and secondly, "fundamental freedoms and human dignity".
Words that are generic in their scope and therefore without further particular-
ity to treaty provisions which are capable of all kinds of subjective interpre-
tation. Fortunately, these words were buttressed by specific treaty provisions
in almost every single instance, whether they be by the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political rights, the American Declaration of Human
Rights, or the European Declaration of Human Rights, to mention a few.
Every single Commonwealth Caribbean country at the time of Inde-
pendence settled a written Constitution, unlike Britain (from whom we
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would have derived most of our governmental structures), whose constitution
still remains unwritten to date. Each one has as its cornerstone in its constitu-
tion a Fundamental Rights Chapter. There is a clear protection for the rights
that we have all come to consider as fundamental to life, to liberty and the
preservation of human dignity. They assert the need to assure due process
and the protection of the law to all of our people. They prohibit slavery and
genocide and the taking of life other than by the due process provided for in
the laws of our country. The freedoms of expression, association and assem-
bly are found in each of them, in varying forms of words but nevertheless
found.
In other words, Commonwealth Caribbean constitutions are strong and
unequivocal in the need to protect these rights and in the definition of these
rights. There was no need for us to avoid this clear definition because its
inclusion ensured that there was then an obvious protection of the rights of
individuals and groups of individuals (minorities in particular) against abuses
that are patently repugnant to the norms of civilized behaviour. Consistent
with the same philosophy that led to these clear written constitutions, there
was a commitment to reflect the same adherence to the protection of these
fundamental rights in our international obligations.
So what did we do? We signed the major human rights conventions like
that of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights; like that of
the American Convention of Human Rights; and at the time of signing them,
there was little or no debate in our countries because it was uncontroversial.
It was accepted that a treaty that spoke of these noble things could only be
good. May I also remind you that these treaties spoke to those universal val-
ues to which you could adhere and that were relevant irrespective of whether
you are a Christian or Muslim; black or white; or old or young. It should be
noted that in all of the treaties to which we adhered there was authorization
for the use, albeit for serious offences, of the death penalty. This is evident
not only in the American Convention of Human Rights and the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights but also in the protocol in the Ameri-
can Convention of Human Rights to abolish the death penalty, where its use
and application is still permitted in times of war. I will say more about that
later because it recognizes that the viability of the state must be preserved at
all costs if mankind is to be preserved ultimately.
But in truth and in fact, for what offences and in what circumstances is
the death penalty used in the region? It is used for murder and treason. In
spite of the fact that these conventions referred to above provided for the use
of the death penalty, Caribbean states, however, took the additional precau-
tion of entering specific reservations to those provisions, as did Barbados in
1982 when it became a party to the American Convention). This clearly re-
flected our continued intention to apply the death penalty as is provided for
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in both the constitution of Barbados and the Offences Against Persons Act
which latter act codifies the common law as it was inherited. We understood
that any obligations attained in international law would be constrained by the
nature of that reservation that was entered by us.
To become a little more specific for you now, because I'm sure many of
you are saying, "Where is she going with this?"
Barbados as you know is a small island in the Caribbean which joined
the family of nation states on the 30 th of November, 1966. Its philosophy,
which is key, as articulated by its then Prime Minister, the Right Excellent
Errol Barrow at his inaugural address to the United Nations, was captured by
this phrase "friend of all, satellite of none". That has continued to guide the
conduct of our foreign policy and our international relations, as small as we
are.
It is fair to say that this philosophy emanated from a state which has
long been known to buck the trend when necessary in support of what it be-
lieves. Our country is internationally recognized for its commitment to the
rule of law and its belief in the central importance of fostering tenets of de-
mocracy within the context of social justice. Many of you may not know that
your own battle of independence here in America, which was fought on the
precept of "no taxation without representation", was pre-dated by more than
one century by the Charter of Barbados signed at Oistins in 1652, when that
precept was articulated by those in Barbados who were defending the rights
of the Crown against the incursions of Cromwellians in London. So that this
dates back beyond our memory. We have been firm in our belief since Inde-
pendence, clearly emerging once again from our historical roots, that each
state must play its role in the international community. There must be an
unwavering effort on the part of states to advance the goals of humanity and
to improve the lot of the citizens of the world, many of whom have been long
oppressed.
Social justice is a critical part of any foreign policy formulation both at
the domestic and the international level. I state these facts because it is im-
portant to understand that the intrinsic values reflected by the modern state of
Barbados are those that are consistent with the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and the American
Convention of Human Rights - generally, the objective to remove inequity,
oppression and lack of dignity from the backs of the people of the countries
of the world as we move forward. Indeed, we have through our existence as
an independent state since 1966 been regarded as a model adherent to human
rights obligations.
The tide, I fear, is now beginning to turn - and unjustly so! This is spe-
cifically as it relates to the country's application of the death penalty accord-
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ing to its laws, which have been intact throughout and unchanged. I will now
seek to provide a brief history in order to explain why.
In 1994, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC), which is
the highest court of Barbados pending the establishment of the Caribbean
Court of Justice, delivered a judgment as the final court, not then of Barba-
dos but of Jamaica, in the case of Pratt and Morgan. This decision was to
have significant and long-ranging consequences for most Commonwealth
Caribbean States. In that case, the Court held that while the application of the
death penalty was not unconstitutional in Jamaica, the detention of a con-
victed person on death row for more than five years constituted cruel and
unusual punishment and hence was unconstitutional.
While this case was binding only on Jamaica, because it sat as the court
of Jamaica, it was persuasive for other Commonwealth Caribbean jurisdic-
tions. Indeed, it represented a sea change for the JCPC. The JCPC would
reaffirm that principle over the next decade when sitting as the final Court of
other Commonwealth Caribbean jurisdictions. In time, they were to come to
use other reasons in a clear effort to restrict the circumstances in which the
death penalty could be applied. In recent times, the debate has revolved
around the mandatory nature of the death penalty.
May I say to you, that three years after that JCPC ruling in relation to
Jamaica, one of the bodies charged with the application of human rights in-
terpretation, that is, the United Nations Human Rights Committee, held in
the case of Johnson v. Jamaica, that in the absence of compelling circum-
stances, mere length of time on death row does not constitute cruel inhuman
and degrading treatment or punishment and hence does not constitute a
breach of the Covenant of International Civil and Political rights. Three
years, after the JCPC in England gave its ruling on this matter, the body
which is actually charged with the interpretation of the same Covenant that
the JCPC uses as the basis for their justification, says that length of time does
not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
It is interesting because in Pratt and Morgan, the JCPC has reflected
that the norm in Europe was seven years, but yet set a five-year deadline for
Commonwealth Caribbean States. And, three years later when the United
Nations Human Rights Committee is ruling in Johnson v Jamaica, this same
JCPC is reducing the five years or sixty months to fifty-six months in the
cases coming from Trinidad - no certainty, no clear line that allows you to
act.
The U.N. Human Rights Committee felt that there ought to be other
compelling circumstances, failing which, you would force governments to
act expeditiously in carrying out the death penalty in circumstances where
they may well be reason not to carry it out. It is important to note that in my
own country, even before Pratt and Morgan, the death penalty had not been
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carried out for almost ten (10) years, and that was because there were cases,
which regularly went to our local Privy Council (an advisory body to the
Governor-General) for the exercise of the prerogative of mercy. So the
JCPC's decision has placed Commonwealth Caribbean countries' backs
against the wall and forced them now to "work to a stopwatch" which makes
no sense, as the Human Rights Committee well appreciated.
May I say, that after many years of this oppression, our own govern-
ment, in 2002, passed a specific legislative amendment to the Constitution,
expressly stating that the reasons set out by the JCPC in Pratt and Morgan
and Neville Lewis v. Attorney General of Jamaica that led to the restriction
of the use of the death penalty, were to be avoided. The amendment rein-
forces that if these circumstances occurred, that they would in no way consti-
tute a breach of the Constitution. This is an assertion of our sovereignty. We
are now in the process of drafting a new Constitution, and we will seek to
reflect the will of the people of Barbados with our understanding of the in-
ternational obligations, which Barbados has accepted.
The most recent litigation, however, has surrounded the issue of what
has now been commonly referred to as "the mandatory death penalty". In the
last three years human rights advocates and lawyers across the region, in
London, and within the Americas, have argued that this system, which has
been in use for centuries and which has been held to be compliant with all of
the human rights conventions is suddenly now unconstitutional domestically
and in breach of the human rights conventions to which we are signatory.
Over the last year, I have appeared before the JCPC on two occasions.
The first time I appeared was three weeks after it delivered a ruling against
the Government of Trinidad and Tobago in the case of Balkissoon Roodal v.
The State of Trinidad and Tobago that the mandatory death penalty was in
breach of the Trinidad Constitution.
Barbados' case was argued three (3) weeks later with the knowledge
that the principle of stare decisis would imply that the JCPC would be
unlikely to move from the Trinidad and Tobago ruling. The JCPC, in an un-
expected move, asked the parties to come back and re-argue the case before a
larger panel of judges. When we returned it was not just to argue as The
State of Barbados, but our appeal was joined with appeals from Trinidad and
Tobago and Jamaica. The three appeals were heard at the same time in a case
that involved over thirty (30) lawyers, and for the first time ever, in its his-
tory, the JCPC sat as a body of nine (9) judges. Normally this body sits as
five (5), and for rare, complex legal decisions they sit as seven (7). In sitting
as a body of nine (9), history was being made.
In July, the JCPC held that Barbados' use of the death penalty, even if
referred to as "mandatory", was consistent with the Constitution of Barbados
since it was expressly saved by the Savings Clause of the Constitution. The
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JCPC also reversed the ruling in the Trinidad and Tobago decision in Roodal
and held that the "mandatory" death penalty is also consistent with Trinidad
and Tobago's Constitution. In Jamaica's case, however, because it has
changed its legislation for capital offences and created a hybrid set of of-
fences since its Independence, it was held that Jamaica's use of the manda-
tory death penalty was unconstitutional.
What was the majority? In Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago's case, it
was won by the slimmest of margins, namely, a five (5) to four (4) majority.
Nevertheless, it reversed what had been ten (10) years of political onslaught
in the form of judicial activism.
What are the real features of this system that has been styled the "man-
datory death penalty"? In truth and in fact any person charged with murder in
Barbados may avail themselves of a range of statutory and common-law de-
fences. Indeed the definition of murder is very precise and results in a very
small percentage of persons (I believe it is about eight percent (8%)) being
convicted of murder and thus sentenced to death. Why is this? Because there
are a range of Pre-conviction defences, ranging from self-defence to acci-
dent, from provocation to diminished responsibility and insanity and equally
related bars to a finding of fitness to plead, to incapacity by infancy to insuf-
ficient mens rea.
There are also Post-conviction mechanisms that have worked exceed-
ingly well for us, both pre- and post-Independence, which can be used to
avoid capital punishment. These include appeals to the Privy Council under
the Constitution. Under Section 78 of the Constitution there is a local Privy
Council chaired by His Excellency the Governor General that membership
comprising accomplished, well-respected and experienced persons. These
persons have been drawn from the ranks of Deputy Prime Ministers and
Prime Ministers; from persons who have been Presidents of international
organizations; and from persons who have served in social services or the
private sector at the very highest level; in other words, what would otherwise
in bygone era, be referred to as a council of wise persons.
Under the new Constitutional Amendment Act, passed in 2002, which
will only be effective in the near future once these four (4) cases that are
going through their appellate process are completed, there is actually a
strengthening of the framework and proceedings by requiring the Privy
Council to invite written representations from any person sentenced to death
before considering the exercise of the prerogative of mercy. This was done
because we accepted that that was a good thing to do, and also to ensure the
sharing of all materials as required by the local Privy Council for those per-
sons so as to permit them to be able to comment thereon. We also have sev-
eral rules of procedural fairness that guarantee the impartiality of our system,
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and also ensure that there are benefits afforded to support an accused person,
namely:
(1) the unanimity rule for the jury in relation to convictions of murder;
(2) the provision of legal aid through an attorney-at-law of choice, (not
a public attorney, not a public defence counsel). Consequently, persons
charged with murder have available to them the best legal counsel on the
island. And indeed, everyone who has made his/her name as an advocate in
Barbados has worked for legal aid representing persons, and that perhaps
accounts for why the conviction rate is as low as eight percent (8%);
(3) allowing in the last decade defence lawyers to be present during the
police interview of any murder accused, so that even before the charge of
murder is brought down, defence counsel are present to guarantee fairness
and an absence of any bias or unfair tactics.
In sum, in order for a person to be executed following a capital punish-
ment conviction in Barbados, his/her offence must have been proved beyond
a reasonable doubt before a unanimous jury, during a trial in which he/she
would have been represented by an attorney-at-law of choice, funded by the
State. He/She would have had their full due process rights respected during
which he/she could have availed himself/herself of a number of legal de-
fences or incapacities, both under statutory and common law. After the con-
clusion of the trial, (an accused) then has the right to go all the way to the
Court of Appeal and the JCPC, soon to be the Caribbean Court of Justice.
Even after that, they then have the right to petition the local Privy Council,
for the exercise of the prerogative of mercy; and the statistics show that more
often than not, since Independence, the sentence has been commuted rather
than affirmed.
Parliament itself, however, has also been sensitive to the need to restrict
the death penalty as a mandatory penalty, the only penalty available to a
judge in certain circumstances. It is significant that under Sentence of Death
(Expectant Mothers) Act, that no woman convicted of an offence punishable
by death is to be sentenced to death while she is pregnant. Her sentence will
be commuted to life imprisonment instead. Equally, other offenses that in our
past have been known to carry the conviction of death no longer do so, for
example:
o killing in the course of the furtherance of some other offence, usually
a felony known as the Felony Murder Rule in our history;
o attempted murder;
o threatening murder through letters;
o conspiracy to murder;
o aiding suicide;
o aiding/acting in pursuance of a suicide pact; and
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o infanticide.
These offences all carry life imprisonment. There has been a genuine at-
tempt to restrict those offences to a minimum. Some ask us 'Why don't you
have two categories of murder?' But the same philosophy that I spoke about
guides us. Most systems that have two categories of murder have- first-
degree murder for who you kill and not the fact that someone was killed. In
Barbados we believe that every life is sacrosanct and that the loss of one life
should not attract a greater penalty than the loss of another person's life. And
that what is important are the issues of intent and defence as opposed to the
subjective issues of who you kill or the manner in which they were killed,
unless they pertain to those offences.
However, the determination of the validity of this mandatory death pen-
alty in international law is much more complex. In spite of the fact that all
human rights treaties apply it, in the last decade there has been a galvanizing
effort on the part of international human rights advocates and lobbyists to
further their political agenda. In this hemisphere, the most persistent chal-
lenge has come within the Inter-American system. In the Organization of
American States the treaty (the American Convention) covers many more
rights than the matter of the death penalty, even though what one hears dis-
cussed is the death penalty. Suffice it to say, that Inter-American court two
years ago in the Trinidadian case of Hilaire held that the mandatory death
penalty was in breach of the American Convention on Human Rights. Sub-
sequent to that, because of that Constitutional Amendment in 2002, they car-
ried the Barbados Government, before the Inter-American Commission. In
spite of the fact that we reserved our right to be heard because we had two
weeks notice of the hearing, they heard the matter in our absence and ren-
dered an opinion. Subsequent to our extremely strenuous objections, we were
again, one year later, allowed to make a submission, after the first opinion
had been rendered by the Inter-American Commision.
This petition to carry us before the Inter-American system was not from
a Barbadian law firm, but from a firm of solicitors out of London Simons,
Muirhead and Burton, who on occasion have been the attorneys at law on
record for the Inter-American Commission before the Inter-American Court.
So the very lawyers of the Inter-American Commission carried us before the
Inter-American Commission. I hope you can begin to see the picture. Never-
theless, we presented our case, but in spite of this, the opinion of the Inter-
American Commission was rendered on the Friday before.
We have now been referred to the Inter-American Court and we have
until the tenth of December of 2004 to find persons out of our seventeen in-
house counsel in the Chambers of the Attorney-General (who deal with every
legal matter coming through the Government of Barbados) to try and find
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time now to research and present a case in Costa Rica that will clearly take a
long time and much effort.
In fine, our contention is that the Inter-American Court and the Inter-
American Commission are treaty-created and treaty-regulated bodies. As
such they cannot go beyond the powers vested in the treaty that creates them
or the 1969 Vienna Convention of Treaties, or the customary international
law as it relates to the interpretation of treaties. We contend that they are
seeking to use a provision in the Convention that for the last twenty years has
been sufficient to keep us compliant. However, all of a sudden, with no
change in our legal system, and with no change in the Convention, we are
deemed overnight to be in breach. And what is that one word? The word is
the word "arbitrarily". And what is the definition of arbitrarily? The meaning
that they would wish to apply is one that says that the inability of Parliament
to give Judges discretion as to what sentence to impose, is now to be re-
garded as an arbitrary process.
In our system, Parliament has the exclusive right to make the law and
hence prescribe the penalty for offences. The courts have the right to inter-
pret and apply the law. What they have effectively done by their assertion is
to cause a blur in the separation of powers as guaranteed by the Constitution
of Barbados in relation to the role of Parliament and the role of the Judiciary.
Equally, when you go to that legal bible of definitions - "Words and
Phrases"- that is used in every common law jurisdiction, arbitrarily is defined
as follows : "that to act arbitrarily is to act "without any reasonable cause;"
or, to act "capriciously," or to act 'without any apparent reason.'
Now a system that guarantees all that I said it guarantees, is now to be
determined as one that is acting "without any reasonable cause" or "capri-
ciously" or "without any apparent reason" in spite of the many safeguards
which I have already outlined. We will await the verdict of the Inter-
American Court, but I must tell you, that our colleagues in the region, did
otherwise. Trinidad chose to denounce the American Convention of Human
Rights and they came out of the Convention. Jamaica chose to step away
from other Human Rights Conventions. The popular thought in Barbados is
probably that we should do the same. However, the Government of Barbados
feels fundamentally that we have worked too long and too hard to promote
and to respect human rights norms and laws for us to be the victim of a form
of judicial activism that constitutes a virtual amendment to the treaty as op-
posed to an interpretation of it. Further, it operates effectively as an amend-
ment that falls outside of the broad framework outlined by the 1969 Vienna
Convention or, indeed, the customary international law as it relates to the
interpretation of treaties.
We also put forward arguments as to why our death penalty legislation
is not a breach of customary international law. All of us know that no more
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than half of the countries in the world have repealed the death penalty.
Therefore, it cannot be styled as a jus cogens right. It cannot be styled as a
crime against humanity, in the way that slavery and genocide have been
categorised. Thus, where is the ability to reinterpret the obligations imposed
on Member States? The Inter-American Court sets out the terms for the re-
strictions to be imposed, in respect of the use of the death penalty, in its Ad-
visory Opinion rendered in 1983. This, however, was not addressed by the
Court.
Now, the question must be asked whether the Courts are bound by pre-
vious decisions and/or opinions forever? Surely, they are not. But what they
also are not entitled to do is to so interpret provisions such that they are in
effect amended without the patent consent of the State Parties. For to do so
is to undermine the system of international law as the glue that keeps interna-
tional law effective. It is the principle that says that States, in good faith,
choose to be bound by the obligations which they accept willingly - Pacta
Sunt Servanda. Are we, therefore, to see the erosion, little by little, of this
rule in this scenario because of the inability of States to accept the new obli-
gations imposed on them which they are unable and unwilling to accept?
All of these questions will lead to significant debate in the countries in
which we live. There is a need for greater accountability on the part of inter-
national human rights bodies that interpret and apply treaties. I know, as a
politician, to whom I am accountable. You know, as officers of this faculty,
to whom you are accountable in terms of your obligations and your contracts.
Most of us have some form of accountability. There is no form of account-
ability for judges in the international human rights system, because there is
no automatic right of appeal to the ICJ or any other body outside of the re-
gional system. And this will have to be placed for political discussion and
debate firmly and squarely within the fora to which these Courts belong if we
are to ensure that we do not have respectable countries opting out of serious
human rights conventions. It is the duty of all (States and the Courts) to en-
sure that the system is not undermined and prevented from being able to
achieve what it was designed so to do.
We also believe that judicial activism is not necessarily to be depre-
cated. However, it is more appropriate within the arena of domestic jurisdic-
tions, where it becomes easier to have a system of checks and balances. This
is because where the activism leads to results which go too far outside the
realm of accepted limits (in relation to the cultural mores, the views and the
perspectives of a country), a democratically elected legislature (as has hap-
pened in this country) and as has happened in my country, can choose to pass
laws to redress what they see as a judicial usurpation of the legislature's role.
This is acceptable within the domestic legal framework provided that
redressing the law is consistent with the same fundamental rights and free-
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doms as guaranteed by the Constitution. So we are not saying that the legis-
lature amends the laws without limits but that it is done in a manner that is
consistent with constitutional obligations.
Therefore, we feel the need for a serious debate in the various interna-
tional fora. There will have to be a recognition that there will be more re-
sentment and there will be a reluctance on the part of States to negotiate and
conclude more international agreements. In particular, those treaties that di-
minish the importance of cultural diversity and seek to create a homogenized
world in the image of only a twentieth-century western-developed world will
be affected. It should be recalled, however, that many of these western de-
veloped countries did not reach this state of development within the forty or
fifty years that they are now requiring of us, but took a century or two, in
some instances, to be able to adjust their societies to the said norms they
would now wish us to readily accept.
Equally, there will be further implications at the domestic level. There
are some players who are now arguing that there should be a reform of the
powers of the State governing their capacity to enter into international treaty
obligations. Right now in our system, the executive can do so without refer-
ence to the Parliament. This is different from the United States of America
that requires the approval of the legislature and the United Kingdom where
Parliamentary debate, and not approval, is needed. These issues will have
now to be put on the table, because countries are being required increasingly
by international tribunals to change domestic policy to adjust to international
obligations that they have never accepted and with which they cannot abide.
The death penalty is the example I have used because of the case in
which we have been involved. Nevertheless, there are other issues that will
affect us more like corporal punishment. In the Caribbean, parents have long
used this as the instrument of correction without there being any detrimental
consequences to any of us who were subjected to this form of discipline. Let
me make it clear that I am not talking about abuse. Abuse is abuse and cor-
poral punishment is corporal punishment. There is also the issue of same-sex
marriages, on which all of us may have different views. In strong Christian
societies like ours, it is felt that this must not be permitted by the laws of the
country - a view incidentally shared by the religious right in the USA.
These are the tensions that will inevitably arise once you start broaden-
ing the definition of human rights from the core that can bind all humanity
together irrespective of race, colour, sex or religion. The reality is that there
is often internationally the political advocacy asserting these rights prior,
then, to the judgements being delivered. One is, therefore, led to the inescap-
able conclusion that there is a political agenda being advanced even if in
some instances that were not the case.
[Vol. 30:3:425
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Many Caribbean societies are simply not prepared to confront these is-
sues nor are their citizens prepared to hear that these are their international
obligations, even if it means, as I have said earlier, that their countries will
have to renounce these international obligations. It should be noted that, in
the case of Barbados, we have decided to fight from within the Inter- Ameri-
can system because we believe that we are more compliant with the majority
of the human rights obligations imposed by the American Convention on
Human Rights than 95% of the countries in the hemisphere as we go through
provision by provision by provision.
However, throughout the region the popular refrain as we confront these
other issues is likely to be the same as with the death penalty - withdraw. It
is significant that this is all the more likely to be the reaction today, more so
than even thirty (30) to forty (40) years ago when there was greater hope
within the country and there was not such a sense of powerlessness felt by
people as they confront the vast changes in the wider community and work
environment.
To date, technological advancement and the rapid pace of globalization
in transportation and the movement of information and capital have caused
so much change to envelop our society that people are more prone to hold on
firmly to those things which they feel they can resist rather than allow
change to take its normal gradual course as has happened in previous genera-
tions. The world is simply moving too fast and when those winds blow upon
us, people hold on to what they can to establish a form of rootedness and
bearings.
By the same token, there are other rights being stemmed, in particular
development rights. On the face of it, these appear to be very noble - the
right to education, the right to health, the right to adequate food, shelter,
clothing, social security, the right to participate in cultural life, the right to
development.
But can these really be styled as "rights" which impose obligations on
the States? While the initial answer may be that they are simply declaratory,
there is no doubt that international jurisprudence has reflected a disposition
on the part of these international tribunals to be more activist and liberal in
their interpretation of such rights. In the construction of the obligations of the
State, not just in Conventions but in soft law, this would be catastrophic for
us as countries since there are fiscal and other constraints we experience. If
the courts, domestic or international, were now to start holding the State li-
able for the inability to provide some of these rights, we may be unable to
satisfy these judgments while meeting our normal developmental and legal
responsibilities as governments.
It is instructive to note that I speak from the perspective of a country,
Barbados, which provides free education from the pre-primary to tertiary
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levels. We provide free access to prescription drugs for all persons under
sixteen (16) and over sixty-five (65) years of age and for those persons suf-
fering from selected chronic diseases. We also provide subsidized public
transportation. However, were we to enshrine these rights in our Constitution
it would present tremendous difficulties for us as a small state which has an
inherent vulnerability not only to international economic shocks but also to
natural disasters. Unfortunately, we have seen this with Grenada, Haiti,
Cayman Islands and Jamaica in this year alone.
This unbridled rush to establish these new norms as rights with the pos-
sibility of their becoming at some point justiciable is unfortunate. These are
best left as ideals and aspects of our political philosophy that will in the fu-
ture guide us in the best way possible. Only last week in London, we, the
Law Ministers of the Small States of the Commonwealth met, and among
other things, we discussed what was happening in the area of human rights.
These are countries mainly from the Pacific region, from Africa and from the
Caribbean. And I quote now directly from the communiqu6 which stated as
follows:
"Ministers emphasized their commitment to the protection of funda-
mental human rights, "universal legal guarantees protecting all individuals
and groups simply by virtue of being human, against actions and omissions
that interfere with fundamental rights and human dignity." Their discussion
reflected strongly-held views over some aspects of current human rights
rhetoric. There was anxiety in particular over the assertion of new human
rights, which emerge not from considerate action by all states but from or-
ganizations with no democratic mandate.
"Although the international conventions on social and economic rights
accept that progressive realization of those rights must take account of the
available resources, there was concern that ideals and aspirations could be
too readily translated into justiciable guarantees requiring sovereign states to
commit themselves to particular patterns of expenditure.
"Ministers discussed the role of human rights courts in the interpretation
and scope of human rights. They recognized that State power had to be sub-
jected to scrutiny as part of the system of checks and balances between the
branches of government, but were concerned at the undue global influence of
some regional courts, as they reflected an activist approach to the interpreta-
tion of treaty obligations and were not subject to appeal to any global body.
"The role of some human rights organizations was seen as problematic.
Their work could be seen as an expression of global citizenship but activism
by unrepresentative organizations, operating in parts of the world distant
from the States whose actions they sought to constrain, could create harmful
disillusionment with the whole human rights movement, the overall results of
which have been so beneficial."
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It is clear that these matters will continue to dominate discussion for
some time to come. Indeed, there has been much debate internationally about
your own government in the U.S.A. and its failure to ratify what people con-
sider to be noble human rights treaties - The United Natiohs Convention on
the Rights of the Child and CEDAW-the UN Convention on the Rights
against the Discrimination against Women and the Kyoto Protocol relating to
the environment.
While one cannot always support the reasoning advanced for not sign-
ing and ratifying these treaties, there must be sympathy and empathy with the
U.S. Government's position when one reads the book "Why Sovereignty
Matters" by Jeremy Rabkin. Mr. Rabkin reflects an understandable concern
on the part of this country about the creeping encroachment of customary
international law (not only treaties) on domestic policy. He argues this fol-
lowing the developments in the 1980s in the Filartiga v. Pina-Iralia case and
the third restatement of Foreign Relations law. There has been a dispropor-
tionate influence over the course of the last two and a half decades in the
U.S. system by reason of the decisions of the Supreme Court and others ef-
fectively opening a back door for international norms to become part and
parcel of domestic law without the tacit approval of Congress.
We in the Caribbean have to seriously examine our options as we go
forward. This would include discussing the feasibility in the near future of a
Caribbean Human Rights Convention adding in addition to the existing non-
binding Charter to Civil Society. Unfortunately, the American Convention on
Human Rights seeks to bring together three (3) distinct cultures: that of Latin
America, North America and the Caribbean. It may well be, that without
prejudice to our right to remain within the American Convention, we would
have to look at a system that is more reflective of our norms and our mores
while still respecting those fundamental rights that are necessary for the ad-
vancement of humanity and the best precepts of social justice.
Indeed, with the advent of The Caribbean Court of Justice, it would
seem appropriate to engage in this regional dialogue because this Court could
then properly be the interpreter of those convention rights should we be able
to settle on such a convention. It is expected, as with every court, that there
must be sensitivity - not that courts do what States or people want them to
do. However, there is a greater sensitivity to the mores and customs of the
region if you are from the region than if you are sitting four thousand (4000)
miles away, having never visited the country, and not necessarily under-
standing the people, their religion or their way of life.
Ladies and gentlemen, this discussion, I anticipate, will dominate re-
gional and Commonwealth dialogue for the next five (5) to ten (10) years
because as with everything else in international law it does not happen over-
night. There is a clear signal that this time judicial activism has gone too far.
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Our countries, which have been model observers of human rights obligations
for decades, are now being suddenly regarded as pariahs in the international
community on this single issue of the death penalty, (a penalty permitted by
every human rights convention). We can run or we can stay and fight and
work within the system. We are choosing to stay and fight and work within
the system. These are interesting times.
We may well want to look at the other provisions that are available to us
which would allow for additional legal arguments such as the provision in
the 1969 Vienna Convention of Treaties. This may allow us to argue that
there has been a fundamental change of circumstances leading to a breach of
the treaty, not originally drafted for this purpose, but drafted for purposes
that are related to fundamental changes of circumstances outside of the con-
trol of the state. These however have never been understood to be such by
the interpreting body.
Equally, there must be a consideration of the wider case law that re-
flects the more restrictive interpretation to interpretation by international
tribunals as they decide asylum cases, immigration cases and those pertain-
ing to economic rights. After all, these are issues that are all central to the
vital interest of the majority of the developed world. Ironically judicial activ-
ism was not as ever present in these areas as they have been applied in our
death penalty line of cases. This is despite the fact, that within our jurisdic-
tion, they are central to our ability to assure the security of our population
and by extension, our economy.
I ask, therefore, that you reflect on these things after my speech today,
not because I expect you to be able to go and do anything substantial or sig-
nificant immediately. However, it is important that by understanding the
context within which we now find ourselves and the challenges which we
face as small states, those of you who occupy academic positions and who
are responsible for expanding knowledge, begin to appreciate that there are
on-going debates on wider global issues within your neighbourhood in which
you may well wish to participate.
I do not expect that many of you will necessarily be in agreement. Nev-
ertheless, I share today my perspective, not asking you to accept it as your
only perspective, but simply to treat it as a valid perspective of a small state
and what it has had to fight, and where it must go to balance its commitment
to fundamental human rights norms with its right to self-determination. I ask
you also to recognize that these interesting times call, therefore, for us to
walk on a tightrope whilst attempting to balance these commitments.
We are not blasting or bashing human rights or human rights organiza-
tions. However, by the same token, we are not going to lie prostrate while
people reinterpret the obligations of our States in a way that causes us to be
deemed non-compliant without our active participation or agreement. This is
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the tightrope that we must walk. It brings to mind the words of that famous
reggae band out of London of Caribbean origins - Steel Pulse, who in its
song "Walking on a Tightrope" expresses all the sentiment we feel.
These are indeed turbulent times for our participation in the interna-
tional law regime. Yes, the waters are truly turbulent but when you come
from an island state you learn to negotiate rough seas and you learn to nego-
tiate high winds as you, too, in Florida ought to have learnt as a peninsula.
In this context, when you combine our geographical circumstances with
our historical characteristics, you will appreciate why we have ultimately
only to be one thing - resilient in all challenges which we confront, confident
that at the end of the day those who labour in a good and just cause shall
never labour in vain.
I am obliged to you.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the nation, America's private property and business owners
are losing many of the property rights the founders of this great country felt
were of utmost importance.' Consider the plight of the Mach family of Hol-
lywood, Florida.2 After chasing the American dream, the Machs had finally
* The author is a J.D. candidate, December 2007, Nova Southeastern University,
Shepard Broad Law Center. Bradley C. Davis has a B.A. in Organizational Communications
from Purdue University with a minor in Organizational Leadership. The author wishes to
thank his mother Anna and grandfather Don, along with Garry Barker, Kristen, Eric, and Josh
for their support throughout the years.
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. See Shannon O'Boye, Widow Promises to Fight Developer Seeking Her Property, S.
FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, June 21, 2005, at BI.
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obtained it in the form of a four-unit retail building in downtown Holly-
wood. 3 For thirty-four years, the Mach family has owned and operated this
building.4 Throughout this period, the property has provided the Machs with
a substantial income and allowed them to work in the city for twenty-five of
those years.5 Katalin Mach, the widowed immigrant who now owns the
property, does not want to sell.6 David Mach, Katalin's son, said that his
father "always wanted to buy because he figured in America, they couldn't
take it."7 Nonetheless, after all of these years of work, during which the
Machs paid taxes and apparently met all other responsibilities of ownership,
the City of Hollywood is threatening to take the property through eminent
domain.8
Eminent domain refers to "[t]he inherent power of a governmental en-
tity to take privately owned property, [especially] land, and convert it to pub-
lic use, subject to reasonable compensation for the taking." 9 This threat is
being made in order to make way for yet another South Florida condomin-
ium development.'0 In July 2004, the city commission approved a develop-
ment plan with the builder, Charles "Chip" Abele, in which they agreed to
use their eminent domain powers if necessary to take the Mach's property."
The City turned down a plan from Mr. Abele which would have left the
Mach's property intact due to concerns about parking. 2
One must consider whether the city has its values right when it shows
greater concern for individuals who may have to walk a block, than to a fam-
ily who has been a part of the city for over three decades. Further, Mr. Abele
claimed that the Machs were "very emotional" and demanded exorbitant
prices for their property. 3 Will he face the same criticism when his 750-
square-foot, one bedroom condos are being sold for $400,000? Just as the
Mach family saw their relatives lose property and businesses in Nazi Ger-
many, the family is now destined to lose their business in the United States
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Michael Mayo, Commentary, A Fight for a Father's Spirit and the American Dream,
S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, July 3, 2005, at B 1 (internal quotations omitted).
8. O'Boye, supra note 2.
.9. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 562 (8th ed. 2004).
10. O'Boye, supra note 2.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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of America.14 The Mach's tragic story is just one example of how the United
States Constitution is being manipulated to crush the American dream.
The problem with a taking claim is that challenging a regulatory taking,
or determining if one has occurred, has been, and continues to be, confusing
for both practitioners and courts alike. Private property and business owners
are at the mercy of the courts and attorneys. While the City of Hollywood
has the power to physically occupy and take the property, the Machs also
face the possibility that their property will be taken through regulation.
Land-use regulations come in many forms including building codes, zoning
ordinances, and growth control statutes. 5 Additionally, such regulations
impose restrictions on landowners regardless of their wishes. 6 Such regula-
tions may, by going "too far,"' 17 effect a taking for which just compensation
is due. 8 This article focuses on the aforementioned regulations, which often
significantly diminish property values and rights, but rarely result in just
compensation.
While the recent United States Supreme Court decision of Lingle v.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 9 helped define certain narrow categories of regulatory
takings,2° the Court has left open the interpretation of the test set forth in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,21 which considers certain
facts and circumstances that are used to adjudicate a case without considera-
tion of wider application.22 Among the facts and circumstances set forth in
Penn Central are "[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant
and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with dis-
tinct investment-backed expectations. 23 Therefore, the courts have indicated
that they are "unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining" whether a
regulatory taking has occurred.24 Instead, the Penn Central test focuses on
the magnitude "of the burden that [the] government imposes upon private
14. Mayo, supra note 7.
15. WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 518 (3d ed.
2000).
16. See id.
17. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
18. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 301 (8th ed. 2004). Just compensation is defined as,
a payment by the government for property it has taken under eminent domain-f[usually] the
property's fair market value, so that the owner is theoretically no worse off after the taking."
Id.
19. 125 S. Ct. 2074 (2005).
20. Id. at 2081-82.
21. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
22. See id. at 124.
23. Id.
24. Id.
20061
114
Nova Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol30/iss3/1
NOVA LAW REVIEW
property rights., 25  The problem is determining when the government has
exceeded its power by taking private property through regulation.26
In light of last year's three takings decisions,2 which have come down
from the United States Supreme Court, American property owners now face
a greater risk of losing their homes and businesses to government regulation
than ever before.28 These decisions may be read to indicate that the Court
feels property rights have gone as far as they should. The destruction of cer-
tain regulatory takings tests which favored property owners, coupled with the
decision in Kelo v. City of New London, in which the United States Supreme
Court held that private property may be taken for private development,29 has
resulted in a severe blow to property rights. Finally, with the massive real
estate development occurring in Florida and throughout major urban centers,
the rights of property owners need to be clearly established. It is for these
reasons that the Penn Central test needs to be reexamined in order to provide
property owners the protections to which they are constitutionally entitled.3"
This article will provide an analysis of regulatory takings jurisprudence and
recommendations to fix the broken balancing test in Penn Central.
There are few, if any, subjects that conjure a more heated debate than
that of regulatory takings. 3 ' This debate is due in part to the numerous, and
often conflicting, holdings of the United States Supreme Court32 which have
led to "ad hoc, factual inquiries, 33 balancing tests,' nuisance exceptions,35
25. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2082.
26. Id. at 2081; Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922).
27. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. 2074; San Remo Hotel v. City of San Francisco, 125 S. Ct. 2491
(2005); Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
28. See generally Kelo, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (upholding decision allowing private property to
be taken for private development).
29. Id. at 2668.
30. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
31. See generally James E. Krier, Book Review, Takings from Freund to Fischel, 84
GEo. L.J. 1895 (1996); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on
the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation'" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165 (1967); Joseph
L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964); Molly L. Dillon, Comment,
Legislative Expansion of Fifth Amendment "Takings"? A Discussion of the Regulatory Tak-
ings Law and Proposed Compensation Legislation, 15 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 243
(1997).
32. Jerome M. Organ, Understanding State and Federal Property Rights Legislation, 48
OKLA. L. REv. 191 (1995). Organ notes that:
The Supreme Court has been much less clear and consistent, however, in deciding when
the Fifth Amendment requires the state to compensate a property owner whose land the
state has not physically taken, but merely has regulated to such an extent that the property
owner has lost the opportunity to enjoy much of the "economic value" associated with her
property.
Id. at 191.
33. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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and per se rules 36-which all seem to conflict in varying degrees. Such con-
flict has left lawyers and courts with little guidance in deciding takings issues
on a case-by-case basis. As Justice Stevens once stated, "[elven the wisest
lawyers would have to acknowledge great uncertainty about the scope of this
Court's takings jurisprudence."37
In order to work through this great uncertainty and provide a proper
background for a clear understanding of this article, Part II will give an over-
view of American regulatory takings jurisprudence, which will include a
discussion of some of the major cases in the development of regulatory tak-
ings. Part lI will discuss Lingle and what implications it may have for the
future of the Penn Central test. Part IV will analyze Penn Central and rec-
ommend ways to turn the test in favor of private property owners. In Part V,
a conclusion will reinforce the suggestions set forth in Part IV, and encour-
age Americans to defend against the governmental taking of their private
property.
II. AMERICAN REGULATORY TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
"The threshold issue in any regulatory takings case is whether the
claimant can point to some property interest she held as of the date of the
alleged taking that was affected by the challenged government action.
38
Also, the property interest must be one "that the claimant can claim a pro-
tected right to exploit. '39 A regulatory taking occurs when government regu-
lation or action goes so far as to constitute a taking, even though no property
or title to such property is actually taken.40
The threat that a government may exercise its power to take property or
frustrate the owner's expectations, so long as just compensation is paid, is
undoubtedly a significant invasion of the rights of private property owners.4 '
34. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980); Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438
U.S. at 124.
35. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1022-23 (1992).
36. Id. at 1027 (setting forth the total diminution in value test); Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (setting forth the permanent physical inva-
sion test).
37. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 866 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
38. John D. Echeverria, Friedenburg v. DEC: A Troubling Regulatory Takings Ruling,
15 ENVTL. L. IN N.Y., 47,47 (2004), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/
papers/friedenburg.pdf.
39. Id. at 48.
40. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922).
41. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089, 1092 n.7, 1092-93 (1972)
(noting the role of property rules in transactions involving real property).
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While the protections set forth in the Constitution should ensure individuals
who have their property taken will not suffer financially, such an exchange
does not leave everyone feeling satisfied with the transaction.42 The Mach
family example, set forth in the Introduction, is a concrete representation of
such a situation.4 ' For the Mach family, no amount of money can make up
for the sentimental ties which flow from the generational ownership of their
building.44 To suggest that an exchange of money for property is "fair" or
"just" overlooks the fact that property is not fungible, which means, "each
parcel of land is 'unique' and therefore money damages cannot be an accu-
rate substitute."45 Anthony Kronman's article on specific performance ad-
dressed this issue by stating:
In asserting that the subject matter of a particular contract is
unique and has no established market value, a court is really say-
ing that it cannot obtain, at reasonable cost, enough information
about substitutes to permit it to calculate an award of money dam-
ages without imposing an unacceptably high risk of undercompen-
sation on the injured promisee. Conceived in this way, the
uniqueness test seems economically sound. 46
However, government regulation is necessary to a certain degree.47 In
fact, the United States Supreme Court has held that regulation is necessary
for the proper performance of our government.48 Nevertheless, the Takings
Clause must be read literally in order to enforce private property owners'
constitutional rights.49
A. The United States Constitution
The guarantee against taking without just compensation is among the
many fundamental rights set forth in the United States Constitution.50 The
Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause provides that private property shall not
42. See id.
43. See JESSE DUKEMiNIER & JAMEs E. KRiER, PRoPERTY 589 (5th ed. 2002).
44. O'Boye, supra note 2.
45. DuKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 43, at 589.
46. Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. Cn. L. REv. 351, 362 (1978).
47. See Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472,480 (1924).
48. See id. (stating that "[t]he taking of private property for public use upon just compen-
sation is so often necessary for the proper performance of governmental functions that the
power is deemed to be essential to the life of the State").
49. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
50. See id.
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"be taken for public use, without just compensation."'" The Takings Clause
is made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment which
states, in pertinent part: "nor shall any [sitate deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law."52 These amendments are
meant to provide a safeguard against governmental abuses of power. 3 While
an initial reading may seem straightforward, these words have caused confu-
sion for well over a century.
5 4
B. The Constitutional Interpretation
1. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon is considered to mark the birth of the
idea that a government action or regulation may result in a taking which re-
quires just compensation.55 In fact, until the Court's decision in Mahon, "it
was generally thought that the Takings Clause reached only a 'direct appro-
priation' of property.., or the functional equivalent of a 'practical ouster of
[the owner's] possession."' 56
In Mahon, the plaintiffs owned the surface of the land, but the deed re-
served the right to remove the coal under the Mahons' land to Pennsylvania
Coal. 7 At issue was the Kohler Act, which prevented the mining of coal in
ways that would cause the disturbance, or sinking, of "any structure used as a
human habitation."" Ultimately, the Court held the statute had resulted in an
unconstitutional taking of Pennsylvania Coal's property.59 This was in part
51. Id.
52. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Chi., Burlington, & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chi-
cago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897) (stating that although the state "legislature may prescribe a
form of procedure to be observed in the taking of private property for public use, but it is not
due process of law if provision be not made for compensation").
53. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
54. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 866 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing).
55. See Janet McClafferty Dunlap, This Land Is My Land: The Clash Between Private
Property and the Public Interest in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 33 B.C. L. REV.
797, 808 (1992) (indicating that prior to the year in which Mahon was decided, the United
States Supreme Court found no taking if the government had a legitimate public purpose for
the challenged regulation and no trespass had occurred on the land).
56. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992) (alteration in original)
(citations omitted).
57. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,412 (1922).
58. Id. at 412-13.
59. Id. at 414.
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due to the fact that "[w]hat makes the right to mine coal valuable is that it
can be exercised with profit. To make it commercially impracticable to mine
certain coal has very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as
appropriating or destroying it."6
Justice Holmes highlighted the eternal struggle between individual
property rights and governmental power in the following quote:
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change
in the general law. As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under
an implied limitation and must yield to the police power. But obviously
the implied limitation must have its limits, or the contract and due proc-
ess clauses are gone. One fact for consideration in determining such
limits is the extent of the diminution. When it reaches a certain magni-
tude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent
domain and compensation to sustain the act. So the question depends
upon the particular facts.6'
The preceding language clearly indicates the power that the Constitu-
tion provides to both private property owners and governments. 62 This lan-
guage also marks the birth of the "diminution in value" test" and the consid-
eration of the economic impact of regulations on property owners. 64 While
disagreement abounds as to the proper interpretation of Mahon, it "is uni-
formly held to stand for the proposition that the judiciary should closely scru-
tinize economic legislation for potential unconstitutionality '65 in order to
ensure that the government is not abusing its power.66
In one of the most famous lines in regulatory takings jurisprudence, Jus-
tice Holmes stated, "[tihe general rule at least is, that while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as
a taking. 67 The problem with this often quoted phrase is that it fails to clar-
ify how to determine what is too far.68 The diminution in value test is one
way that Justice Holmes attempted to define how far is too far. 69 A more
60. Id.
61. Id. at 413.
62. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413.
63. See id. at 413.
64. Id. at 413-14.
65. William Michael Treanor, Jam for Justice Holmes: Reassessing the Significance of
Mahon, 86 GEO. L.J. 813, 816 (1998).
66. Id.
67. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
68. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2081 (2005).
69. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
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recent example of the consideration of economic factors, or diminution in
value test, is set forth in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission
v. Hamilton Bank.70 In Williamson, the Court held that its task was "to dis-
tinguish the point at which regulation becomes so onerous that it has the
same effect as an appropriation of the property through eminent domain or
physical possession."'" While many questions were left unanswered in
Mahon, regulatory takings, a balancing test, and economic considerations
complicated the previously straightforward analysis of the Fifth Amend-
ment.72
2. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City
After leaving so many critical questions unanswered in Mahon, many
commentators expected that the floodgates of regulatory takings litigation
would open.73 However, it was not until fifty-five years later, in Penn Cen-
tral that the United States Supreme Court made a significant effort to clarify
these unanswered questions.74
In Penn Central, the Court admitted that it was "unable to develop any
'set formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that eco-
nomic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government,
rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons. 75 In-
stead, the Court indicated that it will engage in "ad hoc, factual inquiries"
which balance the important factors of each particular case.76 These factors
will be highlighted and discussed in Part IV of this article.
3. Agins v. City of Tiburon
One of the reasons that this article is placing a new emphasis on the
Penn Central test is due to the recent destruction of the regulatory takings
test set forth in Agins v. City of Tiburon.77 In Agins, the landowners filed suit
claiming that the city had unconstitutionally taken their property in violation
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 78 The landowners' claim arose out
of zoning ordinances which were enacted after the purchase of the land and
70. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
71. Id. at 199.
72. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992).
73. STOEBUCK & WHrrMAN, supra note 15, at 530.
74. Id.
75. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
76. Id.
77. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
78. Id. at 258.
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prevented the claimants from building on their property as originally ex-
pected.79
The United States Supreme Court held that the regulation of a "particu-
lar property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his
land."80 The State of California felt that the maintenance of open spaces was
an important state interest and that the zoning ordinance substantially ad-
vanced that interest." Therefore, the Court held that the ordinance passed
constitutional muster.
82
Since Agins was decided, the "substantial advancement test" has been
favored by property rights advocates.83 This favoritism was shown because
the Agins test allowed claimants to challenge the effectiveness of a govern-
ment regulation.84 If the claimant can show that the governmental action or
regulation does not substantially advance a legitimate state interest, the
claimant will prevail regardless of economic impact, or other considera-
tions.
4. Those Other Takings Tests
In the interest of clarity, this section will briefly look at some other tests
the Lingle decision helped set forth. While these tests are not the focus of
this paper, they should be analyzed and distinguished.
First, there are instances when the government has interfered in such a
way that the owner has suffered "a permanent physical occupation" of their
property.86 In these situations, the permanent invasion, no matter how minor,
demands that just compensation be made.87 This type of takings test was
first set forth in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.88
79. Id. at 257.
80. Id. at 260 (citations omitted).
81. Id. at 261.
82. Agins, 447 U.S. at 261.
83. Marcia Coyle, Takings Tussle, DAILY Bus. REv., June 3, 2005, at A10; see also
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2077-79 (2005) (indicating that Chevron
used the Agins test to move forward with its claim).
84. See Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2079.
85. See id.
86. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (finding
a taking where a state law requires landlord to allow cable companies to install their facilities
on or in the buildings).
87. Id. at 425; Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2081.
88. 458 U.S. at 426.
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Next, there may be a total regulatory taking as defined in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council.89 In Lucas, the Court held that if the government,
through a regulation, denied a property owner all economically viable use of
his or her property, then a taking must be found and just compensation must
be paid.90 However, the Court noted that when such a regulation is designed
to prohibit a use that is or could be a nuisance, an exception to the Lucas test
will be found.9'
Finally, the Court held that takings claims which flow from land-use
exactions must be examined through the tests set fort in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission92 and Dolan v. City of Tigard.93 Land use exactions
"include dedications of land to the public, installation of public improve-
ments, and exactions of money for public purposes that are imposed by gov-
ernmental entities upon developers of land as conditions of development
permission."'  This duo of cases sets forth two important points. In Nollan,
the Court stated that there must be a nexus between the condition sought and
the problem to be alleviated.' In other words, the exaction must be calcu-
lated to advance the interest that is used to justify the exaction.96 Dolan went
a step further by indicating that when a nexus exists, there must be some
"rough proportionality" between the thing exacted and the development per-
mitted in exchange. 97 Here again, courts and practitioners are left with a test
that does not clarify the meaning of its terms.9
Outside of these narrow categories, regulatory takings. cases fall under
the Penn Central test. 99 The preceding tests are relatively easy to work with
in comparison to Penn Central.'° For example, when a property owner has
suffered a "permanent physical invasion," or has lost all value associated
with his or her property, it is nearly impossible to argue that just compensa-
tion should not be paid.' 0 ' However, as this article will show, not all of these
tests have survived subsequent interpretations of the United States Supreme
Court.
89. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
90. Id. at 1027.
91. Id. at 1022-23.
92. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
93. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
94. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 15, at 675.
95. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
96. Id.
97. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
98. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 15, at 684.
99. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2081 (2005).
100. See id. (stating that Loretto and Lucas are "per se" or "categorical" takings).
101. Id.
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I. DISCUSSION OF LINGLE V. CHEVRON U.S.A., INc.
While property rights advocates have favored the Agins "substantial ad-
vancement test" for twenty-five years, the recent United States Supreme
Court decision of Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A, Inc. effectively destroyed the
Agins test.'1 2 Due to this rare, unanimous decision from the Court, scholars
have indicated that the next "turn of the wheel" will be a case which helps
define the meaning of the Penn Central test." 3
A. A Statement of the Case
Showing apparent concern for the public welfare in relation to the ar-
guably oligopolistic concentration in the gasoline market, the Hawaii Legis-
lature passed Act 257 in 19 97."°  The key effect of Act 257 involved a rent
ceiling that oil companies could charge dealers who lease their service sta-
tions from the company. 5 This ceiling limited rent to fifteen percent of the
102. Id. at 2087.
103. Coyle, supra note 83.
104. HAW. REv. STAT. § 486H-10.4 (Supp. 2004); Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2078.
105. § 486H-10.4. Section 486H-10.4 states:
(a) Beginning August 1, 1997, no manufacturer or jobber shall convert an existing dealer
retail station to a company retail station; provided that nothing in this section shall limit a
manufacturer or jobber from:
(1) Continuing to operate any company operated retail service stations legally in exis-
tence on July 31, 1997;
(2) Constructing and operating any new retail service stations as company retail sta-
tions constructed after August 1, 1997, subject to subsection (b); or
(3) Operating a former dealer retail station for up to twenty-four months until a re-
placement dealer can be found if the former dealer vacates the service station, cancels
the franchise, or is properly terminated or not renewed.
(b) No new company retail station shall be located within one-eighth mile of a dealer re-
tail station in an urban area, and within one-quarter mile in other areas.
(c) All leases as part of a franchise as defined in section 486H-1, existing on August 1,
1997, or entered into thereafter, shall be construed in conformity with the following:
(1) Such renewal shall not be scheduled more frequently than once every three years;
and
(2) Upon renewal, the lease rent payable shall not exceed fifteen per cent of the gross
sales, except for gasoline, which shall not exceed fifteen per cent of the gross profit of
product, excluding all related taxes by the dealer operated retail service station as de-
fined in section 486H-1 and 486H-10.4 plus, in the case of a retail service station at a lo-
cation where the manufacturer or jobber is the lessee and not the owner of the ground
lease, a percentage increase equal to any increase which the manufacturer or jobber is
required to pay the lessor under the ground lease for the service station. For the purposes
of this subsection, "gross amount" means all monetary earnings of the dealer from a
dealer operated retail service station after all applicable taxes, excluding income taxes,
are paid.
The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to any existing contracts that may be in
conflict with its provisions.
[Vol. 30:3:445
123
: Nova Law Review 30, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2006
SUBSTANTIALLY ADVANCING PENN CENTRAL
dealer's gross profits from gasoline sales plus fifteen percent of gross sales
of products other than gasoline.' °6
At the time of the case, Chevron dominated the Hawaii market by con-
trolling roughly "60 percent of the market for gasoline produced or refined
in-state and 30 percent of the wholesale market on the State's most populous
island, Oahu.' ' 10 7 This market share was accomplished through "64 inde-
pendent lessee-dealer stations.' ' Through this relationship, Chevron pur-
chases the land, erects the station, and then leases the station to independent
dealers at a rent determined by a percentage of the dealer's sales, which al-
lows Chevron to unilaterally set the price for gasoline."°
Within a month of Act 257 being enacted, Chevron filed suit in the
United States District Court for the District of Hawaii." ° Chevron's main
claim was that the rent cap constituted an unconstitutional regulatory taking,
thereby violating the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."' Shortly thereaf-
ter, Chevron moved for summary judgment claiming "that the rent cap [did]
not substantially advance any legitimate government interest.",' 2 The Dis-
trict Court agreed with Chevron's analysis and granted the summary judg-
ment. "'13 The District Court made the following findings: 1) the statute
would not reduce the lessee-dealers' rents or retail prices; 2) dealers who
were selling their stations could "charge the incoming lessee a premium" so
the new lessee's would not obtain the benefits from the rent cap; 3) oil com-
panies would gain back their lost rents by unilaterally increasing fuel price;
and 4) the Act would decrease the number of lessee-dealer stations because
the rent cap would discourage companies, such as Chevron, from investing in
such stations." 4 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
District Court had applied the correct legal standard but vacated the summary
judgment stating that there was a "genuine issue of material fact ... as to
whether the Act would [actually] benefit consumers."' 5 Finally, on remand,
(d) Nothing in this section shall prohibit a dealer from selling a retail service station in
any manner.
Id.
106. Id.
107. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2078.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2078-79.
111. Id. at 2079.
112. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2079.
113. Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano (Chevron 1), 57 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1014
(D. Haw. 1998)).
114. Id.; Chevron 1,57 F. Supp. 2d at 1010-14.
115. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2079 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano (Chevron I1), 224
F.3d 1030, 1037-42 (9th Cir. 2000)).
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the District Court upheld the previous findings that the statute would not
substantially advance a legitimate state interest. 16 This holding was reached
after hearing competing expert economists' opinions of the effects of the
statute.' 17 The State of Hawaii's further attempts to challenge the ruling were
rejected, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari." 8  The
aforementioned procedural history shows the confusion this subject has
caused the courts.
B. Why the Divergence? The United States Supreme Court's Reasoning
Faced with numerous splits among the courts and confusion throughout
the field, the United States Supreme Court hoped to bring some clarity to
regulatory takings tests." 9 The Ninth Circuit, where Lingle took place, and
the First Circuit, consistently applied the "substantially advance test."'120
"Other federal courts hadn't rejected it, but didn't know what to do with it.
A number of state courts had applied it as well.'' In other words, the con-
fusion was apparent and pervasive. 22
Clarifying the confusion, Justice O'Connor, in the telling opening state-
ment of Lingle wrote:
On occasion, a would-be doctrinal rule or test finds its way into
our case law through simple repetition of a phrase-however fortui-
tously coined. A quarter century ago, in Agins v. City of Tiburon, the
Court declared that government regulation of private property "effects a
taking if [such regulation] does not substantially advance legitimate
state interests .... " Through reiteration in a half dozen or so decisions
since Agins, this language has been ensconced in our Fifth Amendment
takings jurisprudence. 123
Next, Justice O'Connor gave a brief overview of takings jurisprudence
before getting into the heart of the majority's analysis.'24 The majority was
exceptionally clear in laying out the distinct categories of takings claims.'25
116. Id. at 2080 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano (Chevron 111), 198 F. Supp. 2d
1182, 1193 (D. Haw. 2002)).
117. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2080 (citing Chevron II1, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 1188).
118. Id.
119. See id. at 2081 (highlighting the categories of regulatory takings tests).
120. Coyle, supra note 83.
121. Id. (quoting Georgetown's John D. Echeverria).
122. See id.
123. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2077-78 (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
124. See id. at 2080-81.
125. Id. at 2081.
[Vol. 30:3:445
125
: Nova Law Review 30, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2006
SUBSTANTIALLY ADVANCING PENN CENTRAL
These claims, which were discussed earlier, include: 1) permanent physical
invasions of property; 2) deprivation of all economically beneficial use of his
or her property; 3) exactions; and 4) claims falling under the Penn Central
test. 26 The Court acknowledged that the categories falling outside the Penn
Central test are "relatively narrow."' 27 Emphasis was placed on the fact that
regulatory takings tests aim to determine the severity of the burden that such
regulations impose upon private property owners,128 which was an indication
of where the opinion was headed.
The Court dealt the final blow to the Agins "substantially advance test"
when it disapproved of the fact that the test has been read to be a stand alone
test, "wholly independent of Penn Central or any other test."' 29 The Court
determined that the Agins test focused on due process and not takings juris-
prudence. 3 ' Showing further approval for the focus of the more deferential
Penn Central test, the Court stated:
In stark contrast to the three regulatory takings tests discussed above, the
"substantially advances" inquiry reveals nothing about the magnitude or
character of the burden a particular regulation imposes upon private prop-
erty rights. Nor does it provide any information about how any regulatory
burden is distributed among property owners. In consequence, this test
does not help to identify those regulations whose effects are functionally
comparable to government appropriation or invasion of private property; it
is tethered neither to the text of the Takings Clause nor to the basic justifi-
cation for allowing regulatory actions to be challenged under the
Clause. 131
As the preceding quote indicates, the Court highlighted the fact that the
Agins "substantially advances" test was a "means-ends test."'32 The Agins
test asks "whether a regulation of private property is effective in achieving
some legitimate public purpose" instead of determining the magnitude or
character of the regulation. 33 Following this determination, the Court held
126. Id.; see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426
(1982) (state law requiring landlords to permit cable companies to install cable facilities in
apartment buildings effected a taking); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)
(economically beneficial use test); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104
(1978).
127. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2081.
128. Id. at 2082.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2083.
131. Id. at 2084.
132. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2083.
133. Id.
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that the Agins test is flawed as a takings test because the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment presupposes that the regulation serves a legitimate,
beneficial effect to the public. 34 Therefore, the Takings Clause is not con-
cerned with whether a regulation is valid on its face, but whether the regula-
tion has such a severe impact on the property owner that just compensation is
required.'35 Consequently, the Agins test is "logically prior to and distinct
from the question [of] whether a regulation effects a taking."'36
In simplistic form, the Court established how a proper takings test
would analyze Chevron's claims by looking at the burden and value loss
associated with Act 257.137 The Court highlighted that there is no clear indi-
cation that Chevron suffered any severe burden or lost revenue which re-
quires just compensation. 138 Chevron expected to regain its losses by raising
the price of the gasoline it sells to the independent lessee-dealer's. 39 How-
ever, the Court does note that Chevron could have brought its claim under
the Penn Central test.' 4 The foregoing analysis suggests that if Chevron
would have brought suit under Penn Central, its claim would have failed.14'
C. A Look to the Future
While the Lingle decision clarified the question of whether the Agins
substantially advances test is proper for regulatory takings, the opinion did
not indicate a proper interpretation of the Penn Central test or attempt to
define its terms. 42 The Penn Central test is vitally important to takings ju-
risprudence because nearly all regulatory takings actions fall under it.'4 3 The
destruction of the Agins test,'" coupled with the recent decisions of Kelo and
San Remo Hotel, demands the test be reexamined in order to provide what
little protection is left to property owners. "45 As John Adams once stated,
"[t]he moment ... the idea is admitted into society that property is not as
sacred as the laws of God, and that there is not a force of law and public jus-
134. See id. at 2084-85.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2084.
137. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2084-86.
138. Id. at 2084-85.
139. Id. at 2085.
140. See id. at 2087.
141. See id. at 2084-86.
142. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2081-82.
143. Coyle, supra note 83.
144. Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2078.
145. See generally id.; Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2668 (2005) (both
cases upheld the government's regulatory takings).
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tice to protect it, anarchy and tyranny commence."'" The force of law and
public justice Adams spoke of is fading with each subsequent interpretation
by the United States Supreme Court)47
IV. SUBSTANTIALLY ADVANCING PENN CENTRAL?
Penn Central has been defined as the "polestar" of American regulatory
takings jurisprudence.' Being classified as the polestar indicates that the
Penn Central test has always been the most widely used takings test.'49 In
fact, "98 percent of regulatory takings cases fall under the Penn Central
wing." 50 However, following the decision in Lingle, the Penn Central test
has been substantially advanced and is now the most important takings case
which the United States Supreme Court needs to interpret.' 5'
Interpreting Penn Central has proven to be extremely difficult and con-
fusing, and has even been described as "inscrutable. 1 52 This difficulty is due
to Justice Brennan's introduction of a new balancing test which considers
multiple factors. 3 As mentioned earlier, Justice Brennan indicated that the
Court was unable to develop a "set formula" for regulatory takings cases, but
instead held that the Court would engage in "essentially ad hoc, factual in-
quiries."'"M Justice Brennan identified the important factors in these inquiries
when he stated:
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the
Court's decisions have identified several factors that have particu-
lar significance. The economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of
course, relevant considerations. So, too, is the character of the
governmental action. A "taking" may more readily be found when
the interference with property can be characterized as a physical
invasion by government, than when interference arises from some
146. Union Pac. R.R. v. United States, 99 U.S. 700, 767 (1878) (quoting John Adams)
(internal quotations omitted).
147. See Lingle, 125 S. Ct. 2074; Kelo, 125 S. Ct. 2655.
148. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
149. See Coyle, supra note 83.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See id.
153. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
154. Id.
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public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life
to promote the common good.' 55
In Penn Central, these factors were applied in order to determine
whether a historic landmark law, which prevented the owners of Grand Cen-
tral Station from building an office high-rise, resulted in a taking for which
just compensation was due.'56 The proposal set forth for the high-rise com-
plied with all zoning and development regulations that were in place at the
time. 57 However, because the City of New York felt that the "special his-
toric, cultural, or architectural significance [would] enhance the quality of
life for all, 1 58 the owner of a designated landmark was required to maintain,
at their own expense, the exterior of the building.' 59 Further, before the
owner of a landmark could alter the exterior or construct any improvements
to the landmark, they were required to seek approval from a regulatory body
known as the Landmark Preservation Commission."'s Penn Central sought
the necessary approval from the Landmark Preservation Commission by
submitting two separate plans.' 6' Both plans submitted to the Commission
were denied.162 Penn Central then sought declaratory judgment and injunc-
tive relief to prevent the City of New York from applying the Landmarks
Preservation Law to prevent the construction of the office building.63 After
making its way through the courts, the case wound up in the United States
Supreme Court."6 The Court held, over strong dissent, that a taking had not
occurred. 65 The Court noted that the regulation had a significant impact on
the use of the property, but did not go too far.' 66 The scales of justice tipped
in favor of the government, and the notion that property provides security,
155. Id. (citations omitted).
156. Id. at 107.
157. Id. at 116.
158. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 108.
159. Id. at 111-12.
160. Id. at 110, 112.
161. ld. at 116.
162. Id. at 117.
163. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 119. Penn Central also sought damages for a
"temporary taking," and a determination as to whether "transferable development rights"
would equate "just compensation" if a taking was found. Id. at 119, 122.
164. Id. at 119-22.
165. Id. at 138.
166. Id. at 137.
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which was set forth in Mahon, was replaced with the notion that property
should provide efficiency for society at large.
167
However, Justice Rehnquist fired back with a powerful dissent.168 He
first attacked the decision because the landmark designation singled out Penn
Central. 169 Penn Central suffered a significant financial burden and received
no meaningful benefit in return. 17 Singling out individual property owners
violates the fundamental notion that a government should not impose bur-
dens upon individuals which should be carried by society at large. 7' Further,
there was no "reciprocity of advantage"172 present to Penn Central because
they received no benefit from the landmark designation.'73 While zoning
ordinances may at times reduce property values, such a burden is shared be-
tween many individuals, thereby leaving some benefit to those affected by
the zoning ordinance.'74 In contrast, Penn Central received no such benefit,
but instead faced a multi-million dollar burden. 175  Had this burden been
placed upon the population of the City of New York, the cost "per person
would be in cents per year."'
176
Therefore, Justice Rehnquist's dissent shows that the case should have
been decided in favor of Penn Central. 17  Penn Central suffered a significant
economic impact, which exceeded several million dollars a year. 178 A rea-
sonable investment-backed expectation was lost due to the preclusion of an
office high-rise. 179  Prior to the landmark designation, Penn Central obvi-
167. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922); Basil H. Mattingly, Forum
Over Substance: The Empty Ritual of Balancing in Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 36
WILLAMEIrE L. REV. 695, 701 (2000). Mattingly defined these terms by stating:
This article use the phrase "property as security" to describe a regulatory regime
that maximizes the landowner's rights in property and protects the property owner
against governmental interference, allowing, to the greatest extent feasible, the
rights of the landowner to utilize her property as she chooses. By. contrast, the
phrase "efficiency of property" refers to an environment in which much greater def-
erence is given to the government's ability to regulate and restrict private property
without compensation.
Id. at 700 n.33.
168. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 138 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
169. See id. at 139.
170. Id.
171. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
172. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
173. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 139.
174. Id. at 147 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 149.
176. Id. at 148.
177. See id. at 138-53.
178. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 149 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 142.
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ously had an expectation to build an office in their air space. 8 ' Finally, be-
cause there was no "reciprocity of advantage"''8' and the regulation imposed
a burden upon an individual, "which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole,"' 82 the character of the regulation does not
pass the third prong of the Penn Central test. 183
A. The Destructible Landmarks of Penn Central
Justice Rehnquist's dissent shows that the Penn Central test can be in-
terpreted in a way that favors property rights." However, a number of
landmark factors coming out of Penn Central stand in the way of reaching
the "justice and fairness" for which this test strives. 185
The first element which stands in the way of justice and fairness is
known as the "whole property" rule. 86 The whole property rule commands
that a court may only consider the effects of a government action or regula-
tion on the whole parcel, as opposed to a specific portion of that parcel. 187
This rule was set forth in Penn Central when Justice Brennan wrote that tak-
ings "jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and
attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been en-
tirely abrogated.' 88
Since the decision in Mahon, courts recognize that a regulation may re-
sult in a taking if it "goes too far."189 However, since Penn Central, deter-
mining if a regulation has gone "too far" depends upon "ad hoc, factual in-
quiries," or the facts of the case at hand."9° The problem is that the courts
must determine what property, or part of the property, is being affected to
determine whether the regulation goes "too far." 9' If only the whole parcel
180. Id.; see also United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (holding that air rights
may be taken).
181. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
182. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
183. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
184. Id. at 138-53 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 124 (majority opinion).
186. Id. at 130; Daniel R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations in Taking Law, 27
URB. LAW. 215, 217 (1995).
187. STOEBUCK & WrTmAN, supra note 15, at 536 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438
U.S. at 104).
188. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 130.
189. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922).
190. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124; Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
191. John E. Fee, Comment, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Taking Claims,
61 U. Cm. L. RaV. 1535, 1536 (1994); Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
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can be considered in the analysis, a regulatory taking will rarely be found. 19 2
Consider the following example of the unfairness of the whole parcel rule
among property owners of land of varying size or values.
[I]f we have an owner of 100 acres of land and also an owner of 10
acres of the same quality of land, then, if piecemealing is not al-
lowed, the owner of the 100 acres would receive no compensation
if 10 (or probably even more) acres were put into an unusable land
reserve, but the owner of the 10 acres would be compensated if his
10 acres were similarly restricted.'93
The preceding example represents an unfair use of the "deep pocket"
doctrine.' 94 Further, the decision in Mahon may be read to indicate that
courts should focus on the loss in value to the affected parcel of property.1
95
In Mahon, Justice Holmes focused on how the Kohler Act diminished the
value of the part of the coal company's rights that were affected, not the en-
tire parcel. 196 While this issue remains to be resolved, this article suggests
abolishing the whole parcel rule in order to get closer to the fairness for
which the Penn Central test currently strives.' 97 In fact, the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals have already em-
braced this interpretation.'98
Next, the Court in Penn Central rejected "the proposition that diminu-
tion in property value, standing alone, can establish a 'taking."' 99 Holding
that diminution in value is not enough to establish a taking contradicts what
the Court previously held in its opinion by stating that one important factor
in the Penn Central test is the "economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant. ' 200 While the Court did not clarify how much of an economic im-
pact would result in a taking,2"' one may deduce that the greater the adverse
192. Id.
193. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 15, at 537.
194. See Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle,
57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561,566-69 (1984).
195. Treanor, supra note 65, at 824.
196. Id.
197. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
198. See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(finding a taking by considering only twelve and a half out of fifty acres for the purposes of a
regulatory taking); Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 95 F.3d 1422,
1433-34 (9th Cir. 1996).
199. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 131.
200. Id. at 124.
201. Id.
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effects on the claimant, the greater the likelihood of a taking.2 °2 However,
this interpretation cannot be squared with subsequent decisions by the United
States Supreme Court.20 3 For example, in Lucas, the Court held that a taking
will often occur "[w]here the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives
land of all economically beneficial use."2" Consideration of the statement in
Lucas indicates that the Court feels that a negative economic impact can lead
to a taking, so long as there is a total loss of value.205
While the Court in Penn Central never expressly held that the three
prongs of the test should be considered together or alone, analysis of the
"economic impact of the regulation" on the claimant prong of the Penn Cen-
tral test shows that the three prongs of the test are to be considered to-
gether.206 Such an analysis means property owners who have suffered a
ninety-five percent loss of their property value will not be compensated,
while an owner suffering a 100 percent diminution of value will recover the
full value of the land.2" As Judge Smith said in Florida Rock Industries, Inc.
v. United States (Florida Rock V),208 "[t]he notion that the government can
take two thirds of your property and not compensate you but must compen-
sate you if it takes 100% has a ring of irrationality, if not unfairness, about
it.
,,209
A better approach is set forth in Florida Rock V, where the Federal
Claims Court found that a ninety-five percent diminution in value was sub-
stantial enough to constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment. 210 In Flor-
ida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States (Florida Rock IV), the Federal Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals held that the Fifth Amendment does not limit guaran-
tees against uncompensable takings to only categorical or complete regula-
tory takings.211 Therefore, in cases falling under the Penn Central test which
deal with less than total takings, the question remains as to "when a partial
loss of economic use of the property has crossed the line from a noncom-
202. John D. Echeverria, Is the Penn Central Three-Factor Test Ready for History's Dust-
bin?, 52 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 3, 3 (2000) [hereinafter Echeverria II].
203. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
204. Id. at 1027.
205. See id.
206. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 714 (1987); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
207. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1064 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
208. 45 Fed. Cl. 21 (1999).
209. Id. at 23.
210. Id.
211. Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States (Fla. Rock IV), 18 F.3d 1560, 1570 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
[Vol. 30:3:445
133
: Nova Law Review 30, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2006
SUBSTANTIALLY ADVANCING PENN CENTRAL
pensable 'mere diminution' to a compensable 'partial taking. ' '21 2 In Florida
Rock V, Judge Loren Smith set forth the conditions under which a substan-
tial, but not complete loss of economically viable use becomes a com-
pensable taking under the Penn Central test.213 This analysis asks the parties
to answer the following economic questions:
1. Has the value of the relevant parcel been significantly dimin-
ished?
2. Can investment in the relevant parcel be recouped? Re-
couped at opportunity cost?
3. Does the return on investment in the relevant parcel before
and after the permit denial reasonably exceed the opportunity cost
of money, i.e., is the return to the entire investment economically
viable before and after permit denial? Or, does the permit denial
frustrate investment-backed expectations? 214
The answers to these questions will determine when a partial regulatory
taking has occurred and just compensation is due.215 The analysis set forth in
Florida Rock V attempts to get past the broken balancing test of Penn Cen-
tral and sets forth a stable framework for when "a severe, but not total, loss
of the economically viable use of plaintiff's property" demands just compen-
216
sation.
However, assuming the Court maintains its position that mere diminu-
tion in value is not enough to constitute a taking, courts across the nation
must interpret another muddled economic prong of the Penn Central test
labeled as interference with the claimant's "distinct investment-backed ex-
pectations., 217 The United States Supreme Court has left the meaning of
"investment-backed expectations" undefined.2 8 One of the problems is clas-
sifying property by using the phrase "investment-backed" because "[a]ll ex-
pectations in privately held property are investment-backed by purchase or
acquisition., 219 Another problem is that both parties to the suit, the property
212. Id. at 1570.
213. Fla. Rock V, 45 Fed. Cl. at 23; William W. Wade, Economic Backbone of the Penn
Central Test After Florida Rock V, K&K, and Palazzolo, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 11221, 11226
(2002).
214. Wade, supra note 213, at 11226.
215. See generally Fla. Rock V, 45 Fed. Cl. 21.
216. Id. at 23.
217. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
218. See Mandelker, supra note 186, at 225.
219. Id. at 226.
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owner(s) and the government, "can legitimately claim expectations entitled
to protection."22
One way to avoid the problems with "investment-backed expectations"
is known as the "entitlement-to-property theory," which recognizes that pro-
tecting landowners' rights is paramount to other considerations in takings
law.22' By accepting a unitary theory such as the entitlement theory, only
one side of the battle can claim expectations.222
A more thorough approach to the problem relates back to the founder of
the phrase "investment-backed expectations., 223 The United States Supreme
Court did not formulate "investment-backed expectations" on its own, but
instead borrowed the phrase from the influential work of Frank I. Michel-
man.224 In his article, Michelman wrote that a proper test asks, "whether or
not the measure in question can easily be seen to have practically deprived
the claimant of some distinctly perceived, sharply crystallized, investment-
backed expectation. "225 Unfortunately, the Court did not adopt the analysis
of Michelman, which would have avoided the years of ensuing confusion.226
Michelman suggests weighing "[d]emoralization costs" against
"[s]ettlement costs. ' ' 2 Michelman defines demoralization costs by looking
to the amount of compensation which would be necessary to satisfy those
who have suffered through regulation, combined with the amount of lost
value caused by the regulation. 22' An example of lost value is a decrease in
investment and development due to fears that such a regulation may result in
similar effects on those similarly situated.229
These demoralization costs must then be weighed against the settlement
costs, which are defined as "the dollar value of the time, effort, and resources
which would be required in order to reach compensation settlements ade-
quate to avoid demoralization CoStS., 230 If the demoralization costs are
greater than the settlement costs, then compensation is due. 23' This analysis
220. Id. at 227.
221. Id. at 227-28.
222. See id.
223. Michelman, supra note 31, at 1213.
224. See id.
225. Id. at 1233.
226. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (failing to
mention the demoralization and settlement costs highlighted by Michelman).
227. Michelman, supra note 31, at 1214-15.
228. Id. at 1214.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 1215.
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conforms with the rules discussed throughout this article.232 For example, in
the case of a Loretto-type physical occupation, "settlement costs are likely to
be low and demoralization costs (absent compensation) to be high."233
Therefore, compensation would be due.2" In a Penn Central analysis, the
"ad hoc, factual inquir[y], 235 could remain intact, and Michelman's analysis
would set forth a balancing test with defined terms. 236 The fact that no tak-
ings claimant has ever prevailed under the Penn Central test suggests that it
is time for a change.237
One of the problems with suggesting a replacement balancing test is
that some of the same problems will arise.238 While the Michelman test does
define the terms used in its analysis, any balancing test will allow "bias,
prejudice, and incompetence" to be brought into the analysis.2 39 Even though
judges are supposed to be insulated from political pressures, they may have
their own political or ideological desires to push upon the public. 240 For
these reasons, another suggestion may be discarding the Penn Central test in
exchange for bright line rules which provide greater protection to property
owners.24 Examples of these rules are set forth in legislative proposals.242
Such proposals call for compensation when diminution in value is as low as
twenty percent.243 Legislative proposals show that many lawmakers believe
that when an individual has lost a portion of their property rights, just com-
pensation should be paid.2 4 While bright line rules must have exceptions,
such rules may be the only answer to protecting property rights.245
While the economic factors of the Penn Central test are usually the de-
ciding factor, courts must also consider the "character of the governmental
action. ' 246 The character prong of the Penn Central test focuses on whether
232. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 43, at 1234.
233. Id.
234. See Michelman, supra note 31, at 1215.
235. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
236. See generally id. at 1165.
237. See Echeverria II, supra note 202.
238. See Mattingly, supra note 167, at 716.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See generally Dillon, supra note 31, at 243-50.
242. See id. at 246-50.
243. See id. at 246.
244. See id.
245. See Echeverria II, supra note 202 at 4 (indicating that no regulatory takings claimant
has ever prevailed under the Penn Central analysis).
246. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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a government action promotes the common good.24 One problem with the
character prong of the Penn Central test is the deference that courts show
economic and social regulations.248 Such deference means that all regula-
tions that meet "a very low threshold" of public benefit are given substantial
weight in the analysis.249
In order to balance this deference towards government regulation, the
courts should scrutinize the actions of the regulators in the same manner they
scrutinize takings claims.2 50 To reach the fairness the Penn Central test
strives for, "the motivation and circumstances of the regulator" should be
analyzed as well."' Applying the same standard to government regulators as
to private property owners helps make the character prong symmetrical and
moves toward a fair balance.252 The character prong of the Penn Central test
must mesh with the idea that a government should not force "some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole. 253
Whatever approach property advocates pursue, they must get back to
the notion "that the state's rights against its citizens are no greater than the
sum of the rights of the individuals whom it benefits in any given transac-
tion."254 The answer to the question of how much power the government
should have to take property is the government should only have the power
to force exchanges of property when it can leave the property owners with
rights more valuable than those which are lost.
255
VI. CONCLUSION
The efforts of the United States Supreme Court have failed to attain a
true balancing test which meets even the most liberal standard of justice and
fairness. This failure is highlighted by the fact that since the Penn Central
test was set forth in 1978, the Court has rarely found that a regulatory taking
247. See Steven J. Eagle, "Character" as "Worthiness:" A New Meaning for Penn Cen-
tral's Third Test?, ZONING & PLAN. L. REP., June 2004, at 2, available at http://mason.gmu.
edu/-seagle/pubs/2004_Character_asWorthinessZPLR.pdf.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See id.
251. Id. at 6.
252. Eagle, supra note 247, at 7.
253. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
254. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 331 (1985).
255. Id. at 332.
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had occurred.256 In fact, the few cases that have been decided in favor of a
takings claimant have been decided as a categorical or per se taking as de-
fined in Lucas and Loretto.257 This leads to the conclusion that a takings
claimant has never prevailed under the Penn Central test. Such a conclusion
is not reached through a true balancing test.
As takings opinions continue to come down from the United States Su-
preme Court, the balance remains tilted in favor of government regulation.258
This article has shown how the constitutional interpretation has moved from
a notion of property as security towards the notion of property as social effi-
ciency. While the recent cases from the United States Supreme Court may
have broken many of the arrows in the property advocate's quiver, and the
Penn Central test as it stands heavily armors the government, the changes
suggested in this article may sharpen this remaining arrow and provide a
chink in the government's mail.
Getting back to the roots of regulatory takings, in which private prop-
erty was viewed with the notion that it was secure, is essential to the mainte-
nance of our society. In foreshadowing the pressures which rest on the tak-
ings issue today, Justice Holmes warned that courts were "in danger of for-
getting that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not
enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitu-
tional way of paying for the change."' 59 This article takes the position that
the courts have crossed that line, have gone too far, and need to consider
revising the interpretation of the Penn Central test in order to provide private
property and business owners the protections to which they are constitution-
ally entitled.
256. See Mattingly, supra note 167, at 699.
257. See id.; Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992); Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
258. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc, 125 S. Ct. 2074 (2005); San Remo Hotel v. City
of San Francisco, 125 S. Ct. 2491 (2005); Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655
(2005).
259. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1993, while other juniors at Fox High School were planning their ca-
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Christopher Simmons was planning a gruesome and egregious murder.'
Simmons described his plan to his friends in "chilling, callous terms" about
how he wanted to find someone to burglarize, tie the victim up, and ulti-
mately push the victim off a bridge.2 Simmons assured his friends Charles
Benjamin, fifteen, and John Tessmer, sixteen, that because they were juve-
niles "they could 'get away with it."' 3
In the late evening of September 8, 1993, Simmons met with his two
friends; however, Tessmer dropped out of the plot and went home.' Sim-
mons and Benjamin continued on their mission to commit burglary, hoping
to find drug money.' At random, they picked the home of forty-six-year-old
Shirley Crook.6 Finding a window cracked open, they reached in, opened it,
and entered into Crook's home.' Mrs. Crook saw a hallway light turn on and
asked, "'Who's there?"' 8 Simmons entered into her bedroom and "he recog-
nized her from a previous car accident." 9 Simmons then realized Mrs. Crook
could identify them, so he panicked and "'decided to kill her, so she
wouldn't snitch on them.""' Simmons next ordered Mrs. Crook to get out of
her bed." Then, while Benjamin stood guard, Simmons used duct tape to
bind her hands as well as to cover her eyes and mouth.' 2 They put Mrs.
Crook in her minivan, bound and gagged her, and drove around looking for a
place to kill her.'3 They stopped at a state park, forced her out of the van,
and noticed that she had removed the tape from her arms and her mouth. 4
They then proceeded to cover her entire face with duct tape as well as a
towel and hog-tied her by tying her hands and feet together with electrical
cable. 5 They took her to the railroad trestle, forty feet above the Meramec
River, kicked her off the side of a bridge, and watched her drown in the cold
1. Tim Rowden, Inmate Imagines His Final Walk to Execution: Simmons Hopes Court
Decision Will Keep Him from Taking It for Real, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, June 17, 2002, at
Al [hereinafter Rowden I].
2. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 556 (2005).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Rowden I, supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. Roper, 543 U.S. at 556.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Kim Bell, Woman Thrown into River Alive; Teen-agers Bound Her, Police Say, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 12, 1993, at ID (quoting Ferguson police lieutenant).
11. Brief for the Petitioner at 4, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633).
12. Id.
13. Rowden I, supra note 1.
14. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 11, at 4.
15. Id.
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waters below. 16 As a result of the burglary, Simmons and Benjamin only
procured about six dollars from Mrs. Crook's purse.' 7 "'It's a cheap price for
a life,"' the local police lieutenant said.'
8
The next day, her husband, Steven Crook, returned home from an over-
night trip to find his bedroom in disarray. 9 Steven Crook testified that when
he arrived "the couple's poodle was whimpering" and "the dog [was]
wrapped in duct tape on the bed in the master bedroom."2 Meanwhile,
Simmons was busy bragging to his friends that he "killed a woman 'because
the bitch seen my face.'' "That same afternoon, two fishermen found Mrs.
Crook's body floating in the Meramec River, three quarters of a mile down-
stream from the railroad trestle. 22 The medical examiner determined that
the cause of death was drowning and that Mrs. Crook was fully conscious
and alive before being pushed from the bridge.' He also "testified that
Shirley Crook's face had been bound with duct tape with only an area for her
nose visible" and was battered with "29 bruises on her body and four frac-
tured ribs."24
Shirley Crook was forty-six when she died: a wife, a mother of two,
and unbeknownst to her at that time, soon to be a grandmother.25 Her daugh-
ter learned that she was pregnant two weeks after the murder.26 The murder
caused great anguish among Mrs. Crook's family.27 Mrs. Crook's mother
died of a heart attack shortly after she was murdered.28 A few years later,
Mrs. Crook's husband also died of a heart attack.29 The two were high
school sweethearts, and family members expressed that he never got over the
agony of losing his wife.30
In all likelihood, Simmons never envisioned that his actions would lead
to such a great deal of controversy-not only among our nation, but also
16. Tim Rowden, Killer's Stay of Execution Prolongs Family's Agony, Sister of Victim
Says, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 3, 2002, at 5 [hereinafter Rowden H].
17. Bell, supra note 10.
18. Id.
19. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 557 (2005).
20. Leo Fitzmaurice, Jury Will Get Case of Drowning Death, ST. LOUIS PosT-DISPATCH,
June 16, 1994, at 3C.
21. Roper, 543 U.S. at 557.
22. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 11, at 5.
23. Id.
24. Fitzmaurice, supra note 20.
25. Rowden II, supra note 16.
26. Id.
27. See id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Rowden II, supra note 16.
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worldwide. This article discusses the fate of Simmons and the juvenile death
penalty.31 Part H discusses the controversy that arose over Simmons' case,
including how it reached the United States Supreme Court and the relevant
precedent. Part III discusses the international community's disdain for the
juvenile death penalty, including arguments made by England and the Euro-
pean Union in their amici curiae briefs submitted to the Court in support of
Simmons. Part IV analyzes the Court's rationale for abolishing the juvenile
death penalty and the reasons why the dissenters opposed the abolition. Fi-
nally, Part V illustrates the effects of the Court's decision around the nation
and in Florida, specifically detailing the number of juveniles on death row at
the time whose lives were spared.
II. THE CONTROVERSY
A. The Trial
Simmons was charged with burglary, kidnapping, stealing, and first-
degree murder-there was little question as to his guilt.32 The State intro-
duced an overwhelming weight of evidence against Simmons, including his
own confession to the murder, a video-taped reenactment of the scene, along
with testimony from his friend, John Tessmer, stating that Simmons had dis-
cussed the plot with him and later bragged about it.33 The defense did not
call any witnesses.' The jury found Simmons guilty and the trial proceeded
to the penalty phase.35
The State sought capital punishment.36 Family members of Simmons
took the stand and testified about the close relationship they had with him
and described some of the kind acts he had performed in his life, such as
taking care of his two younger half-brothers.37 Simmons' counsel introduced
mitigating factors, most significantly, his lack of any prior criminal history
and his age. 38 In response, the prosecutor used Simmons' age as a double-
edged sword. He argued that it was "[q]uite the contrary" of a mitigating
factor stating: "Seventeen years old. Isn't that scary? Doesn't that scare
31. The term "juvenile death penalty" used throughout this article refers to the imposition
of the death penalty on those under the age of eighteen years old.
32. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 557 (2005).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Roper, 543 U.S. at 558.
38. Id.
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you? Mitigating? Quite the contrary I submit. Quite the contrary. ' 39 "The
jury found three statutory aggravating factors"' and recommended the death
sentence, which the judge imposed."
B. Post-Conviction Proceedings
Simmons applied to the trial court for post-conviction relief alleging in-
effective assistance of counsel at trial based on his counsel's failure to intro-
duce Simmons' alcohol and drug usage.42 The court found no constitutional
violation and denied the motion.43 Simmons took a consolidated appeal to
the Supreme Court of Missouri, which affirmed the trial court's denial of
post-conviction relief.44 The federal courts, specifically the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri and the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit, also denied Simmons' writ of habeas corpus.
45
After these numerous post-conviction relief efforts were made, the
United States Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia,4 6 holding that the
Eighth Amendment forbids the imposition of the death penalty on mentally
retarded persons.47 Based on Atkins, Simmons filed a new motion for post-
conviction relief alleging that a similar national consensus has developed
against executing juveniles.48
The Missouri Supreme Court agreed, finding that "a national consensus
has developed against the execution of juvenile offenders." '49 Based on this
finding and a prediction of how the United States Supreme Court would cur-
rently decide the constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty, the Supreme
39. Id.
40. Brief for the Respondent at 5, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633).
The jury found the following three statutory aggravating factors; that the murder was: 1)
"committed for the purpose of receiving money"; 2) "outrageously and wantonly vile, horri-
ble, and inhuman" because it involved torture and depravity of the mind; and 3) "committed
for the purpose of avoiding . . . a lawful arrest." Id. at 5 (quoting Mo. ANN. STAT. §
565.032(2) (West 1999)).
41. Roper, 543 U.S. at 558.
42. Id. at 558-59.
43. Id. at 559.
44. Id. (citing State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165, 169 (Mo. 1997) (en banc), cert denied,
522 U.S. 953 (1997)).
45. Id. (citing Simmons v. Bowersox, 235 F.3d 1124, 1127 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
534 U.S. 924 (2001)).
46. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
47. Id. at 321.
48. State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 399 (Mo. 2003) (en banc), cert.
granted, 540 U.S. 1160 (2004).
49. Id.
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Court of Missouri "set[] aside Mr. Simmons' death sentence and re-
sentence[d] him ... to life imprisonment without eligibility for probation,
parole, or release except by act of the Governor."5° In 2004, the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the issue of whether a
national consensus has in fact developed against imposing the death penalty
on juveniles.51
C. Relevant Precedent
1. Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution contains a
provision against the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments. 52 The
United States Supreme Court has held that this proscription must be observed
not only by the Federal Government, but also by the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.53 The Court has acknowl-
edged that "[t]he authors of the Eighth Amendment... made no attempt to
define [its] contours"' and has frequently acknowledged the difficulty in
defining what constitutes "cruel and unusual."55 Although there is no precise
definition of what is "cruel and unusual," the Court has sought guidance in
determining whether a particular punishment is categorically prohibited by
the Eighth Amendment by referring to "the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society. ' 6
To determine what the "evolving standards" are, the Court has empha-
sized that such an inquiry should not be based on the subjective views of the
Justices, but rather on "objective factors to the maximum possible extent." 57
The Court has found that laws enacted by states' legislatures provide "[tihe
clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values."58
Additionally, the Court has referenced the behavior of sentencing juries.59
50. Id. at 413.
51. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555-56, 560 (2005).
52. U.S. CONST. amend. VIH.
53. E.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 675 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring).
54. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821 (1988).
55. E.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 376 (1972) (Burger, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
ban on 'cruel and unusual punishments' is one of the most difficult to translate into judicially
manageable terms.").
56. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
57. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
58. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 307 (2002).
59. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 831.
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This section of the article focuses on Supreme Court decisions discussing the
Eighth Amendment's contours.
2. Thompson v. Oklahoma
In Thompson v. Oklahoma, the petitioner was fifteen years old when he
murdered his former brother-in-law, with the help of three men, by shooting
the victim and by cutting his throat, chest, and abdomen. 60 They chained
concrete blocks to his body and threw him into a river where the victim's
body remained for nearly four weeks before being discovered. 6' The peti-
tioner was convicted of murder in the first degree and, by the jury's recom-
mendation, was sentenced to capital punishment.62
The case reached the United States Supreme Court where the Court
considered whether the execution of a person who was fifteen-years-old at
the time of committing a capital offense violates the constitutional prohibi-
tion against "cruel and unusual punishment. 63 In evaluating the contours of
the Eighth Amendment, guided by the "'evolving standards of decency,"' the
Court looked at two societal factors in confronting the issue before it: first,
relevant legislative enactments, and second, jury determinations.64 In assess-
ing these factors, coupled with an independent assessment of the issue, the
Court ultimately concluded "that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
prohibit the execution of a person who was under 16 years of age at the time
of his or her offense. 65
Looking at the legislative enactments, the Court recognized the differ-
ences in the law "which must be accommodated in determining the rights
and duties of children as compared with those of adults."'  The Court em-
phasized that in Oklahoma "a minor is not eligible to vote, to sit on a jury, to
marry without parental consent, or to purchase alcohol or cigarettes. ' 67 In
addition, most states are also in conformance with such legislation that im-
poses restrictions on minors with regard to driving, gambling, and the pur-
chase of pornographic materials.68 Every state has created a juvenile justice
system in which most juvenile offenders are not held criminally responsi-
60. Id. at 819.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 818, 820.
63. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 820.
64. Id. at 821-22 (citations omitted).
65. id. at 838.
66. Id. at 823.
67. Id. (footnotes omitted).
68. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 824 (citations omitted).
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ble. 9 The Court concluded that "[a]ll of this legislation is consistent with the
experience of mankind, as well as the long history of our law, that the normal
15-year-old is not prepared to assume the full responsibilities of an adult. 7°
Additionally, the Court addressed state legislation concerning the death
penalty, finding that "[m]ost state legislatures have not expressly confronted
the question of establishing a minimum age for [its] imposition."' At the
time of the decision, there were nineteen states that authorized capital pun-
ishment, but had no minimum age to impose such punishment.72 However,
the Court pointed to eighteen death penalty states that had expressly deline-
ated an age limit to their death penalty statutes.73 The Court attached a par-
ticular importance to the fact that all eighteen of the these states had limited
their imposition of the death penalty to those offenders who were at least the
age of sixteen at the time the capital offense was committed.74
The Court also looked at the behavior of sentencing juries.75 The Court
found that, in the twentieth century, imposition of the death penalty by juries
on those who were under the age of sixteen when committing the capital
offense was exceedingly rare.76 Further demonstrating the rarity of its prac-
tice, the Court referred to Department of Justice statistics from 1982 to 1986
that showed of the 1393 offenders sentenced to death, only five of them were
under sixteen years of age at the time of the offense.77 The Court deemed
these five young offenders' sentences as "'cruel and unusual in the same way
that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual." 78 Based on juries' hesi-
tation to impose death sentences on such young individuals, the Court con-
cluded "that the imposition of the death penalty on a 15-year-old offender is
now generally abhorrent to the conscience of the community. ' 79
In addition to legislative enactments and the behavior of juries, the
Court undertook its own analysis of whether the Eighth Amendment permits
the imposition of the death penalty on a fifteen-year-old offender.80 In mak-
ing an independent judgment, the Court analyzed two pivotal concerns: first,
69. Id. at 823-24.
70. Id. at 824-25.
71. Id. at 826.
72. Id. at 826-27 (citations omitted).
73. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 829.
74. Id. (citations omitted).
75. Id. at 831.
76. See id. at 832.
77. Id. at 832-33.
78. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 833 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972)
(Stewart, J., concurring)).
79. Id. at 832.
80. Id. at 833.
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"whether the juvenile's culpability should be measured by the same standard
as that of an adult" and, second, "whether the application of the death penalty
to this class of offenders 'measurably contributes' to the social purposes that
are served by the death penalty."
8
'
The Court found that "less culpability should attach to a crime commit-
ted by a juvenile than to a comparable crime committed by an adult," based
on juveniles' lack of experience, education, and intelligence that impairs
juveniles' ability to assess the consequences of their actions.8 2 Furthermore,
the multitude of reasons why juveniles are not given the same privileges and
responsibilities of adults "also explain[s] why their irresponsible conduct is
not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult."8 3
Additionally, the Court found that the retribution and deterrence pur-
poses of the death penalty were not served when imposed on those who
committed crimes under the age of sixteen.84 Retribution is not furthered by
the execution of a fifteen-year-old offender "[g]iven the lesser culpability of
the juvenile offender, the teenager's capacity for growth, and society's fidu-
ciary obligations to its children., 85 Likewise, the Court found that the deter-
rent function of the death penalty was not effective when imposed on juve-
nile offenders.86 The Court's reasoned that juveniles are not likely to make a
cost-benefit analysis of the possibility of being executed, and, even if they
do, given the extreme rareness of executing such individuals in the twentieth
century, it would be unlikely that such an individual would be deterred by
the possibility of such a rare sanction.87
3. Stanford v. Kentucky
Nearly a year after deciding Thompson, the Court again addressed the
constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty in Stanford v. Kentucky. 88 In
Stanford, there were two consolidated cases with one ultimate issue before
the Court: whether the imposition of the death penalty on an individual who
commits a capital offense "at 16 or 17 years of age constitutes cruel and un-
usual punishment" in violation of the Eighth Amendment.8 9 One of the peti-
tioners, Kevin Stanford, was seventeen-years-old when he committed mur-
81. Id. (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)).
82. Id. at 835.
83. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835.
84. See id. at 836-37.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 837.
87. Id. at 837-38.
88. 492 U.S. 361, 368 (1989), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
89. Id. at 364-65.
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der.90 Stanford and an accomplice robbed a gas station, "repeatedly raped
and sodomized" the twenty-year-old attendant, and then shot her at close
range in the face.9' Stanford was convicted of first-degree murder and sen-
tenced to death.92 The other petitioner, Heath Wilkins, was sixteen years old
when he and an accomplice stabbed to the death a twenty-six-year old store
clerk while robbing a convenience store.93 Wilkins was also convicted of
first-degree murder and sentenced to death.94
Consistent with Thompson, the Court again assessed the "'evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."' 95 Writ-
ing for the majority, Justice Scalia emphasized that in making Eighth
Amendment evaluations, the Court has not looked at its own independent
"conceptions of decency, but to those of modem American society as a
whole." 96 As mandated by the language of the Eighth Amendment, what is
cruel and unusual should not be decided by the "'subjective views of indi-
vidual Justices; judgment should be informed by objective factors to the
maximum possible extent.' 97 Further admonishing what an Eighth Amend-
ment judgment should not include, Justice Scalia delineated that the concep-
tions of decency in other countries are not relevant-nor are public opinion
polls and the views of interests groups and various professional associa-
tions.98
The relevant objective indicium looked at once again to "'reflect the
public attitude toward a given sanction ' ' 99 were legislative enactmentsl °° and
the behavior of juries.' The Court found that out of the thirty-seven death
penalty states, only fifteen prohibited its imposition on sixteen-year-old of-
fenders and twelve prohibited its imposition on seventeen-year-old offend-
ers."°2 The Court concluded that these legislative enactments did "not estab-
lish the degree of national consensus this Court has previously thought suffi-
cient to label a particular punishment cruel and unusual."' 3 As a benchmark,
90. Id. at 365.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 366.
93. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 366.
94. Id. at 367.
95. Id. at 369 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
96. Id.
97. Id. (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)).
98. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369 n.1, 377.
99. Id. at 370 (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987)).
100. Id. at 369-70.
101. Id. at 373.
102. Id. at 370.
103. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370-71.
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the Court provided a summary of instances when it previously found the
evidence of a national consensus sufficient to characterize a particular pun-
ishment as cruel and unusual:
In invalidating the death penalty for rape of an adult woman, we
stressed that Georgia was the sole jurisdiction that authorized such
a punishment. In striking down capital punishment for participa-
tion in a robbery in which an accomplice takes a life, we empha-
sized that only eight jurisdictions authorized similar punishment.
In finding that the Eighth Amendment precludes execution of the
insane and thus requires an adequate hearing on the issue of sanity,
we relied upon (in addition to the common-law rule) the fact that
"no State in the Union" permitted such punishment. And in strik-
ing down a life sentence without parole under a recidivist statute,
we stressed that "[iut appears that [petitioner] was treated more se-
verely than he would have been in any other State." 1 4
Unlike these cases, the Court did not find a national consensus against the
death penalty of sixteen and seventeen-year-old offenders because the major-
ity of states authorized the death penalty for such offenders.' 5
The Court next looked at the behavior of juries in imposing the death
penalty upon sixteen or seventeen-year-old offenders. °6 While only two
percent of executions between 1642 and 1986 were for crimes committed by
offenders under the age of eighteen, Justice Scalia did not find these statistics
sufficient.'0 7 Justice Scalia argued, rather than showing that prosecutors and
juries felt the death sentence is categorically unacceptable for those offenders
under the age of eighteen, it shows instead that they believe it should rarely
be imposed.'08 Additionally, this discrepancy in treatment can be attributed
to the fact that juveniles commit a far smaller percentage of capital crimes
than adults."°
The Court also responded to the petitioner's argument that because the
legal age for various activities such as drinking alcoholic beverages and vot-
ing is set at the age of eighteen, the death penalty should also be set at eight-
een."' Justice Scalia did not see the connection between these activities:
104. Id. at 371 (citations omitted).
105. See id. at 371-72.
106. Id. at 373.
107. Id. at 373-74.
108. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 374.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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It is, to begin with, absurd to think that one must be mature enough
to drive carefully, to drink responsibly, or to vote intelligently, in
order to be mature enough to understand that murdering another
human being is profoundly wrong, and to conform one's conduct
to that most minimal of all civilized standards .... These laws set
the appropriate ages for the operation of a system that makes its
determinations in gross, and that does not conduct individualized
maturity tests for each driver, drinker, or voter. The criminal jus-
tice system, however, does provide individualized testing. In the
realm of capital punishment in particular, "individualized consid-
eration [is] a constitutional requirement.""'
Based on the legislative enactments and the behavior of juries, the Court
held that neither a historical nor a modem national consensus existed forbid-
ding the imposition of the death penalty on an individual who committed a
capital offense at the age of sixteen or seventeen." 2 Accordingly, the Court
concluded that such punishment was not deemed cruel and unusual and con-
sequently did not violate the Eighth Amendment." 3 Justice O'Connor con-
curred in the judgment of the Court, stating that "[t]he day may come when
there is such general legislative rejection of the execution of 16- or 17-year-
old capital murderers that a clear national consensus can be said to have de-
veloped," but that she did not believe that day had yet arrived."
4
4. Penry v. Lynaugh
On the same day the Court decided Stanford, it also decided another
Eighth Amendment case, Penry v. Lynaugh."5 In 1979 the petitioner,
Johnny Penry, violently raped a Texas woman and then stabbed her to death
with scissors. 16 Despite the fact that Penry was mentally retarded, he was
sentenced to death for his brutal crime.' '7 The issue before the Court was
whether the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits the imposition of the
death penalty on the mentally retarded." 8 Once again, to determine if there
was a national consensus against such a practice, the Court looked at the
111. Id. at 374-75 (citation omitted).
112. Id. at 380.
113. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380.
114. Id. at 381-82 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
115. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
116. Id. at 307.
117. Id. at 307, 310.
118. Id. at307.
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objective evidence of legislative enactments and the actions of sentencing
juries."9
First, in looking at legislative enactments, the Court noted that "[o]nly
one State . . . currently bans execution of retarded persons who have been
found guilty of a capital offense."'"0 Maryland had also adopted a similar
statute to take effect that year.' 2' The Court found that the legislation by
these two states was not sufficient evidence to amount to a national consen-
sus against such punishment. 2 2 To the contrary, when the Court found a
national consensus against the execution of the mentally insane, no state then
permitted the execution of the insane.2 3
The Court also looked at the behavior of juries and likewise concluded
that there was a lack of evidence, finding no facts as to the general behavior
of juries in regards to sentencing mentally retarded defendants to death. 24
The Court disregarded public opinion polls against the execution of the men-
tally retarded, recognizing that they may be ultimately expressed in legisla-
tion, which is objective indicia the Court considers in a national consensus
evaluation.2 5
Lastly, the Court evaluated whether the mentally retarded could act with
the degree of culpability required to justify the death penalty. 6 The Court
admitted "that mental retardation has long been regarded as a factor that may
diminish an individual's culpability for a criminal act."' 27 However, it rec-
ognized that the states already have procedural safeguards to protect the
mentally retarded by recognizing their limited levels of culpability as a miti-
gating factor in death penalty statutes; for example: "'[t]he capacity of the
defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his con-
duct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.""128
The Court refused to generalize the level of culpability of all mentally
retarded people: "In light of the diverse capacities and life experiences of
mentally retarded persons, it cannot be said on the record before us today
that all mentally retarded people, by definition, can never act with the level
119. Id. at 331.
120. Penry, 492 U.S. at 334 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(j) (2004)).
121. Id. (citation omitted); see MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202(b)(2)(ii) (LexisNexis
2002).
122. Penry, 492 U.S. at 334.
123. Id. (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408 n.2 (1986)).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 334-35.
126. Id. at 336.
127. Penry, 492 U.S. at 337 (citations omitted).
128. Id. (quoting ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51(6) (LexisNexis 1994)).
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of culpability associated with the death penalty."' 129 Ultimately, the Court
held that, while mental retardation may lessen a defendant's culpability for a
capital offense, according to the Eighth Amendment, mental retardation itself
does not categorically preclude the execution of a person convicted of a capi-
tal offense.
30
5. Atkins v. Virginia
Thirteen years later, the Court revisited the issue of the constitutionality
of executing the mentally retarded in Atkins v. Virginia.13 ' The petitioner,
Daryl Renard Atkins, and an accomplice robbed and murdered a man, shoot-
ing him eight times with a semiautomatic handgun. 132 The jury sentenced
Atkins, a mentally retarded man, to death.
33
The Court took note of a "dramatic shift in the state legislative land-
scape that ha[d] occurred in the past 13 years," so it granted certiorari to re-
visit the issue from Penry. 134 The Court considered these recent and consis-
tent legislative enactments, the reluctance of juries to impose the death pen-
alty upon the mentally retarded, the Court's independent assessment of pe-
nology, and the mental capacity of the mentally retarded and ultimately con-
cluded that executing the mentally retarded violates the Eighth Amend-
ment. 135
Looking at the legislative enactments since Penry was decided, the
Court observed significant changes:
In 1990, Kentucky and TennesSee enacted statutes similar to those
in Georgia and Maryland, as did New Mexico in 1991, and Arkan-
sas, Colorado, Washington, Indiana, and Kansas in 1993 and 1994.
In 1995, when New York reinstated its death penalty, it emulated
the Federal Government by expressly exempting the mentally re-
tarded. Nebraska followed suit in 1998. There appear to have
been no similar enactments during the next two years, but in 2000
and 2001 six more States-South Dakota, Arizona, Connecticut,
Florida, Missouri, and North Carolina-joined the procession.
The Texas Legislature unanimously adopted a similar bill, and
129. Id. at 338-39.
130. Id. at 340.
131. 536 U.S. 304, 310 (2002).
132. Id. at 307.
133. Id. at 309.
134. Id. at310.
135. See id. at 321.
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bills have passed at least one house in other States, including Vir-
ginia and Nevada. 1
36
While only two states in 1989 had statutes prohibiting the death penalty
for mentally retarded offenders, in 2002 there was a total of eighteen states
with such statutes. 37 The Court found that it is not the number of states with
such statutes that is significant; rather, it is the consistent direction of change,
coupled with the fact that it is a time when anti-crime legislation is more
popular than providing protections for criminal defendants.
31
Even in states without these statutes, the Court found evidence of a na-
tional consensus against executing mentally retarded offenders by the fact
that juries hesitate to impose such punishment. 39 While states such as New
Hampshire and New Jersey do not statutorily prohibit imposition of the death
penalty on the mentally retarded, it has not been carried out for decades.'
4
Only five states have executed an offender with an IQ below seventy since
Penry was decided. 41 The Court concluded that the practice of executing the
mentally retarded had "become truly unusual.' 42
The Court proceeded with two additional reasons, "consistent with the
[national] consensus that the mentally retarded should be categorically ex-
cluded" from receiving the death penalty: 1) the penological goals of the
death penalty are not justified when applied to mentally retarded offenders;
and 2) the reduced capacity of the mentally retarded make them ineligible for
the death penalty. 
14
The two prominent goals of the death penalty are "retribution and deter-
rence of capital crimes."' 44 The Court found that the goal of retribution is not
met when the death penalty is imposed on the mentally retarded: "[i]f the
culpability of the average murderer is insufficient to justify the most extreme
sanction available to the State, the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded
offender surely does not merit that form of retribution."' 45 Likewise, the
Court concluded that the goal of deterrence is not met by executing the men-
tally retarded, finding that inherent in such persons are "cognitive and behav-
ioral impairments" that make it unlikely that they will be able to process the
136. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-15. (footnotes omitted).
137. See id. (citations omitted).
138. Id. at315-16.
139. See id. at 316.
140. Id.
141. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316; see Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
142. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316.
143. Id. at 318-21.
144. Id. at 319 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)).
145. Id.
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nature and consequences of their conduct and control their conduct based
upon that information.
46
The Court found that the reduced capacity of the mentally retarded pro-
vides further justification against imposing the death penalty upon such indi-
viduals.1 47 In addition to the increased likelihood of false confessions, the
mentally retarded may have trouble assisting their counsel, "and their de-
meanor may create an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their
crimes. '  The Court concluded that the mentally retarded are especially
prone to being wrongfully convicted. 49 This case would lay the analytical
framework for assessing the constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty.
III. INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE
The case of Roper v. Simmons has generated an unusually large number
of amicus briefs filed on behalf of Christopher Simmons, the Respondent,
from various organizations representing international, religious, child advo-
cacy, and professional and legal communities. 50 Premised on different rea-
146. Id. at 320.
147. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320.
148. Id. at 320-21.
149. Id. at 321.
150. See, e.g., Brief for the American Bar Ass'n as Amici Curiae Supporting the Respon-
dent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633); Brief for the American Medical
Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting the Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551
(2005) (No. 03-633); Brief for the American Psychological Ass'n & the Missouri Psychologi-
cal Ass'n as Amici Curiae Supporting the Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551
(2005) (No. 03-633); Brief for the Coalition for Juvenile Justice as Amici Curiae Supporting
the Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633); Brief for the Constitu-
tion Project as Amici Curiae Supporting the Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551
(2005) (No. 03-633); Brief for the European Union et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting the
Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633) [hereinafter Brief for the
European Union]; Brief for Former U.S. Diplomats Morton Abramowitz et al. as Amici Cu-
riae Supporting the Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633); Brief
for the Human Rights Committee of the Bar of England and Wales et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting the Respondent, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633) [hereinafter Brief for England];
Brief for the Juvenile Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting the Respondent, Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633); Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educa-
tional Fund, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting the Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633); Brief for the National Legal Aid and Defender Ass'n as Amici
Curiae Supporting the Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633);
Brief for New York et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting the Respondent, Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633); Brief for President James Earl Carter, Jr. et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting the Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633);
Brief for the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops and Other Religious Organizations
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soning and beliefs, there was clearly one shared belief amongst them all: the
United States Supreme Court should prohibit the juvenile death penalty and
spare the juvenile defendant's life. 5 ' While this article does not address all
of the concerns included in the various amicus briefs, it will discuss some of
the international issues, which caused a great deal of controversy in the ac-
tual decision by the Supreme Court.
15 2
A. England and Wales
On July 15, 2004, England submitted a brief of amici curiae in support
of Simmons, urging the Court to prohibit the juvenile death penalty.'53 Eng-
land asserted that a prohibition against executing persons who were under the
age of eighteen at the time of committing a crime has now reached the status
of 'jus cogens, a peremptory norm of international law" which is beyond the
status of customary international law."5
England explained that international law is relevant in the United States
because "[f]rom the beginning, the laws of the United States have been in-
formed and shaped by laws and opinions of other members of the interna-
tional community. ' ' 155 This amici brief made note of the Founders influence
by international and social thought, as well as the Court's "recogni[tion of]
the relevance of international norms when considering the permissibility of
practices" under the Constitution. 56 International law has been particularly
relevant in determining the boundaries of the Eighth Amendment in defining
what punishments are "cruel and unusual."' 57 This amici brief asserted that
viewing "the evolving standard[s] of decency in an isolated and insular do-
mestic environment would be contrary to all that the drafters of the Constitu-
tion knew as essential to joining the ranks of nations."'58 Additionally, based
on the shared values and close relationship between the United States and the
United Kingdom, this amici brief asserted that the law and opinions of the
as Amici Curiae Supporting the Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No.
03-633).
151. See, e.g., Brief for England, supra note 150, at 3.
152. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 628 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that
"'[a]cknowledgment' of foreign approval has no place in the legal opinion of this Court").
153. Brief for England, supra note 150, at 3. Signatories to the brief included the Human
Rights Committee of the Bar of England and Wales, Human Rights Advocates, Human Rights
Watch, and the World Organization for Human Rights USA. Id. at 1.
154. Id. at 3.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 5-6.
157. Brief for England, supra note 150, at 6-7.
158. Id. at 7.
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United Kingdom are particularly relevant in the Court's evaluation of the
contours of the Eighth Amendment. 5 9 Since 1948, at a time when British
law still accepted the death penalty, statutory developments in England pro-
hibited the execution of persons under the age of eighteen at the time of the
offense. 0
Aside from British law, England asserted that the practice of executing
persons who were under the age of eighteen at the time of the commission of
the crime "has been rejected by every nation in the world except the United
States.' 6' Hence, the prohibition of such practice is now ajus cogens norm,
defined as "'a norm accepted and recognized by the international community
of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international
law having the same character. ' ' 162 England explained that a norm must
meet four requirements in order to be considered ajus cogens norm: "1) it is
general international law; 2) it is accepted by a large majority of states; 3) it
is immune from derogation; and 4) it has not been modified by a new norm
of the same status.' 63
This amici brief elucidated how each of these requirements has been
met. 164 First, general international law clearly prohibits the juvenile death
penalty, as evidenced by "[n]umerous treaties, declarations, and pronounce-
ments by international bodies, as well as the laws of the vast majority of na-
tions."'65 Second, the prohibition of the juvenile death penalty is accepted by
a large majority of states." This amici brief contended every country in the
world has ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child which prohibits
the juvenile death penalty, 67 except the United States and Somalia-"a coun-
try lacking a central government."'' 68 As to the third requirement for a jus
cogens norm, the prohibition against the juvenile death penalty is "non-
derogable," as explicitly expressed in the International Covenant, as well as
159. Id. at8.
160. Id. at 11.
161. Id. at 12.
162. ' Brief for England, supra note 150, at 13 (quoting Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, art. 53, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331).
163. Id.
164. See id. at 13-22.
165. Id. at 13.
166. Id. at 17.
167. Brief for England, supra note 150, at 18 (citing Convention on the Rights of the
Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, art. 37(a) (Nov. 20, 1989)).
168. Id. (citing The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Status of
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Annex I, delivered to the Economic and Social
Council, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/2001/"4 (Dec. 5, 2000)).
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evidenced by the laws and practices of other nations.69 Lastly, "[a]s to the..
. final requirement, there is no emerging norm that contradicts the current
norm. The prohibition of the juvenile death penalty enjoys near universal
acceptance."' 70
The counsel for amici concluded that the uniform international rejection
of the imposition of the death penalty on persons under the age of eighteen at
the time of the commission of the crime is "strong evidence" that such a
practice is inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment and, thus, should be
deemed cruel and unusual.' 7 ' This amici brief reprimanded the United
States, stressing that "[t]he United States cannot continue to demand compli-
ance with human rights principles and norms abroad while it refuses to apply
them in its own country."' 72 Yet these amici were not alone in their stance.
B. The European Union
On July 12, 2004, the European Union (EU) also submitted a brief of
amici curiae in support of Simmons.'73 The brief was filed on behalf of its
twenty-five Member States'74 and in the shared interest of Canada, the Coun-
cil of Europe, 7' Iceland, Liechtenstein, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, and
Switzerland.'76 The EU asserted that there is an international consensus
against imposing the death penalty upon offenders below the age of eight-
een. 177 Evidencing its argument, the EU relied upon "the practices of the
overwhelming majority of nations," international law and treaties, along with
international norms and standards. 178 As a threshold matter, the EU urged
that "'the views of the international community [are relevant] in determining
whether a [particular] punishment is cruel and unusual. ' 179
169. Id. at 22.
170. Id.
171. Id. at25.
172. Brief for England, supra note 150, at 25.
173. Brief for the European Union, supra note 150.
174. Id. at 1. The Member States include: Austria; Belgium; Cyprus; Czech Republic;
Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Ireland; Italy; Latvia;
Lithuania; Luxembourg; Malta; the Netherlands; Poland; Portugal; Slovakia; Slovenia; Spain;
Sweden; and the United Kingdom. Id.
175. Id. at 3. The Council of Europe is a political organization comprised of forty-six
countries, including twenty-one countries from Central and Eastern Europe. About the Coun-
cil of Europe, http://www.coe.int/T/e/Com/about_coel (last visited Apr. 2, 2006).
176. Brief for the European Union, supra note 150, at 3.
177. Id. at 6.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 7 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 n.31 (1988)).
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These amici found it significant that "[slince 1990, only eight countries
reportedly executed children: Iran (8), Saudi Arabia (1), Nigeria (1), the
Democratic Republic of Congo ("DRC") (1), Yemen (1), Pakistan (3), China
(1) and the United States (19)." '' ° These countries have either now abolished
the use of the juvenile death penalty, are in the process of doing so, or deny
that they have executed juvenile offenders.18 1 This amici brief concluded
that the United States presently "stands virtually alone among all the nations
of the world" in imposing the death sentence for offenses committed by indi-
viduals under the age of eighteen. 8 2
These amici also commented on the fact that a considerable number of
treatises, some of which have been signed or ratified by the United States,
prohibit the imposition of the death penalty for offenses committed by indi-
viduals below the age of eighteen. 183 The United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child (CRC),84 ratified by roughly 192 nations, "is the most
widely ratified human rights treaty in the world" and prohibits the imposition
of the death penalty on juveniles.' "The [United States] and Somalia are
the only two nations [in the world] that have not ratified the CRC," but both
countries have signed it, indicating an intent to ratify. 186 This amici brief
pointed to the Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties, an authoritative
guide on treaty procedure, which instructs that after signing a treaty and prior
to ratification, "a nation is oblig[ated] to 'refrain from acts which would de-
feat the object and purpose of the treaty. ' ' ' 87
Likewise, these amici pointed to Article 6(5) of the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which prohibits the imposition of
the death penalty upon juvenile offenders. 8 The United States "ratified [the
ICCPR] in 1992 with a reservation to Article 6(5), stating that 'the United
States reserves the right, subject to its Constitutional constraints, to impose"'
the death penalty upon juvenile offenders. 8 9 This reservation was made de-
180. Id. at 8-9.
181. See Brief for the European Union, supra note 150, at 9-11.
182. Id. at 11.
183. Id. at 12.
184. Convention of the Rights of the Child, supra note 162, at art. 37(a).
185. Brief for the European Union, supra note 150, at 12.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 12 (quoting Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 162, at art.
18).
188. Id. at 14. Article 6(5) of the ICCPR specifically states that a .'[s]entence of death
shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age."' Id.
(quoting International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6(5), adopted Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]).
189. Brief for the European Union, supra note 150, at 14.
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spite the fact that Article 4(2) of the ICCPR does not permit derogation from
Article 6 "even in times of public emergency, thus indicating that Article 6 is
seen to be inherent to the object and purpose of the ICCPR."' This amici
brief mentioned other agreements, such as the Arab Charter on Human
Rights,' 9' the American Convention on Human Rights, 192 and the Fourth Ge-
neva Conventions, 93 that also prohibit the imposition of the death penalty on
juvenile offenders. 94
Lastly, these amici found that "[i]nternational norms and standards
adopted by international bodies and organisations, including the United Na-
tions, further reflect the international consensus against the death penalty for
juvenile offenders."' 95 The counsel for these amici concluded that a national
consensus exists against the imposition of the death penalty upon individuals
below the age of eighteen, and the United States' position on this issue "is
out of step with the international community, [presenting] both legal and
diplomatic issues."'
196
V. THE DECISION: ROPER V. SIMMONS
A. The Majority
On March 1, 2005, the United States Supreme Court once again con-
fronted the issue of whether the execution of persons who were sixteen or
seventeen years of age at the time of the commission of the crime violates
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.' 97
190. Id. at 14-15; ICCPR, supra note 188, art. 4(2).
191. Brief for the European Union, supra note 150, at 18 (citing Arab Charter on Human
Rights, reprinted in 18 HUM. RTS. L.J. 151 (1997) [hereinafter Arab Charter]). The Arab
Charter on Human Rights states that the "[t]he death penalty shall not be inflicted on a person
under 18 years of age." Arab Charter, supra, at 152.
192. Brief for the European Union, supra note 150, at 19 (citing American Convention on
Human Rights art. 4(5), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Conven-
tion]). The American Convention on Human Rights provides that .'[clapital punishment shall
not be imposed upon persons who, at the time the crime was committed, were under 18 years
of age."' Id. at 19 (quoting American Convention, supra, art. 4(5)).
193. Id. at 21 (citing Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War art. 68, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion]). The Fourth Geneva Convention states in Article 68 that "'the death penalty may not be
pronounced against a protected person who was under eighteen years of age at the time of the
offence."' Id. (quoting Fourth Geneva Convention, supra, art. 68).
194. Id. at 18-21.
195. Brief for the European Union, supra note 150, at 21.
196. Id. at 26.
197. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,555-56 (2005).
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Justice Kennedy delivered the majority opinion of the Court, joined by Jus-
tices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.'98 The Court rendered its deci-
sion based on objective indicium, particularly relevant legislative enact-
ments, as well as an independent determination by the Court.' 99 Addition-
ally, the Court found confirmation from the opinion of the international
community.2"
Recognizing that the Eighth Amendment forbids excessive sanctions,
the Court reaffirmed "the necessity of referring to 'the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society' to determine which
punishments are so disproportionate as to be cruel and unusual."' ' In a 5-4
decision, the Court overruled Stanford, holding that society's standards have
changed since that decision and the evolving standards have changed to indi-
cate that the imposition of the death penalty on such individuals is forbidden
by the Eighth and the Fourteenth Amendments.2°2
The Court looked at objective indicium in determining that a national
consensus has formed since Stanford against the juvenile death penalty.2 3
Looking at the relevant legislative enactments, the Court relied heavily on
Atkins, outlining the similarities between the constitutionality of executing
the mentally retarded and executing juvenile offenders:
When Atkins was decided, 30 States prohibited the death penalty
for the mentally retarded. This number comprised 12 that had
abandoned the death penalty altogether, and 18 that maintained it
but excluded the mentally retarded from its reach. By a similar
calculation in this case, 30 States prohibit the juvenile death pen-
alty, comprising 12 that have rejected the death penalty altogether
and 18 that maintain it but, by express provision or judicial inter-
pretation, exclude juveniles from its reach. Atkins emphasized that
even in the 20 States without formal prohibition, the practice of
executing the mentally retarded was infrequent.
20 4
Similarly, the practice of executing juveniles is infrequent in the states
without a formal prohibition against such a practice.2 5 Since Stanford, only
198. Id. at 554.
199. Id. at 564.
200. Id. at 575.
201. Id. at 561 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
202. Roper, 543 U.S. at 574.
203. Id. at 564.
204. Id. (citations omitted).
205. Id.
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six states have imposed the death penalty on juvenile offenders.' ° Likewise,
only five states executed the mentally retarded since Penry v. Lynaugh, the
predecessor case to Atkins. °7
The Court noted that despite the striking similarities between the pre-
sent case and Atkins, there is at least one difference between the cases per-
taining to evidence of a national consensus.0 8 During the thirteen year pe-
riod between the decisions of Penry and Atkins, sixteen additional states pro-
hibited the practice of executing the mentally retarded.2°9 "[Tihe rate of abo-
lition of the death penalty for the mentally retarded" during this period was
significant.10
To the contrary, the rate of abolishing the juvenile death penalty has
been slower.2z In the fifteen intervening years since Stanford, only five ad-
ditional states have prohibited the juvenile death penalty, "four through legis-
lative enactments and one through judicial decision.212 The Court consid-
ered this change since Stanford significant, despite the "less dramatic"
change from Penry to Atkins, stressing that "'[i]t is not so much the number
of these States that is significant, but the consistency of the direction of
change.' '2 13 Since Stanford, there has been a consistent direction of change
against the juvenile death penalty-with no states reinstating it.2 14
The Court concluded that, similar to Atkins, looking at objective indicia
such as "the rejection of the juvenile death penalty in the majority of States;
the infrequency of its use even where it remains on the books; and the con-
sistency in the trend toward abolition of the practice" provides evidence of a
national consensus against executing such individuals.1 5
The Court also made its own independent evaluation of the constitu-
tionality of the juvenile death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.21 6 The
Court emphasized that "the death penalty is the most severe punishment,
[and therefore] the Eighth Amendment applies to it with special force.2 17
The imposition of the death penalty "must be limited to those offenders who
206. Id. at 564-65.
207. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564.
208. Id. at 565.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Roper, 543 U.S. at 565 (citations omitted).
213. Id. at 566 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002)).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 567.
216. See id. at 567-75.
217. Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 856 (1988)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment)).
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commit 'a narrow category of the most serious crimes' and whose extreme
culpability makes them 'the most deserving of execution.' 2,1 8 The Court
noted three differences between juveniles and adults that categorically re-
move juveniles from the classification of the worst offenders.2 9 First, juve-
niles tend to be less mature and more irresponsible than adults.220 States rec-
ognize this fact and, hence, prohibit juveniles from enjoying many privileges
that adults have such as "voting, serving on juries, or marrying without pa-
rental consent. '221 Secondly, "juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to
negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.
' 222
Lastly, because juveniles go through so many changes, their character "is not
as well formed as that of an adult. 22' 3 The Court found that "[t]hese differ-
ences render suspect any conclusion that a juvenile falls among the worst
offenders."224
The Court also concluded that the penological justifications for the
death penalty are not served with the same force when applied to juveniles.2 5
First, "[r]etribution is not proportional if the law's most severe penalty is
imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a
substantial degree, by reason of youth and immaturity.22 6 Second, "[a]s for
deterrence, it is unclear whether the death penalty has a significant or even
measurable deterrent effect on juveniles, as counsel for the petitioner ac-
knowledged at oral argument. '227 Even if the death penalty were to have a
deterrent effect on juveniles, the sanction of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole would also deter such persons, particularly juveniles
who have their entire life ahead of them. 228
The petitioner argued that even if juveniles in general have a diminished
level of culpability, a categorical bright-line rule barring the death penalty on
any juvenile offender "is both arbitrary and unnecessary.2 29 Petitioner as-
serted that jurors should decide if the death penalty is appropriate for juve-
nile offenders on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration mitigating
218. Id. (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319).
219. Id. at 569.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)).
223. Id. at 570.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 571.
226. Id.
227. Roper, 543 U.S. at 571.
228. See id. at 572.
229. Id.
[Vol. 30:3:473
162
Nova Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol30/iss3/1
ABOLITION OF THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY
factors related to youth.23" The Court disagreed with this argument, finding
that the task of deciding whether a juvenile should receive the death penalty
is too difficult of an inquiry for jurors.23 ' Even expert psychologists have
difficulty in distinguishing whether a juvenile offender acts due to his or her
immaturity or acts a result of his or her "irreparable corruption" of charac-
ter.232 However, the Court did acknowledge that a bright-line rule is not
flawless:
Drawing the line at 18 years of age is subject, of course, to the ob-
jections always raised against categorical rules. The qualities that
distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an indi-
vidual turns 18. By the same token, some under 18 have already
attained a level of maturity some adults will never reach ...
[H]owever, a line must be drawn.233
The Court found that drawing the line at eighteen is appropriate because this
is where society commonly marks the line between a child and an adult.
234
Based on its own determination, the Court concluded that due to the
diminished capacity of juveniles and the lack of penological justifications for
imposing the death penalty on such offenders, the death penalty is a dispro-
portionate punishment for juveniles.235  The Court pronounced "[w]hen a
juvenile offender commits a heinous crime, the State can exact forfeiture of
some of the most basic liberties, but the State cannot extinguish his life and
his potential to attain a mature understanding of his own humanity. 236
Lastly the Court pointed to "overwhelming weight of international opin-
ion against the juvenile death penalty. 237 The Court stated that "[t]he opin-
ion of the world community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide
respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions. 238  The
Court found confirmation that the death penalty is excessive punishment for
juveniles due to the fact "that the United States is the only country in the
world" that officially continues to carry out such a sanction. 23 9 Looking at
international treaties and practices prohibiting the juvenile death penalty, the
230. Id.
231. See id. at 573.
232. Roper, 543 U.S. at 573.
233. Id. at 574.
234. Id.
235. See id. at 567-74.
236. Id. at 573-74.
237. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 575.
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Court concluded that "it is fair to say that the United States now stands alone
in a world that has turned its face against the juvenile death penalty."2'
While looking at the international authority, the Court noted that the
United States Constitution still earns the highest respect, and its doctrines
remain essential to our national identity.24' The Court explained how looking
at an international opinion does not defy the Constitution: "[i]t does not
lessen our fidelity to the Constitution or our pride in its origins to acknowl-
edge that the express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other na-
tions and peoples simply underscores the centrality of those same rights
within our own heritage of freedom., 242 The Court emphasized that an inter-
national opinion is not controlling in the Court's Eighth Amendment inter-
pretation, however it is instructive.243
B. Justice Stevens, Concurring
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg
agreed with the majority opinion and emphasized that interpreting the Con-
stitution is not a static task:
Perhaps even more important than our specific holding today is our
reaffirmation of the basic principle that informs the Court's inter-
pretation of the Eighth Amendment. If the meaning of that
Amendment had been frozen when it was originally drafted, it
would impose no impediment to the execution of 7-year-old chil-
dren today. 244
Justice Stevens found it important for the Court to adjust its interpreta-
tion of the Eighth Amendment in accordance with the evolution of society.245
He postulated that if Alexander Hamilton were alive today, sitting with the
Court, he would also join the majority in its decision.2"
C. Justice O'Connor, Dissenting
Justice O'Connor dissented, contending that there was a lack of evi-
dence to support the Court's categorical prohibition against the juvenile
240. Id. at 577.
241. Id. at 578.
242. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
243. Id. at 575 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958)).
244. Id. at 587 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
245. See id.
246. Id.
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death penalty.247 Justice O'Connor asserted that neither the objective evi-
dence of a national consensus, nor the Court's independent assessment,
which she referred to as "the Court's moral proportionality analysis," sup-
ported this categorical prohibition.2" Finding that so little had changed since
the Court's decision in Stanford, Justice O'Connor pronounced that she
"would not substitute [the Court's] judgment about the moral propriety of
capital punishment for 17-year-old murderers for the judgments of the Na-
tion's legislatures," but would rather wait for a patent showing that society is
against such a practice before categorically forbidding it.249
Justice O'Connor pointed to the Court's decision in Thompson, in
which she concurred, acknowledging that a national consensus existed
against imposing the death penalty on fifteen-year-old offenders, but she
"declined to adopt that conclusion as a matter of constitutional law without
clearer evidentiary support. '  Yet again in the Court's decision of Stanford,
Justice O'Connor concurred with the Court's judgment that imposing the
death penalty on sixteen and seventeen-year-old offenders was not prohibited
by the Eighth Amendment."' Justice O'Connor concluded that there was not
a national consensus against such a practice and that the "proportionality
arguments," much the like the Court's arguments in Roper, "did not justify a
categorical Eighth Amendment rule against capital punishment of 16- and
17-year-old offenders. 252
Justice O'Connor agreed that the objective evidence presented in Roper
was similar to that presented in Atkins, but found that the evidence of a na-
tional consensus in Roper was weaker than the evidence in Atkins:
Most importantly, in Atkins there was significant evidence of op-
position to the execution of the mentally retarded, but there was
virtually no countervailing evidence of affirmative legislative sup-
port for this practice. The States that permitted such executions
did so only because they had not enacted any prohibitory legisla-
tion. Here, by contrast, at least eight States have current statutes
that specifically set 16 or 17 as the minimum age at which com-
247. Roper, 543 U.S. at 587-88 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 588.
250. Id. at 591 (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 849 (1988) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in judgment)).
251. Id. (citing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 381 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment)).
252. Roper, 543 U.S. at 592 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Stanford, 492 U.S. at 382
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
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mission of a capital crime can expose the offender to the death
penalty. 253
Justice O'Connor found it noteworthy that of the eight states that still permit-
ted the juvenile death penalty, five of these states had juvenile offenders on
death row and four of them had executed such offenders in the past fifteen
years.2 4 She pointed to the fact that there were over seventy juveniles on
death row at the time of the decision of Roper, adducing the actuality of
"continuing public support" for upholding the juvenile death penalty.1 5
Justice O'Connor also found that the proportionality argument against
the juvenile death penalty to be "so flawed that it can be given little, if any,
analytical weight., 256 She argued that the differences between a seventeen-
year-old and young adults are not clear "enough to justify a bright-line pro-
phylactic rule against capital punishment of the former., 257 She criticized the
line drawn by the Court to be "indefensibly arbitrary," claiming that it may
protect those juvenile "offenders who are mature enough to deserve the death
penalty., 258 Justice O'Connor found individualized sentencing by juries to
be more appropriate than a bright-line rule. 59 She pointed out that the Court
provided no evidence for its argument that sentencing juries cannot ascertain
the juvenile's level of maturity to give appropriate weight to mitigating fac-
tors, asserting that this task is no different than sentencing juries "giving
proper effect to any other qualitative capital sentencing factor."'
Justice O'Connor also criticized the Court for failing to admonish the
Supreme Court of Missouri for not following the precedent set out by the
United States Supreme Court in Stanford.26' She stated that "[b]y affirming
the lower court's judgment without so much as a slap on the hand, today's
decision threatens to invite frequent and disruptive reassessments of our
Eighth Amendment precedents. 262
253. Id. at 595-96 (citations omitted).
254. Id. (citing VICTOR L. STREIB, THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY TODAY: DEATH
SENTENCES AND EXECUTIONS FOR JUVENILE CRIMES, JANUARY 1, 1973 - DECEMBER 31, 2004, at
24-31 (2005), available at http://www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib/documents/
JuvDeathDec2004.pdf.
255. Id. at 596 (citing STREIB, supra note 254, at 11, 24-31).
256. Id. at 598.
257. Roper, 543 U.S. at 601 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
258. Id. at 601-02.
259. Id. at 602-03.
260. Id. at 603-04.
261. Id. at 593-94.
262. Roper, 543 U.S. at 594 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority on one issue: that foreign
and international law can be pertinent to Eighth Amendment evaluations.263
She stated that "the existence of an international consensus ... can serve to
confirm the reasonableness of a consonant and genuine American consen-
sus." 26 Because she did not find a genuine national consensus in this case,
however, she did not think that "the recent emergence of an otherwise global
consensus" could replace the lack of a national consensus against the juve-
nile death penalty.265
D. Justice Scalia, Dissenting
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas,
also dissented, arguing that not only was there a lack of evidence showing
the development of a national consensus against the juvenile death penalty,
but moreover they discredited the modern usage of the national consensus
test in general.266 Rather than using "the evolving standards of decency" to
determine what punishments are cruel and unusual, Justice Scalia would re-
fer to "the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment.2 67 Justice Scalia
also disagreed with the Court acting as a "sole arbiter of our Nation's moral
standards" in making an independent judgment on the issue, as well as taking
guidance from international opinions.26
Justice Scalia scrutinized the Court's evidence of a national consen-
sus.269 He criticized the majority for counting non-death penalty states to-
ward evidence of a national consensus against the imposition of the death
penalty on sixteen and seventeen-year-olds.27 ° Justice Scalia objected to the
relevancy of the twelve states that prohibit the death penalty in all cases be-
cause, in repealing the death penalty, the states did not consider the same
determinative factors decided by the Court with respect to juvenile offenders,
such as levels of culpability and maturity.271
Justice Scalia also took issue with the Court's reliance on the legislative
changes since Stanford.272 He did not find the fact that only four states since
Stanford have changed its laws to prohibit the juvenile death penalty signifi-
263. Id. at 604.
264. Id. at 605.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 607-11 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
267. Roper, 543 U.S. at 608 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
268. Id.
269. See id.
270. Id. at 610-11.
271. Id.
272. Roper, 543 U.S. at 613 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2006]
167
: Nova Law Review 30, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2006
NOVA LAWREVIEW
cant enough for the Court to take the matter out of the legislature's hands.273
Scalia contended that "[w]ords have no meaning if the views of less than
50% of death penalty States can constitute a national consensus. '274
In addition to disagreeing with the evidence of a national consensus,
Justice Scalia did not find it appropriate that the Court exercised its own in-
dependent judgment in coming to the conclusion that the death penalty is an
inappropriate punishment for all juveniles. 75 Justice Scalia objected "to sup-
plant[ing] the consensus of the American people with the Justices' views"
asserting "that it has no foundation in law or logic. '276 Justice Scalia found
the Court's role in evaluating the "evolving-standards" test is solely to de-
termine if a national moral consensus exists. 77 Justice Scalia posed the ques-
tion: "By what conceivable warrant can nine lawyers presume to be the au-
thoritative conscience of the Nation?
278
Justice Scalia further attacked the Court for exercising its own inde-
pendent judgment, stating that:
Today's opinion provides a perfect example of why judges are ill
equipped to make the type of legislative judgments the Court in-
sists on making here. To support its opinion that States should be
prohibited from imposing the death penalty on anyone who com-
mitted murder before age 18, the Court looks to scientific and so-
ciological studies, picking and choosing those that support its posi-
tion. It never explains why those particular studies are methodol-
ogically sound; none was ever entered into evidence or tested in an
adversarial proceeding.279
Justice Scalia observed that the Court "need not look far to find studies"
showing otherwise."' Justice Scalia also posited the fact that the legislatures
are in the best position to look at the results of statistical studies in light of
their own local conditions.28' Justice Scalia found it significant that even
looking at the studies cited by the Court, "[n]ot one ... opines that all indi-
viduals under 18 are unable to appreciate the nature of their crimes. 282
273. Id. at 613-14.
274. Id. at 609 (citation omitted).
275. Id. at 615-16.
276. Id.
277. Roper, 543 U.S. at 616 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
278. Id.
279. Id. at 616-17.
280. Id. at 617.
281. Id. at 618 (citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987)).
282. Roper, 543 U.S. at 618 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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He also disagreed with the Court's explanation for drawing the line at
eighteen years old.283 Justice Scalia found that "[s]erving on a jury or enter-
ing into marriage also involve[s] decisions far more sophisticated than the
simple decision not to take another's life.,, 284 Furthermore, Justice Scalia
established that, in imposing these types of age limitations, states make cate-
gorical determinations without looking at individual maturity levels.285 On
the other hand, he asserted that the criminal justice system "provides for in-
dividualized consideration of each defendant. 286
Justice Scalia also rejected the Court's use of international opinions in
its decision, denouncing that the "'[a]cknowledgment' of foreign approval
has no place in the legal opinion of this Court unless it is part of the basis for
the Court's judgment-which is surely what it parades as today. 2 7 Justice
Scalia explained that the fact that the President of the United States and the
Senate have not entered into treaties prohibiting the juvenile death penalty
only further evidences that the United States has not reached a national con-
sensus against it.
28
Justice Scalia also referred to the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child, explaining that it not only prohibits the juvenile death
penalty, but also prohibits life imprisonment of juveniles. 289 He pointed out
that if the United States is to remain consonant "with the international com-
munity, then the Court's reassurance that the death penalty is really not
needed, since 'the punishment of life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole is itself a severe sanction,' gives little comfort.
' 290
V. EFFECTS OF THE COURT'S RULING
A. Nationwide Effects
The United States Supreme Court's ruling in Roper spared seventy-two
juvenile offenders' lives nationwide by commuting their death sentences to
life imprisonment. 29' Thirteen states at the time of the decision had juveniles
283. See id. at 619.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 620.
286. Id.
287. Roper, 543 U.S. at 628 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
288. Id. at 622-23.
289. Id.; Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 167, at art. 37(a).
290. Roper, 543 U.S. at 623 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
291. Chris Tisch, Supreme Court Rules on Juvenile Death Penalty: Only Adults Can Face
Execution, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 2, 2005, at IA; see also STREi, supra note 254, at
11, 24-31.
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on death row: Texas (28); Alabama (13); Mississippi (5); Arizona (4); Lou-
isiana (4); North Carolina (4); Florida (3); South Carolina (3); Georgia (2);
Pennsylvania (2); Virginia (1); and Nevada (1).292 The decision had the ef-
fect of invalidating laws in twenty states that permitted the juvenile death
penalty.293
The implications of this ruling were immediately felt in Prince William
County, Virginia, where prosecuting attorney Paul Ebert was considering
trying Washington D.C. area sniper Lee Boyd Malvo on capital charges, but
stated that "in light of this decision, [he] will not do so."294 Malvo was sev-
enteen-years-old at the time of the shooting spree in 2002 and had already
been convicted and sentenced to life in prison for two of the ten murders. 295
Prosecutors were planning to try him in other jurisdictions in hopes of ob-
taining a death sentence. 2' Ebert criticized the Supreme Court's decision
stating that he personally believes "'you can't draw a bright line between a
17-year-old and an 18-year-old.' ' 297 In regards to Malvo's crimes, Ebert
thought they "were meticulously planned-not the negligent act of a mi-
nor."
298
The difficulty in drawing a bright-line rule was clearly illustrated in the
case of brothers Kevin and Tilmon Golphin.299 In 1997, the brothers robbed
a finance company in South Carolina, stole a car, and drove off on the inter-
state heading north.3" They were pulled over near Fayetteville, North Caro-
lina by Highway Patrol Trooper Ed Lowry who called for back up after real-
izing that they were driving a stolen vehicle.0 1 When Deputy David Hatch-
cock arrived, nineteen-year-old Tilmon Golphin shot both men with a semi-
automatic rifle, seriously wounding them.3" 'Then, as the men lay wounded,
the 17-year-old [Kevin Golphin] took Lowry's pistol and finished them off,
292. Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court Strikes Down Death Penalty for Juveniles, USA
TODAY, Mar. 2, 2005, at IA, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-
03-01 -scotus-juvenile_x.htm.
293. Id.
294. Mike M. Ahlers, Malvo Won't Stand Trial in Virginia Case, CNN.coM, Mar. 1, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/03/01/teen.sniper.
295. Id.
296. See id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Valerie Bauman, Age Ruling Lets Older Brother Die, Other Live: Narrow Gap Be-
tween Partners in Murder Highlights Cutoff Conflict, CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, Mar. 17, 2005,
at 6B.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
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shooting both officers to death at point-blank range. 3 °3 The brothers were
adjudged guilty of murder and were both sentenced to death.30, However,
the Court's ruling in Roper had the effect of releasing Kevin Golphin from
death row, while his brother Tilmon Golphin will remain there for essentially
the same crime.
305
Not all commentators favor this trend. Jordan Steiker, a death penalty
expert at the University of Texas law school, suggested that the decision may
lead to a judicial abolition of the death penalty in all cases.30 6 Steiker stated
that "'[the lasting significance of this case is that it opens the door to the
abolition of the death penalty judicially . . . . If a national consensus can
emerge without a majority of the death penalty states moving toward aboli-
tion, then it suggests that judicial abolition is a genuine prospect.' 30 7
B. Effects on Florida
Florida was one of the nineteen states that permitted the imposition of
the death penalty on juvenile offenders. 38 The ruling affected three juvenile
offenders on death row in Florida whose sentences will be reduced to life in
prison.309 Before 1994, Florida law allowed those facing life sentences to
have the possibility of parole after serving twenty-five years. 3'0 Two of the
three juvenile offenders formerly on death row in Florida committed their
crimes before a change in this law was made, so they may now become eli-
gible for parole.3 1
The two men are Cleo LeCroy, now forty-one-years-old, and James
Bonifay, now thirty-one-years-old.1 2 In 1986, LeCroy of Palm Beach
County was convicted for the murders of a young couple from Miami, John
303. Id.
304. Bauman, supra note 299.
305. See id.
306. Peter Franceschina, Juvenile Killers Spared Death, FT. LAUD. SUN SENT., Mar. 2,
2005, at IA.
307. Id.
308. Tisch, supra note 291; see also STREIB, supra note 254, at 24-31.
309. See Jackie Hallifax, Ruling Will Affect Florida's Death Row, TALL. DEM., Mar. 2,
2005, at A8.
310. Franceschina, supra note 306; see FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1) (1993), amended by FLA.
STAT. § 775.082(1) (1995). In 1993, section 775.082(1) of the Florida Statutes proscribed that
"[a] person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by life imprisonment
and shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for parole." Id.
311. Franceschina, supra note 306.
312. Id.
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and Gail Hardeman, who were camping near the Florida Everglades 31  In
1991, Bonifay misidentified Billy Wayne Coker, a clerk at an auto parts store
in Pensacola, Florida, for another clerk that allegedly caused Bonifay's
cousin to get fired.314 Coker, the victim, had "pleaded for his life on behalf
of his wife and two children" before he died.31 5 "But... Bonifay told Coker
to 'shut up' and fired two [deadly] shots into his head. 31 6
Twenty-seven-year-old Nathan Ramirez was also on death row for a
crime committed as a juvenile and will no longer be executed, despite the
fact that two juries decided Ramirez should receive the death penalty. 317
However, Ramirez will be incarcerated for the rest of his life without the
possibility of parole because he committed the crime after the change of law
in Florida.18 In 1995, Ramirez and a friend broke into the home of seventy-
one-year-old widow Mildred Boroski to steal her birthday presents in Pasco
County, Florida.319 They beat her miniature poodle to death with a crow
bar.32  "Then they tied up the 71-year-old woman with telephone cords,
raped her and drove her to a grassy field, where they shot her twice in the
head with her late husband's .38-caliber revolver., 32' As a result of the bur-
glary, Ramirez and his friend stole "two guns, a pair of handcuffs, a ring, a
cordless phone and about $30, which the teenagers used to play video games
the next day. ' '322
VI. CONCLUSION
Our living document, the United States Constitution, is a symphony of
words that harmonize the collective conscience of our forbearers. This mas-
terpiece is dynamic and evolving in its performance, reflecting the prevailing
313. Scott Hiaasen, U.S. Supreme Court: Justices: States Can't Execute Juveniles, MIAMI
HERALD, Mar. 2, 2005, at Al.
314. Amber Bollman, Convicted in 1991 Murder, Parole Now Possible for Bonifay,
PENSACOLA NEws J., Mar. 2, 2005, at 4A.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Bridget Hall Grumet, Pasco Killer Might Escape Death Row, ST. PETE. TIMEs, Mar.
2,2005, at 1.
318. Franceschina, supra note 306; compare FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1) (1993) (prescribing
that "[a] person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by life impris-
onment and shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for pa-
role"), with FLA. STAT. § 775.082(1) (1995) (prescribing that a person punished by life impris-
onment shall be ineligible for parole).
319. Grumet, supra note 317.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
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wisdom of the day. No one person has the hand of change, but many have
fingerprints on the documents used as a basis for rulings to be rendered.
In Roper, the legal system of the United States addressed a topic
wrought with controversy of a multi-faceted nature.323 The concept of exe-
cuting persons for capital crimes they committed as juveniles merited con-
sideration at the highest level, presenting a quandary to the United States
Supreme Court that legal, moral, and religious beliefs do not always coin-
cide. When the "hands of change" were counted, the majority ruled by a 5-4
decision that capital punishment of juveniles violates the Eighth Amend-
ment's ban against "cruel and unusual" punishment. 24
The decision's significance goes beyond abolishing the juvenile death
penalty; it subjects the Eight Amendment's "cruel and unusual" punishments
clause to interpretation by the Justices based on their own subjective views.
In the progeny of case law since Thompson, the Court has slowly veered
away from the objective national consensus analysis of looking at the states
legislative enactments to decide the constitutionality of a particular punish-
ment. Instead, they have created leeway for Justices to instill their own be-
liefs as to what punishments are "cruel and unusual," supported by scientific
studies that endorse their individual views. As Justice Scalia noted in his
dissent, there is nothing in the law that allows the Justices "to supplant the
consensus of the American people" with their own personal views.325
Many question whether a categorical bright-line rule was appropriate
here. With the sad reality that juveniles kill, the questions become: What is
the proper punishment for these juvenile murderers? Should our laws as-
sume that no juvenile can act with the same level of culpability as that of an
adult and hence the death penalty is not appropriate for all juveniles? They
should not. The relationship between chronological age and levels of culpa-
bility is tenuous. There is serious doubt over whether one is less culpable at
the age of seventeen years and 364 days as compared to the day he or she
turns eighteen.
The majority is correct that a line must be drawn. However, the line
was drawn correctly in the Court's decision of Thompson, prohibiting the
death penalty on those under the age of sixteen.326 This left the decision-of
whether sixteen and seventeen year olds should be executed-to juries based
on case-by-case examinations of individual defendants in the states that per-
mitted the juvenile death penalty. This line was drawn correctly because
there was a clear national consensus of support.
323. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 616 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
324. Id. at 578-79 (majority opinion).
325. Id. at 615 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
326. Thomson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988).
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The ruling in Roper has left many wondering what the role of interna-
tional opinion serves in our country's legal system. What did the majority
mean by stating that the international opinion provided "confirmation" of its
decision? It is difficult to see where international opinion fits into the in-
quiry of a national consensus. If we change this test to an international con-
sensus, we may find ourselves on a slippery slope, considering the fact that
many of the countries the Court looked to for "confirmation" forbid life im-
prisonment for juveniles and prohibit the death penalty in all cases.327
If the ruling does not stand the test of time, relief will be delivered by
the merits of each case as it progresses through the system. If one day in age
can be the difference between facing capital punishment or life imprison-
ment, the rigidity of this line is arbitrary and bound to produce injustice.
327. See, e.g., Brief for the European Union, supra note 150, at 1, 13.
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